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ABSTRACT
This study examines the role that paternalism plays 
in the exercise and vindication of the rights of the 
child.
This study demonstrates that paternalism plays a 
determining role in the exercise and vindication of the 
rights of the child. The study shows that this 
paternalism was originally inherent in judicial law­
making, deployed as a consequence of the importance of 
parens patriae to the constitutional and administrative 
framework of the State.
The thesis analyses the judicial role in proceedings 
involving the rights of the child in Ireland, England, 
the United States and to a lesser extent Canada. The 
thesis demonstrates that the judicial role has a dual 
function. First, the judge must protect the integrity of 
the family unit to which a child is born. Second, the 
judge is the protector and vindicator of the child's 
rights.
Chapter 1 outlines the rights model and the concept 
of parens patriae. This chapter also constructs the 
welfare model regulating the relationships between the 
child, parents and the State. This chapter shows that the 
judiciary have developed the welfare model in which they 
are the dominant actors. In chapter 2 the relevant 
literature is discussed and analysed. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
prove that judicial paternalism plays a determining role 
in proceedings concerned with the exercise and 
vindication of the rights of the child in the health 
care, education and juvenile justice systems. Chapter 6 
contains the conclusions to this study and provides 
suggestions for reform.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that an optimal 
model of child law must reiterate the concept of parens 
patriae shorn of its inappropriate paternalistic 
accretions.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, AND MODELS
1.0. Purpose and method of study
Evidence is presented in this study that the common 
law world formerly reflected society's view that children 
were property.1 This view, the thesis argues, has been 
supplanted by a received paradigm of children as objects 
of concern, and more recently as rights holders.2 Were 
this simplistic paradigm to be accepted, it might be 
expected that there is no room for paternalism in legal 
proceedings involving the rights of the child.
The study distinguishes between paternalism and the 
conscientious process of vindication of children's 
rights. The vindication of a child's rights requires a 
vindicator, be that the parents or the State in its guise 
as parens patriae.
The thesis commences with the rights model that 
requires safeguards to protect a child's rights when 
paternalism is introduced. This model views impartiality 
as fundamental to the exercise of judicial function. 
However, the function of a judge in proceedings involving
1 Ireland: In The People (Attorney General) v. Edge [1943] 
I. R . 115 at 147 per Black J. who held that early laws relating 
to children were concerned with feudal and proprietorial rights 
and very little about parents' feelings or children's welfare.
2 Canada: In Racine v. Woods (1983) 1 D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 
2 02, Wilson J. in the Supreme Court stated that the law no longer 
treats children as the property of parents. In P.(D.) v. S.(C.)
(1993) 108 D.L.R. (4th) 287 at 298, L'Heureux Dube J. in the
Supreme Court expressed similar sentiments.
1
the child's constitutional rights is to determine the 
child's best interests. The judge will ensure that the 
child's rights are exercised and vindicated accordingly. 
The danger is that this quasi-paternal role is performed 
in a way which interferes with a child's rights and 
ignores the child's principle of self-determination. This 
danger can be averted in three ways. First, the scope of 
best interests is curtailed with a greater understanding 
of children, child development and child-parent 
relationship. Second, the court must consider and give 
weight to the views of the child, depending on the 
child's understanding and competence. Third, the court 
cannot restrict or interfere with the exercise of the 
rights of a child who is competent to exercise his or her 
rights.
The study reveals that paternalism still plays the 
predominant role in the exercise and vindication of the 
rights of the child in Ireland and other common law 
jurisdictions. The study demonstrates that there are 
three reasons why paternalism plays such an important 
role.
First, judges do respect the integrity of the family 
units into which children are born. Judges uphold the 
parental right to raise and educate their children. The 
child's right to reach his or her potential and principle 
of self-determination is jeopardised by the judicial 
deference to parental decision making.
Second, judges act in a paternalistic manner, when
2
the judges exercises the parens patriae role of the 
State. The judges view themselves as protectors of the 
child's rights and as having a quasi-parental role.
Third, the judges are obliged to act in the child's 
best interests when protecting and vindicating the 
child's rights. The judges protect the child's welfare as 
distinct from respecting a competent child's exercise of 
rights.
The method employed in this thesis is to analyse 
judgments from Ireland, England, United States and, to a 
lesser extent, Canada.3 This analysis demonstrates the 
employment of paternalism as a judicial technique in 
proceedings involving the child's rights. This approach 
is inimical to the concept of autonomous rights.
Chapter 1 commences with an outline of the welfare 
model, the rights model and the concept of parens 
patriae. This Chapter constructs the welfare model that 
regulates the relationships between the child, parents 
and the State. The Chapter describes the welfare model, 
emphasising the judiciary's dominant role in defining the 
actors and principles of this model. The relevant 
literature is discussed and analysed in Chapter 2. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus respectively on decisions of 
the courts affecting children in the health care, 
education and juvenile justice systems These decisions 
demonstrate the influential role that judicial
3 The legal systems of the United States and Canada are 
federal. Therefore, I limited my research to decisions of the 
United States and Canadian Supreme Courts.
3
paternalism plays in contemporary proceedings involving 
the rights of the child. Chapter 6 contains suggestions 
for reform in the judicial approach in such cases in 
order to prevent paternalism.
1.1. Definitions
Society has seen radical changes in the concepts of 
the child, the parent and the State in the last two 
centuries.
1.1.0. Child
There are three features to the law's definition of 
a child. First, a child is a person who has yet to attain 
the chronological age of majority.4 This is 18 in most 
common law jurisdictions and in all of the jurisdictions 
surveyed in this thesis.5 Second, a child suffers from 
the legal disability of infancy. This prevents inter alia 
a child from exercising the rights, freedoms and 
privileges of adults.6 Third, the relationship to a
4 A child can acquire the status of an adult prior to the 
age of majority on certain events, such as marriage, parenthood 
and enlisting in the armed forces. England: In R . v . The 
Inhabitants of Lvtchet Matraverse (1827) 7 B. & C. 226, 108 E.R. 
707 at 232, 710 Bayley J. held that a father's authority over his 
child usually exists until the child reaches 21. However, this 
will not occur when a child enlists in the armed forces. The 
effect of enlistment is that the child becomes bound to serve the 
State. Enlistment severs the child from his family and the child 
becomes subject to the paramount control of the State. Ireland: 
In G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 70-71 per Walsh J. who 
held that a child may cease to become a member of a family when 
the child no longer lives with his or her family by reason of age 
or maturity or the child establishes a family of his or her own.
5 Ireland: Age of Majority Act 1985, s. 2(2). England: 
Family Law Reform Act 1969, s. 1.
6 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 17 p. 464 where the 
disabilities of infancy were considered privileges as they 
prevented children from injuring themselves or their interests
4
child's carers must be considered.
These features do not encapsulate the concept of a 
child for the purpose of the rights model. There are 
three characteristics that define a child. First, a child 
is dependent on others for protection, food, shelter, 
education, and care. Second, a child is a person whose 
potential developing physical and intellectual capacities 
are required to be fostered and protected. Third, a child 
is a person whose intellectual competence to make 
decisions for himself or herself increases significantly 
during adolescence. Judicial paternalism results in undue 
weight being attached to the first two characteristics of 
a child and insufficient weight to the third.
1.1.1. Parent
The law defines a parent as the carer and guardian 
of a child. The word "parent" originates from the latin 
words "parens" and "parere", meaning to "bring forth". 
This definition identifies the relative recent function 
of parents: to raise and educate children. The twentieth 
century has seen radical changes that have altered 
society's view as to the people who may act as parents. 
Five factors can be identified.
First, the legal relationship between parent and 
child can be determined by the relationship between the 
child's parents. Historically, the common law wanted 
children to be cared for by parents who are married to
by unwise acts or omissions.
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each other.7 The law imposed a number of legal 
disabilities on a child whose parents were not married to 
each other.8 The Constitution of Ireland 1937 fosters the 
concept of the family based upon marriage by according it 
special status.9 There has been an increase in the number 
of children born to parents who are not married to each 
other and one parent families.10 The law has removed the
7 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 446 and p. 459; 
Bracton (1210-1268) Vol. 2 p. 31 and p. 187.
8 A child who was born to parents who were not married to 
each other was considered filius nullius (the son of no one) or 
filius populi (the son of the people) . Such a child suffered 
additional disadvantages to those of infancy. An illegitimate 
child could not be heir to anyone. An illegitimate child could 
only gain a surname by reputation and not by inheritance. 
England: In In Re Walker, Walker v. Lutyens [1897] 2 Ch. 238 at 
241 per Romer J. explained that a parent has no legal rights or 
duty to support his or her illegitimate child. Hill v. Crook 
(1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 265 at 276 per Lord Chelmsford, at 280 per 
Lord Colonsay and at 282 per Lord Cairns; Dorin v. Dorin (1875) 
L.R. 7 H.L. 568 at 574 per Lord Hatherley, at 576 per Lord 
0'Hagan and at 577 per Lord Selborne; In Re Bolton, Brown v. 
Bolton (1886) 31 Ch. D. 542 at 547 per Kay J. and at 551 per
Cotton L.J.; O'Loughlin v. Bellew [1906] 1 I.R. 487 at 491 per
Walker L.C.. In Dickinson v. North-Eastern Railway Co. ((1863) 
2 H. Sc C. 735 at 736 Pollock C.J. interpreted the term child in 
a statute as only applying to a legitimate child. However, in 
Woolwich Union v. Fulham Union [1906] 2 K.B. 240 at 246-247
Vaughan Williams L.J. held that the term can be interpreted as 
applying to an illegitimate child if this is more consistent with 
the purpose or object of the statute. Ireland: In Re M. (An
Infant) [1946] I.R. 334 at 341-342 per Gavan Duffy P.; O'B. v. 
S . [1984] I.R. 316 at 321 per Darcy J..
9 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.1. ; The 
State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtala [1966] I.R. 567 at 643 per
Walsh J. ; G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 54-55 per
O'Higgins C.J., at 70 per Walsh J. and at 86 per Henchy J.; The 
People (P.P.P.) v. J .T . (1988) 3 Frewen 141 at 157 per Walsh J..
10 United States: In Troxel v. Granville, unreported,
Supreme Court, 5 June, 2000 at 4-5 per O'Connor J. noting that 
28% of children in the United States are being raised by a single 
parent. Ireland: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 
Sc Central Statistics Office (2000) Ireland: North and South: A
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legal disabilities applying to children whose parents are 
not married to each other.11
Second, the law viewed the relationship of parent 
and child as one created by natural law.12 Parents were 
responsible for the care and protection of children. 
Parents could not surrender the duties and rights 
conferred by nature.13 However, biological parents may be
Statistical Profile Chap. 2 at 21 between 198 0 and 1998 the 
proportion of births outside marriage increased from 5% to 28% 
in the Republic of Ireland and from 6% to 28% in Northern 
Ireland.
11 Ireland: Status of Children Act 1987.
12 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 446; Ireland: 
Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.1. In The People 
(Attorney General) v. Edge [1943] I.R. 115 at 163 per Gavan Duffy 
J. who held that a father's authority has been described as a 
sacred thing and an authority to be sustained to the uttermost 
by human law. In North Western Health Board v. H.W. and C.W., 
unreported, High Court, McCracken J. , 27 October, 2000, at 12-13 
McCracken J. held that this constitutional provision was the 
nearest to accepting that there is a natural law in the 
theological sense. England: Ex Parte Hopkins (1732) 3 P. Wms.
152, 24 E.R. 1009 at 154, 1009; Ex Parte Pve (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 
140, 34 E.R. 271 at 153-154, 276 per Eldon L.C.; Hodgens v . 
Hodgens (1837) 4 Cl. & Fin. 323, 7 E.R. 124 at 375, 144 per Lord 
Wynford; In Re Meades, Minors (1870) 5 Ir. Eq. 98 at 103 per Lord 
O'Hagan L.C.; Bennet v. Bennet (1879) 10 Ch. D. 474 at 477-478
per Jessel M.R.; In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles (1883) 
24 Ch. D. 317 at 326-329 per Brett M.R. and 334-336 per Bowen 
L.J.; R. v. Barnardo [1891] 1 Q.B. 194 at 207 per Lord Esher
M.R. ; In Re Newton (Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 at 747-748 per
Lindley L.J.; In Re J.M. Carroll (an infant) [1931] 1 K.B. 317
at 353-354 per Slesser L.J..
13 Coke (1552-1634) 2 Inst. p. 97. England: Vansittart v.
Vansittart (1858) 2 De G. & J. 249, 44 E.R. 984 at 256, 987 per 
Chelmsford L.C. and at 259, 988 per Turner L.J.; In Re Violet
Nevin [1891] 2 Ch. 299 at 311-312 per Lindley L.J. and at 313 per 
Bowen L.J. who held that an antenuptial agreement as to 
children's religion was void; R . v . Barnardo [1891] 1 Q.B. 194
at 207 per Esher M.R.; In Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232 at 241 per 
Fitzgibbon L.J. and at 253 per Holmes L.J.. In Humphrvs v. Polak 
[1901] 2 K.B. 385 at 388-389 per Vaughan Williams L.J. and 3 89- 
390 per Stirling L.J. holding that an unmarried mother could not 
transfer her parental duty and rights to someone else by way of 
a private agreement; Besant v. Naravaniah (1914) 30 T.L.R. 560
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unavailable, unwilling or unable to perform this role. 
Alternative carers are needed. The law permits the 
displacement of the concept that parenthood may only 
arise through nature by providing processes through which 
parental rights and duties are conferred on people who 
have no biological connection with the child.14 This 
includes the appointment of testamentary guardians,15 the 
concept of in loco parentis,16 adoption,17 fosterage,18
at 562 per Lord Moulton; In Re J.M. Carroll (an infant) [1931] 
1 K.B. 317 at 356 per Slesser L.J.. Ireland In Re M. (An Infant) 
[1946] I.R. 334 at 345 per Gavan Duffy P.. Canada: In Re Baby
Duffell [1950] 4 D.L.R. 1 at 7-8 per Cartwright J.; In Re Agar
[1958] 11 D.L.R.(2nd) 721 at 724 per Locke J..
14 England: In In Re N. (Minors)(Parental Rights) [1974] 1 
All E.R. 126 at 130, Ormrod J. held that a person who is not a 
biological parent can only acquire parental rights through a 
legal process such as adoption, care proceedings and wardship. 
A step parent has no parental rights as a matter of status nor 
by reason of accepting children as children of his or her family.
15 England: Tenures Abolition Act 1660, s. 8 conferred upon 
the father for the first time a statutory right to appoint a 
testamentary guardian to his unmarried children. This 
testamentary guardian could take legal proceedings to recover 
custody of the child and for ravishment of the ward. Tenures 
Abolition Act 1660, s. 9 provided that the testamentary guardian 
was entitled to manage the child's property. An Act for taking 
away the Courts of Wards and Liveries, and Tenures in capite, and 
by Knights Service 1662, s. 6 allowed a father to appoint a 
guardian to children under the age of 21. This guardian could 
take legal proceedings to recover custody of the child and for 
ravishment of the ward. An Act for taking away the Courts of 
Wards and Liveries, and Tenures in capite, and by Knights Service 
1662, s. 7 allows the guardian to take for the use of the 
children the profits of lands and management of the child's 
personal estate until the child reached the age of 21.
16 Ireland: Waters v. Cruikshank [1967] I.R. 378 at 384-285 
per Kingsmill-Moore J.; Hollywood v. Cork Harbour Commissioners
[1992] 1 I.R. 457 at 465-466 per O'Hanlon J.. England: Ex Parte 
Pve (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 140, 34 E.R. 271 at 153-154, 276 per
Eldon L.C.; Powys v. Mansfield (1837) 3 Myl. & Cr. 359, 30 E.R. 
964 at 367-368, 967-968 per Cottenham L.C.; Savre v. Hughes
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and surrogacy contracts.19
Third, an individual has a right to determine and 
control his or her procreation.20 The State cannot 
dictate or prescribe the number of children a person 
might or should have.21 This is seen as a matter outside 
the control of positive law.
Fourth, society is growing in its acceptance of same
(1868) L.R. 5 Eq. 376 at 380 Sir John Stuart V.C.; Bennet v. 
Bennet (1879) 10 Ch. D. 474 at 477 per Jessel M.R. ; In Re Hamlet, 
Stephen v. Cunnigham (1888) 38 Ch. D. 183 at 190 per Kay J. .
Canada: In Chartier v. Chartier [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 540 at 552 
and 555-557 per Bastarche J. held that the law precludes a person 
who is acting in loco parentis to a child from unilaterally 
withdrawing from such a relationship. The court held that a court 
should consider the views of the child when determining whether 
a person was in loco parentis to a child.
17 Ireland: Adoption Act 1952, s. 24; England: Adoption of 
Children Act 1926, s. 5(1) . These statutes provide that an 
adoption terminates the relationship between the biological 
parent and child, and substitutes this with a legal tie between 
the adoptive parent and child.
18 Ireland: Child Care (Placement of Children in Foster
Care) Regulations 1995, Art. 3; Education Act 1998, s. 2(1)
defines a parent as including a child's biological parent,
adoptive parent, a foster parent, a guardian, or person acting 
in loco parentis. United States: In Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families 431 U.S. 816 (1977) at 842-847 per Brennan J.
considered the legal status of foster parents under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
America. Brennan J. decided that it was not necessary to
determine whether foster parents have a protected liberty 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
19 England: In A. v. C . (1978) 8 Fam. Law 170 at 170 per
Comyn J. took no cognisance of a surrogacy agreement. Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 accords legal validity to surrogacy
contracts in certain circumstances.
20 Ireland: McGee v. Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 at 313 
per Walsh J..
21 Ireland: In McGee v. Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 at 
313, Walsh J. held that the common good may require the 
maintenance or increase in the population. Walsh J. held that in 
such circumstances the State could take steps to hinder the use 
of birth control.
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sex relationships and the law in some countries confers 
parental rights and duties on same sex couples.
Five, there has been substantial scientific progress 
in reproductive medicine. Such techniques may use donated 
genetic material and the child may have no genetic link 
to his or her parents.22
Thus, the concept of a parent has moved from 
biologically created dependency and ownership to 
relationships not necessarily based in biology but 
societal and personal choice. However, this does not 
alter the function of a parent: to raise and educate the 
child.
1.1.2. State
A state is a sovereign political power or community. 
Originally, the State was one person, the sovereign. This 
person retained all powers to govern the people and the 
State. The concept of the State changed when there was a
devolvement of power from the sovereign to the organs of
the State: the executive, the parliament and the
judiciary. Parliament has delegated the State's
responsibility for children to organisations, such as 
health boards, local authorities or schools. However, the 
thesis does not consider these organisations' actions.
The thesis is restricted to considering the role of the 
judiciary in proceedings involving the rights of the 
child.
22 England: Human and Embryology Act 1990. s. 27, s. 28 and
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1.1.3. Right
A right is that to which a person has a lawful and
just claim. Parents and children have rights in the
welfare model and rights. However, the nature and purpose 
of the rights of parents and those of the children differ 
significantly.
1.1.4. Duty
A duty is an act that is due by a legal or moral 
obligation. The parents and the State have duties to
children in the welfare model and the rights model.
1.1.5. Parens patriae23
One of the English sovereign's prerogatives was the
responsibility of caring for those citizens unable to
care for themselves - the parens patriae prerogative.24
This prerogative was defined in Eyre v. Countess of
Shaftesbury.25
[T]he King is bound of common right, and by 
the laws to defend his subjects, their goods 
and chattels, lands and tenements, and by 
the law of this realm, every loyal subject 
is taken to be within the King's protection,
23 This translates as: parent of his country. United States: 
In Fontain v. Ravenel 17 How. (U.S.) 393 (1855) at 384-395 per
McLean J. , the Supreme Court held that the parens patriae concept 
is no longer vested in the English sovereign but is vested in the 
States of the Union. Canada: Hepton v. Maat [1957] 10 D.L.R.(2nd) 
1 at 1-2 per Rand J.; (E.)(Mrs.) v. Eve [1986] 31 D.L.R.(4th) 1
at 16 per La Forest J. . Youncr v. Young [1993] 108 D.L.R. (4th) 193 
at 210 per L'Heureux Dube J.; Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. D.F.G. [1997] 156 D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 218 per 
Major J.. See (E.) (Mrs.) v. Eve [1986] 31 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 13-22 
per La Forest J. for a discussion of the evolution of the parens 
patriae prerogative.
24 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 17 p. 464.
25 England: (1722) 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 E.R. 659.
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for which reason it is, that idiots and 
lunatics, who are incapable to take care of 
themselves, are provided for by the King as 
pater patriae; and there is the same reason 
to extend this case to infants. Infants as 
well as idiots and lunatics, are said to be 
under the care and protection of the Crown, 
as persons equally unable to take care of 
themselves26
As this quotation demonstrates, this duty was owed 
primarily to persons of unsound mind27 and children,28 
who could not take care of themselves.29 The sovereign 
had a custodial jurisdiction over the child and in effect 
became the child's parent.30 This prerogative has been 
supplemented by constitutional31 and statutory intervention.32
26 England: ibid. at 118, 664.
27 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 8 p. 303. England: In
Beverley's Case (1603) 4 Co. Rep. 123b, 76 E.R. 1118 the court
discussed inter alia the responsibility of the sovereign to 
persons of unsound mind. Sheldon v. Fortescue Aland (1731) 3 P. 
Wms. 104, 24 E.R. 987 at 110-111, 989 per King L.C.; Oxenden v. 
Lord Compton (1793) 2 Ves. Jun. 69, 30 E.R. 527 at 70-72, 528 per 
Loughborough L .C ..
28 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical
treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 139-140 per Blayney J. .
England: Cary (Lord Falkland) v. Bertie (1696) 2 Vern. 333, 23
E.R. 814 at 342, 818 per Lord Somers; Eyre v. Countess of
Shaftesbury (1722) 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 E.R. 659 at 123-124, 666 per
Gilbert L.C.; In Re Grimes (1877) 11 Ir. Eq. 465 at 470 per Lord 
Chancellor; In Re X. (A Minor)(Wardship: Restriction on
Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 52 per Latey J. ; In Re F. (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 57 per Lord Brandon.
29 England: Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ. 1, 
38 E.R. 236 at 20, 243 per Eldon L.C..
30 England: In Beall v. Smith (1873) L.R. 9 Ch. 85 at 92 per 
Sir James L.J., holding that the Court of Chancery is by law the 
child's guardian but not the guardian of the person of unsound 
mind.
31 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5.
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The parens patriae prerogative may appear laudable 
and unselfish. However, the sovereign benefitted in three 
ways from this prerogative. First, the sovereign could 
manage the child's property. The sovereign used money 
raised from managing the property to care for the child33 
and retained some money for fulfilling the parens patriae 
prerogative. Second, the sovereign received loyalty and 
obedience from the citizens for performing this 
prerogative, in particular children whom the sovereign 
had protected.34 Third, the parens patriae prerogative 
grants to the State the ability to protect and foster its 
children: the State's future taxpayers, voters and 
stakeholders.35 It was to the advantage of the sovereign 
that children born in the sovereign's land should be 
cared for and educated.36
32 England: Poor Law Amendment Act 1868 allowed a child to 
be taken into care. F. v. Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council and 
another [1991] Fam. 69 at 87 per Purchas L.J.; Children Act 1989. 
Ireland: Child Care Act 1991.
33 England: Prerogativa Regis 1324; Sheldon v. Fortescue 
Aland (1731) 3 P. Wms. 104, 24 E.R. 987 at 110-111, 989 per King 
L.C.; Oxenden v. Lord Compton (1793) 2 Ves. Jun. 69, 30 E.R. 527 
at 70-72, 528 per Loughborough L.C..
34 England: Calvin's Case (1603) 7 Co. Rep. 2a, 77 E.R. 379 
at 4 (b)-5(a) , 382 ; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury (1722) 2 P.
Wms. 103, 24 E.R. 659 at 123-124, 666 per Gilbert L.C.
35 England: In Re X. (A Minor) (Wardship: Restriction on
Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 52 per Latey J. ; In Re C. (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)(No.2) [1990] Fam. 39 at 46
per Lord Donaldson M.R..
36 England: Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 43 E.R. 
534 at 344-345, 540-541 per Cranworth L.C.; J. v. C. [1970] A.C. 
668 at 693 per Lord Guest. Canada: King v. Low [1985] 16
D .L .R . (4th) 576 at 582 per McIntyre J..
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1.1.6. Paternalism
Paternalism is the exercise of overprotective 
authority over an individual's rights. Paternalism 
involves restricting a person's liberty when it is either 
for the promotion of the person's good or the prevention 
of harm to the person. Paternalism involves showing 
concern for the person and a presumption that one's 
judgment about what will promote the person's welfare is 
superior to that of the person concerned. The argument in 
favour of paternalism is that, if one can prevent people 
from harming themselves, there is no reason not to do so. 
An argument against paternalism is that it violates the 
right or principle of autonomy.37
1.2. Rights model
Rights have two functions. First, rights can protect 
individuals from the arbitrary use of State power, such 
as the rights to bodily integrity and liberty. The 
benefit of these rights is not dependent on the 
individual's intellectual competence. Paternalism 
involves care and protection. Paternalism may involve 
abrogating or denying an individual such a right in order 
to care for the individual.
Second, rights allow an individual to determine for 
himself or herself the person he or she wants to be. An 
inherent component of an individual right is the 
principle of autonomy: a competent adult can decide for 
himself or herself on the exercise of his or her rights,
37 Areneson (1998), Ten (1988) and Dworkin (1995).
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provided that such an exercise does not interfere with 
the rights of others. The principle of autonomy precludes 
interference with the exercise of rights by a competent 
adult, even where the majority of people may consider 
such an exercise as unwise.38 Paternalism involves care 
and protection. Paternalism restrains an unwise choice as 
to the exercise of rights. The concepts of autonomy and 
paternalism are incompatible.
The rights model must accommodate the fact that 
young children are by definition incompetent to exercise 
all or most of their rights.39 Parents decide on the 
exercise of the child's rights where the child is 
incompetent. There is a need to protect children against 
bad decisions of parents. This is achieved by requiring 
parents to act in the child's best interests when 
deciding on the exercise of the child's rights. The State 
must assume the role of decision maker where parents do 
not act in the child's best interests. The court is the
38 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical 
treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 124-125 per Hamilton
C.J. and at 156 and 164 per Denham J.. England: In Re F .
(Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 55 per
Lord Brandon and at 72-73 per Lord Goff; In Re T. (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95 at 102 per Lord 
Donaldson M.R., at 116 per Butler-Sloss L.J. and at 120 per 
Staughton L.J.; Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 
789 at 857 per Lord Keith and at 864 per Lord Goff. United 
States : Cruzan v. Director Missouri Department of Health
497 U.S. 261 (1990) at 269-270 Rehnquist C.J. reviewed the 
common law relating to the principle of autonomy; Vacco v. 
Quill, unreported, Supreme Court, 26 June, 1997 at 10 per 
Rehnquist C.J.. Canada: R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 44
D.L.R.(4th) 385 at 484-487 per Wilson J..
39 Canada: B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 42 per La 
Forest J..
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State body that is commonly asked to intervene on the 
State's behalf. The court must also act in the child's 
best interests when deciding on the exercise of a child's 
rights.
A child acquires intellectual competence as the 
child grows older and is able to make decisions for 
himself or herself. Greater weight must be given to the 
child's wishes, when parents or the court decide on the 
exercise of the child's rights as the child's 
intellectual competence evolves. Parents or the court 
lose the ability to decide on the exercise of the child's 
rights where the child has acquired the intellectual 
competence to exercise his or her rights.
1.3. Welfare model
In this thesis, the legal and regulatory framework 
in which the relationships between the child, the parents 
and the State exist are referred to as the welfare model. 
This model comprises interconnected rights and duties. As 
will be shown, one of the main differences between the 
rights model and the welfare model is that the welfare 
model contains a greater degree of unsupervised 
paternalism. This will be evidenced in each successive 
chapter by detailed consideration of the law on each 
topic.
It is contended that the parens patriae prerogative 
underlies the State's duty to protect and provide for the 
child in the welfare model, and particularly in the 
health, education and juvenile justice systems.
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1.3.0. Parens patriae jurisdiction of courts
The parens patriae prerogative, though inherent in 
the sovereign,40 was from earliest times delegated to the 
Lord Chancellor41.42 The earliest Lord Chancellor was 
appointed by Edward the Confessor (1042-1066) .43 The Lord 
Chancellor was in himself a combination of three 
functions, judicial, executive and legislative.44
Originally, the Lord Chancellor was a judge who sat 
on his own in the Court of Chancery. The Lord Chancellor 
was said to be the keeper of the King's conscience and as 
such could exercise an influence over the course of the 
law by the issue from his Chancery of a writ designed to 
correct grievances of which the common law could take no 
cognisance. Therefore, the Lord Chancellor acquired a
40 England: In Re X. (A Minor) (Wardship: Restriction on 
Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 52 per Latey J..
41 Heuston (1964) explains that the word "Chancellor" 
derives from "cancelli" or the lattice work screen behind 
which sat the clerks for the dispatch of clerical business 
in a court.
42 England: Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 43 
E.R. 534 at 344-345, 540-541 per Cranworth L .C .; In Re L. 
(An Infant) [1968] P. 119 at 156 per Lord Denning.
43 Heuston (1964) .
44 Schuster (1949) . Ireland had its own Lord 
Chancellor. The first Lord Chancellor of Ireland was 
appointed in 1219. See Smyth (1839) . Irish Free State 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1922, s. 2 abolished 
officers of State of the English administration, including 
Lord Chancellor of Ireland.
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special relation inter alia to wards of court.45
In 1540, the parens patriae prerogative in respect 
of wards with property was transferred from the Lord 
Chancellor to the Courts of Wards and Liveries.46 
Wardship was the mechanism through which the parens 
patriae prerogative was exercised.47 The Lord Chancellor 
retained jurisdiction for wards who were not profitable 
to the sovereign.48 When the Court of Wards and Liveries 
were abolished in 1660 , 49 the wardship jurisdiction 
should have disappeared.50 However, the wardship 
jurisdiction was retained as part of the Chancery Court's 
jurisdiction. The Lord Chancellor was the judge 
responsible for managing the Chancery Courts.51 The 
Chancery Courts justified the continued existence of the
45 Schuster (1949) .
46 England: Cary (Lord Falkland) v. Bertie (1696) 2
Vern. 333, 23 E.R. 814 at 342, 818; Morgan v. Dillon (1724) 
9 Mod. 135, 88 E.R. 361 at 139, 364.
47 England: In Re W. (Minors)(Wardship: Evidence)
[1990] 1 F.L.R. 203 at 211-212 per Butler-Sloss L.J..
48 England: Morgan v. Dillon (1724) 9 Mod. 135, 88 E.R.
361 at 139, 364 per West L.C..
49 England: Tenures Abolition Act 1660, s. 1; An Act
for taking away the Courts of Wards and Liveries, and
Tenures in capite, and by Knights Service 1662, s. 1.
50 England: Cary (Lord Falkland) v. Bertie (1696) 2
Vern. 333, 23 E.R. 814 at 342, 818.
51 England: In Butler v. Freeman (1756) Amb. 301, 27
E.R. 204 at 302-305, 204-206 per Hardwicke L.C. explaining 
that the Chancery Court's wardship jurisdiction enabled it 
to intervene to protect and benefit those incapable of 
protecting themselves.
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wardship jurisdiction as an aspect of the parens patriae 
prerogative.52 However, the Chancery Courts could 
exercise the parens patriae prerogative without making 
the child a ward of court. The parens patriae prerogative 
was used to protect children because of the particular 
legal status attaching to childhood.53 The Chancery 
Court's jurisdiction in relation to children owed its 
origins to the parens patriae prerogative of the 
sovereign to act as supreme parent and guardian of all 
children.54
The wardship jurisdiction was initially exercised by 
the Lord Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor, but was 
eventually delegated to all Chancery Court judges.55 The 
wardship jurisdiction survived the merger of the Chancery
52 England: Carv (Lord Falkland) v. Bertie (1696) 2
Vern. 333, 23 E.R. 814 at 342, 818 per Jefferies L.C.;
Morgan v. Dillon (1724) 9 Mod. 135, 88 E.R. 361 at 139, 364 
per West L .C ..
53 England: In Re Spence (1847) 2 Ph. 247, 41 E.R. 937 
at 252, 938 per Cottenham L.C.; Brown v. Collins (1883) 25 
Ch. D. 56 at 60-61 per Kay J . ; Barnardo v. McHugh [18 91]
A.C. 388 at 395 per Lord Halsbury; In Re Magees, Infants 
(1893) 31 L.R. Ir. 513 at 519 per Porter M.R.; In Re N. 
(Infants) [1967] 1 Ch. 512 at 530 per Stamp J.; In Re L. 
(An Infant) [1968] P. 119 at 156 per Lord Denning.
54 England: In Re Naish (A Minor) [1895] 1 I.R. 266 at 
2 69 per Porter M.R. explaining that the Lord Chancellor 
acted for the benefit of the child and the child alone.
55 England: In Wellesley v. Wellesley (1828) 2 Bligh
N.S. 124, 4 E.R. 1078 at 129-133, 1080-1081 Lord Redesdale 
holding that for a 150 years the Court of Chancery has 
assumed an authority with respect to the care of children. 
This derived from the parens patriae role of the sovereign. 
The court can apply the property of the children to 
maintain and educate the children during their minority.
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and Common Law Courts.56 The merger appointed the Lord 
Chancellor as President of the Chancery Division of the 
Irish High Court.57 The President of the Chancery 
Division controlled the wardship jurisdiction and the 
protection of children's property.58 The wardship 
jurisdiction survived the creation of the Irish Free 
State in 1922 and the 1937 Constitution,59 though doubt 
persists as to its compatibility with the Constitution.60 
The President of the Irish High Court can direct that any 
judge of the High Court may exercise this jurisdiction.61
56 Ireland: Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 
1877, s. 21 (1) .
57 Ireland: Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 
1877, s. 6 and s. 34 (1) .
58 Ireland: Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 
1877, s. 36(5). England: In Re Cunninghams, Infants [1915]
1 I.R. 380 at 3 84 per Molony L.J..
59 Ireland: In Re K. (A Ward of Court) , unreported, 
Supreme Court, 31 July, 2 000 at 3 per Keane C.J..
60 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 5. In 
Bvrne v. Ireland [1972] I.R. 241 at 274-275 per Walsh J. 
and Webb v. Ireland [1988] I.R. 353 at 382-384 per Finlay
C.J. and at 387-388 per Walsh J. who held that royal 
prerogatives were inconsistent with a sovereign, 
independent and democratic republic where the powers of 
government, legislative, executive and judicial derive from 
the people. In Eastern Health Board v. M.K. and M.K. [1999]
2 I.R. 99 at 117 per Barrington J. holding that the 
wardship jurisdiction exists in the State to the extent 
that it is not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
Ireland 1937. Barrington J. held that the concept of the 
sovereign as parens patriae has no place in a modern 
democratic republic.
61 Ireland: Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, 
s. 9; In Re D. [1987] I.R. 449 at 452-453 per Finlay C.J. 
and In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical 
treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 103 and 127 per
Hamilton C .J ..
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The jurisdiction can only be exercised where it is 
demonstrated that the parents' conduct is such that it is 
not merely better but clearly right for the welfare of 
the child in some very serious and important respect to 
require suspension or supersession of the parent's 
rights.62 The rights model requires the invocation of the 
court's jurisdiction where parents are not acting in the 
child's best interests. However, the welfare model 
requires parental misconduct before the State may 
intervene.63
The parens patriae jurisdiction is quasi-paternal.64 
The court acts in loco parentis as a wise and
62 Ireland: In Re Kinderslev [1944] I.R. Ill at 130-131 
per O'Byrne J. . England: In Re Fynn (1848) 2 De G. & Sm.
457, 64 E.R. 205 at 474-475, 212 per Knight-Bruce V.C.; R. 
v. Gvngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 242 per Lord Esher M.R.; In 
Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232 at 239-241 per Fitzgibbon L.J.; 
In Re Cunninghams, Infants [1915] 1 I.R. 380 at 383 per
Molony J. ; In Re Story [1916] 2 I.R. 328 at 351-352 per
Dodd J.; J. v. C. [1970] A.C. 668 at 694-697 per Lord 
Guest.
63 England: In Re Magees, Infants (1893) 31 L.R. Ir.
513 at 523 per Porter M.R..
64 Ireland: In Re K. (A Ward of Court) , unreported,
Supreme Court, 31 July, 2000 at 3 per Keane C.J.. England: 
In Re Gills, Minors (1891) 27 L.R. Ir. 129 at 135 per
Ashbourne L .C .; R. v. Gvngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 241-242 
per Lord Esher M.R. and at 248 per Kay L.J.; In Re Newton 
(Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 at 745 per Kay L.J.; In Re E.
(An Infant) [1956] Ch. 23 at 26 per Roxburgh J.; Andrew v.
Andrews and Sullivan [1958] P. 217 at 220 per Wrangham J.; 
In Re A. (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1995] 1 F.L.R. 767 at
768-769 per Hale J. .
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affectionate parent.65 In In Re J. (A Minor) (Wardship:
Medical Treatment)66 Balcombe L.J. held that when a court
is deciding what is in the ward's best interests :-
the court adopts the same attitude as a responsible 
parent would do, in the case of his or her own child; 
the court exercising the duties of the [s]overeign as 
parens patriae is not expected to adopt any higher or 
different standards than that which, viewed 
objectively, a reasonable and responsible parent would 
do.67
The judge must sanction any important step in the 
child's life.68 The court has power to deal with anything 
affecting the child's welfare including custody, care, 
control, protection of property, medical intervention, 
religious upbringing, education and protection against
65 England: R. v. Gvngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 241-242 
per Lord Esher M.R. and at 248 per Kay L.J.; In Re Story 
[1916] 2 I.R. 328 at 339 per Gibson J..
66 England: [1991] Fam. 33.
67 England: ibid. at 50. Ireland: In In Re a Ward of
Court (withholding medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R.
79 at 106 Hamilton C.J. approved of this approach.
68 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Edge
[1943] I.R. 115 at 140 per Geoghegan J. ; In Re a Ward of
Court (withholding medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R.
79 at 106, 117-118 and 127 per Hamilton C.J., at 143 per
Blayney J. and at 164 per Denham J.; Eastern Health Board 
v. M.K. and M.K. [1999] 2 I.R. 99 at 110 per Denham J. ;
Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877, s. 28(10). 
England: In Re Grimes (1877) 11 Ir. Eq. 465 at 471 per Lord 
Chancellor; In Re Magees. Infants (1893) 31 L.R. Ir. 513 at 
523 per Porter M.R.; In Re D. (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Sterilisation) [1976] Fam. 185 at 196 per Heilbron J.; In 
Re G.-U. (A Minor)(Wardship) [1984] F.L.R. 811 at 811-812 
per Balcombe J. ; In Re C. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical
Treatment) [1990] Fam. 26 at 32 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and 
at 38 per Balcombe L.J..
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potentially harmful relationships.69 The guiding 
principle for this jurisdiction was and is the welfare of 
the child.70
69 Ireland: medical treatment: In Re a Ward of Court
(withholding medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79; In
Re Gills, Minors (1891) 27 L.R. Ir. 129 at 134-135 per 
Ashbourne L.C.; In Re S. (An Infant) [1967] 1 W.L.R. 396 at 
407 per Cross J.; In Re Mohamed Arif (an infant) [1968] Ch. 
643 at 662 per Russell L.J.; In Re X. (A Minor)(Wardship: 
Restriction on Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 50 per Latey 
J.; In Re D. (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1976] Fam. 
185 at 196 per Heilbron J. ; In Re B. (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 at 1424 per
Templeman L.J. and Dunn L.J.; In Re C.B. (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Local Authority) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 379 at
3 8 7-388 per Ormrod L.J.; In Re S.W. (A Minor)(Wardship: 
Jurisdiction) [1986] 1 F.L.R. 24 at 27 per Sheldon J.; In
Re P. (A Minor) [1986] 1 F.L.R. 272 at 276-279 per Butler- 
Sloss J.; In Re C. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1990] Fam. 26 at 32 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and at 38 per 
Balcombe L.J.; In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical
Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33 at 40 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and 
at 4 9 per Balcombe L.J.; In Re C. (a baby) (1996) 32
B.M.L.R. 44 at 45 per Sir Stephen Brown P..
70 Ireland: Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 
1877, s. 28(10); In Re Kindersley [1944] I.R. Ill at 130- 
131 per O'Byrne J. ; In Re a Ward of Court (withholding 
medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 106 and 127
per Hamilton C.J.; Eastern Health Board v. M.K. and M.K.
[1999] 2 I.R. 99 at 110 per Denham J. and at 117 per
Blayney J.. England: Supreme Court of Judicature 1873, s. 
25 (10) . The rules of equity prevail where there was a 
conflict between equity and the common law. In Re McGrath 
[1893] 1 Ch. 143 at 148 per Lindley M.R.; R. v. Gvngall
[1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 242-243 per Lord Esher M.R. and at 248 
per Kay L.J.; In Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232 at 239-241 per 
Fitzgibbon L.J. and at 251 per Holmes L.J.; Ward v. Lavertv
[1925] A.C. 101 at 108 per Viscount Cave; In Re Thain
[1926] Ch. 676 at 689 per Lord Haworth M.R., at 690-691 per 
Warrington L.J. and at 691 per Sargant L.J.; In Re 
R. (M. ) (An Infant) [1966] 3 All E.R. 58 at 64-66 per Plowman 
J. ; J. v. C. [1970] A.C. 668 at 697 per Lord Guest and at 
720-721 per Lord Upjohn; In Re P. (A Minor) [1986] 1 F.L.R. 
272 at 279 and 281 per Butler-Sloss J.. United States: Lehr 
v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248 (1983) at 257-262 per Stevens J. 
speaking for the majority.
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The term "welfare" is interpreted broadly.71 The 
child's welfare is not the first and paramount 
consideration, where there is a competing public interest 
such as the freedom of the press72 or the administration 
of justice.73 The child's welfare is the first and 
paramount consideration, but not the only 
consideration.74 The court must consider the wishes of 
the parents75 and the child,76 where the child is of
71 England: In Re McGrath [1893] 1 Ch. 143 at 148 per 
Lindley M.R.; R. v. Gvngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 242-243
per Esher M.R. and at 248 per Kay L.J.; In Re O'Hara [1900] 
2 I.R. 232 at 254 per Holmes L.J.. Canada: King v. Low
[1985] 16 D.L.R.(4th) 576 at 581-582 and 587 per McIntyre
J. ; Young v . Young 108 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 231-234 per
L'Heureux Dube J..
72 England: In Re X. (A Minor) (Wardship: Restriction on 
Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 61 per Sir John Pennycuick; 
In Re M. and N. (Minors) (Wardship: Publication of
Information) [1990] Fam. 211 at 223-224 per Butler-Sloss 
L.J. and at 229 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re W. 
(Wardship: Discharge: Publicity) [1995] 2 F.L.R. 466 at
473-474 per Balcombe L.J. and at 475-476 per Waite L.J.. In 
these cases, the courts held that the ward's welfare is not 
the paramount consideration when balancing the ward's 
interests with those of the press. United States: Reno v . 
Flores 507 U.S. 292 (1993) at 303-305 per Scalia J.
speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court.
73 England: In S. v. McC. , W. v. W. [1972] A.C. 24 at 
43-45 per Lord Reid holding that the child's welfare is not 
the paramount consideration when a court is deciding 
whether to order a blood test for a child to determine 
paternity. The competing public interest is that justice 
requires relevant evidence to be available to a court.
74 Ireland: Eastern Health Board v. M.K. and M.K.
[1999] 2 I.R. 99 at 117 per Blayney J..
75 Ireland: In Re Westbv Minors(No.2) [1934] I.R. 311
at 322 per O'Sullivan P., 324-326 per Fitzgibbon L.J. and 
at 331 per Murnaghan J. . England: In Re P. (A Minor) [1986] 
1 F.L.R. 272 at 281 per Butler-Sloss J. ; In Re J. (A
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33 at 41
per Lord Donaldson M.R.. Canada: Hepton v. Maat [1957] 10
D.L.R.(2nd) 1 at 2 per Rand J..
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sufficient age and understanding to express these. The 
court attaches weight to the child's wishes depending on 
the child's competence.77 The greater the child's 
competence, the greater weight the court will attach to 
the child's own expression of his or her wishes.78 The 
court is not bound to give effect to the wishes of the 
parents or the child. The court may override these wishes 
where the wishes conflict with the child's best 
interests.79
The parens patriae jurisdiction extends as far as is 
necessary to protect the child's welfare. The court may
76 England: In Re Grimes (1877) 11 Ir. Eq. 465 at 471- 
472 per Lord Chancellor; R. v. Gyngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 
245 per Lord Esher M.R.; In Re Story [1916] 2 I.R. 328 at 
344-45 per Gibson J.; In Re P. (A Minor) [1986] 1 F.L.R.
272 at 279 per Butler-Sloss J..
77 Ireland: Child Care Act 1991, s. 3(2) (b) (ii) and s. 
24 (b) require the health boards and courts to give due 
consideration to the child's wishes, having regard to that 
child's age and understanding. England: Dawson v. Jay
(1854) 3 De G. M. & G. 764, 43 E.R. 300 at 772, 304 per
Cranworth L.C.; R. v. Gynqall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 245-246 
per Lord Esher M.R.; In Re S. (An Infant) [1967] 1 W.L.R.
396 .
78 England: In Re Manda [1993] Fam. 183 at 195 per
Balcombe L.J.. Canada: Eaton v. Brant County Board of
Education [1997] 142 D.L.R.(4th) 385 at 410 per Sopinka J..
79 England: In Re P. (A Minor) [1986] 1 F.L.R. 272 at
279 per Butler-Sloss J. ; In Re C. (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1990] Fam. 39 at 4 6 per Lord Donaldson 
M . R . ; In Re J. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1991] Fam. 33 at 41 per Lord Donaldson M.R.. Canada:
B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto
[1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 42 per La Forest J. and at 87
per Iaccobucci J., Cory J. and Major J.; Winnipeg Child and 
Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G. [1997] 152
D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 218 per Major J..
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make orders against third parties,80 including orders 
prohibiting the media publishing information about the 
child81 or against a Minister of the Government to 
provide services necessary to vindicate the rights of a 
child with special needs.82
The welfare model ascribes to the jurisdiction 
unbounded limits.83 Yet the rights model requires that 
the jurisdiction must be exercised carefully and within 
limits.84 These limits are that a court should not cause
80 England: In Re C. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical
Treatment) (No. 2) [1990] Fam. 39 at 46 per Lord Donaldson
M.R. and at 51 per Balcombe L.J..
81 England: In Re M. and N. (Minors)(Wardship: 
Publication of Information) [1990] Fam. 211 at 223-225 per 
Butler-Sloss L.J..
82 Ireland: D.B. v. Minister for Justice [1999] 1 I.R. 
29 at 40-43 per Kelly J. ; T.D. v. Minister for Education 
and Ireland, unreported, High Court, at 1-2 per Kelly J., 
ex-tempore, 4 December, 1998; T.D. v. Minister for 
Education [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 321 at 339-342 per Kelly J.;
D.H. v. Ireland, unreported, High Court, at 9-11 per Kelly 
J. , 23 May, 2000. In these cases, the High Court issued a 
mandatory injunction against the Minister requiring the 
Minister to provide facilities for children with special 
needs. These cases can be seen as a dispute between two 
organs of the State as to satisfying the parens patriae 
duty of the State.
83 England: Wellesley v. Wellesley (1828) 2 Bligh N.S. 
124, 4 E.R. 1078 at 136, 1083 Lord Redesdale holding that 
the jurisdiction extends to the case of a child as far as 
necessary for that child's protection and education; In Re 
X. (A Minor)(Wardship: Restriction on Publication) [1975] 
Fam. 47 at 50-51 per Latey J.; In Re J. (A Minor)(Child in 
Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 at 29 per Balcombe 
L.J.. Canada: Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v. D.F.G. [1997] 152 D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 218 per Major 
J. .
84 England: In Re X. (A Minor) (Wardship: Restriction on 
Publication) [1975] Fam. 47 at 58-59 per Lord Denning M.R., 
60-61 per Roskill L.J. and at 61 per Sir John Pennycuick; 
In Re D. (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1976] Fam. 185 
at 193-194 per Heilbron J.; In Re J. (A Minor) (Child in
26
irreversible or permanent damage to the rights of the 
child thereby denying the child the ability to exercise 
these rights as an adult. The court's guiding principle 
should be to prevent damage being done to the child's 
welfare and rights.85 The court will choose the course 
that will best provide for healthy growth, development 
and education of the child so that the child will be 
equipped to face the problems of life as an adult.86
The purpose of the jurisdiction is to ascertain what 
is in the child's best interests. The court's special 
paternal jurisdiction is inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial.87 These proceedings cannot be considered as 
the administration of justice as with a lis inter
Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 at 29 per Balcombe 
L.J.. Canada: (E.)(Mrs.) v. Eve [1986] 31 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at
2 9 per La Forest J..
85 England: Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2
Russ. 1, 38 E.R. 236 at 18, 242 per Eldon L.C. explaining 
that the court's guiding principle is to prevent damage 
being done to a child and avoid causing damage to a child 
that cannot be repaired. Canada: (E. ) (Mrs. ) v. Eve [1986]
31 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 30 per La Forest J..
86 Canada: King v. Low [1985] 16 D.L.R. (4th) 576 at
581-582 per McIntyre J..
37 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical 
treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 144-145 per Blayney
J .; A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460 
at 4 71 per Geoghegan J. ; In Re K. (A Ward of Court) . 
unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July, 2 000 at 3 per Keane
C.J.. England: Scott v. Scott [1913] A.C. 417 at 482-483 
per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline; In Re K. (Infants) [1965] 
A.C. 201 at 238-241 per Lord Devlin; In Re E . (S .A. ) (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Court's Duty) [1984] 1 W.L.R. 156 at 158- 
15 9 per Lord Scarman.
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partes.88 The child's interests may not be served by 
relying on the submissions, evidence and course of action 
pleaded for by the parties to the proceedings.89 The 
court may of its own motion, direct such inquiries and 
examinations as it might think fit.90 The courts have 
modified the adversarial rules of evidence that may 
exclude relevant evidence as to the child's welfare, such 
as the rule against hearsay.91 In addition, proceedings 
are heard in camera.92 The court is inquiring into the 
life of the child and family. This task is better 
achieved where the proceedings are heard in private.93
This role is at odds with the common understanding
88 Ireland: In The State (D. and D.) v. Groarke [1990] 
1 I.R. 305 at 319 Finlay C.J. held that an application 
relating to a child's welfare is not a lis inter partes; In 
Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment)(No.2)
[1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 144-145 per Blayney J. ; In Re K. (A 
Ward of Court), unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July, 2000 at 
3 per Keane C.J..
89 England: In Re E. (S.A.)(A Minor)(Wardship: Court's 
Duty) [1984] 1 W.L.R. 156 at 158-159 per Lord Scarman.
90 England: In Re Birch (1892) 29 L. R. Ir. 274 at 275
per Lord Ashbourne L .C .; In Re A. (Wardship: Jurisdiction) 
[1995] 1 F.L.R. 767 at 769 per Hale J..
91 Ireland: Eastern Health Board v. M.K. and M.K.
[1999] 2 I.R. 99 at 108-113 per Denham J.. These judicial 
modifications have been replaced by statutory
modifications: Children Act 1997, s. 23, s. 24 and s. 25.
England: In Re K.(Infants) [1965] A.C. 201 at 242 per Lord 
Devlin; In Re W. (Minors)(Wardship: Evidence) [1990] 1
F.L.R. 203 at 213 per Butler-Sloss L.J and at 227 per Neill 
L. J. .
92 Ireland: Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, 
s. 45(1) (c) . England: Scott v. Scott [1913] A.C. 417 at 
482-483 per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline.
93 England: R. (Mrs) v. Central Independent Television 
pic [1994] Fam. 192 at 207 per Waite L.J..
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of an independent and impartial judge in adversarial 
proceedings who is disinterested with the outcome. The 
judge has an interest in proceedings relating to 
children. The judge has a proactive role in protecting 
and promoting the child's welfare. This role may explain 
why children are not afforded separate legal 
representation in proceedings.94 The judge advocates for 
the rights and interests of the child. There is no need 
for another individual to perform this role. However, the 
special role of the judge does not relieve the judge of 
the responsibility to act in an independent and impartial 
manner.95
Although the parens patriae jurisdiction was 
exercised through wardship, it has been adopted in all 
proceedings involving the welfare and rights of a child.
1.3.1. Duties and rights of parents
Originally, parental rights rested with the father 
when the father was married to the child's mother. Under 
Roman law, a paterfamilias could kill his wife and
94 In M.F. v. Superintendent, Ballvmun Garda Station. 
John Rvnne and Eastern Health Board (Notice Parties) [1991] 
1 I.R. 189 at 200 per O'Flaherty J. holding that 
proceedings concerned with the care and custody of children 
and the protection of their rights are in a special and, 
possibly, unique category. The proceedings are special 
because they concern children and are possibly unique in 
that the fundamental rights of persons are in issue in 
litigation in which they are not represented.
95 England: R. v. Gvnqall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 242 per 
Lord Esher M.R. holding that a judge exercising the 
jurisdiction must act judicially. Scott v. Scott [1913] 
A.C. 417 at 437 per Viscount Haldane L.C.; In Re K.
(Infants) [1965] A.C. 201 at 217-218 per Lord Evershed and 
at 238-241 per Lord Devlin.
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children with impunity.96 In England, though the common 
law penalised a parent who killed a child, the common law 
allowed a child to be treated as a source of labour. A 
father could sell the child's services by apprenticing 
the child.97 The common law considered the relationship 
between a father and child as akin to that of master and 
servant. The father had a proprietorial right to the 
custody of his child which could be enforced by the writ 
"per quod servitium amisit".98 The father had no right to 
enjoy the consortium of his child.99 The common law 
conferred the father with the right to control the 
religious upbringing, apprenticing and training of his 
child.100 The father's extensive control over his
96 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 453. Roman laws 
were amended to restrict somewhat this right: patria 
potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate. consistere 
(paternal power should consist in kindness, not in 
cruelty).
97 Mason (1994) .
98 England: Hall v. Hollander (1825) 4 B. & C. 660, 107
E.R. 1206 at 663, 1027 per Abott C.J.; Evans v. Walton
(1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 615 at 620-621 per Bovili C.J., at 622- 
623 per Willes J. , and 623-624 per Montague-Smith J. . In 
Lough v . Ward [1945] 2 All E.R. 338 at 350 per Cassels J. 
holding that a girl had rendered services to her father. 
The defendant had enticed the girl away from her father. 
Cassels J. awarded the father £500. Ireland: The People
(Attorney General) v. Edge [1943] I.R. 115 at 150 and 153 
per Black J..
99 England: Lough v. Ward [1945] 2 All E.R. 338 at 346- 
347 per Cassels J..
100 England: Ex Parte Hopkins (1732) 3 P. Wms. 152, 24
E.R. 1009 at 154-155, 1010 per King L.C.. In R. v. De
Manneville 5 E. 221, 102 E.R. 1054 at 223, 1055, per Lord
Ellenborough C.J. who held that the common law provided 
that the father is the person entitled to the custody of 
his child.
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children may be accounted for by the concept of patria 
potestas.101 A father would forfeit his rights to the 
custody, control and education of his child when guilty 
of misconduct.102 There was a radical shift from the 
rights of fathers to the welfare of children. Legislation 
was enacted punishing child neglect, restricting the 
employment of children, making education compulsory and 
granting equality to parents in guardianship and custody 
matters.
The Custody of Infants Act 1839 altered the father's 
position by allowing the Courts of Chancery to grant the 
mother custody of a child under the age of 7.103 This was 
extended to children under the age of 16.104 The purpose 
of this statutory intervention was to preclude fathers 
from using the custody of children to put pressure on the
101 Bracton (1210-1268) Vol. 2 p. 34.
102 Ireland: In Re Kinderslev [1944] I.R. Ill at 130 per 
O'Byrne J. . England: R. v. Greenhill (1836) 4 A. & E. 624, 
43 R.R. 440 at 640, 449 per Lord Denman; R. v. Gvnqall
[1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 239-240 per Lord Esher M.R.; In Re
Story [1916] 2 I.R. 328 at 351-355 per Dodd J. ; In Re
O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232 at 240 per Fitzgibbon L.J.; In Re 
J.M. Carroll [1931] 1 K.B. 317 at 333-335 per Scrutton L.J. 
and at 349 per Slesser L.J..
103 England: Custody of Infants Act 1839, s. 1. In Warde 
v. Warde (1849) 2 Ph. 786, 41 E.R. 1147 at 789, 1149 
Cottenham L.C. holding that children are by nature entitled 
to the care of both parents. In Re Taylor (1876) 4 Ch.D. 
157 at 159-160 per Jessel M.R.; In Re Elderton (1883) 25 
Ch.D. 220 at 230-231 per Pearson J..
104 England: Custody of Infants Act 1873, s. 1.
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wife to forego her legal remedies against him in cases of 
his misconduct, or where he wished to appropriate to 
himself property which by law was hers.
The child's welfare was placed as the guiding 
principle in guardianship and custody disputes when the 
Chancery and Common Law Courts merged.105 However, the 
courts still vigorously enforced the rights of the father 
to control the religious education of a young child.106 
This led to a further statutory intervention guaranteeing 
an equal say to the father and mother in the upbringing 
of their children.107 A mother was the child's sole 
guardian on the death of the father, unless the father 
had appointed a testamentary guardian.108 The Custody of 
Children Act 1891 provided that a court is prohibited 
from giving a parent custody of a child where the parent
105 England: R. v. Gvngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 241-242 
per Lord Esher M.R. explaining that the court could 
interfere with unwise parental decisions without having to 
show parental misconduct; In Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232 at 
239-241 per Fitzgibbon L.J.
106 England: In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles 
(1878) 10 Ch. D. 49 at 56-57 per Mallins V.C.; In Re Agar- 
Ellis, Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 at 326- 
329 per Brett M.R. and at 334-336 per Bowen L.J..
107 Ireland: In Re Kinderslev [1944] I.R. Ill at 130 per 
O'Byrne J.. England: Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, s. 
5; Smart v. Smart [1892] A.C. 425 at 431-436 per Lord 
Hobhouse; Custody of Children Act 1891, s. 4; In Re Story 
[1916] 2 I.R. 328 at 343-344 per Gibson J. ; In Re J.M.
Carroll [1931] 1 K.B. 317 at 333-335 per Scrutton L.J. and 
at 353 per Slesser L.J.; J. v. C. [1970] A.C. 668 at 721 
per Lord Upjohn. Canada: King v. Low [1985] 16 D.L.R.(4th) 
576 at 587-588 per McIntyre J.; Young v. Young [1993] 108
D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 209-211 per L'Heureux Dube J..
108 England: Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, s. 2.
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has deserted or abandoned that child, unless the parent 
can prove to the court that he or she is a fit person to 
have custody.109
Originally, the law did not view the father's duty 
to maintain and advance his children as a legal duty, but 
as merely a moral one.110 This changed in two ways.
First, these moral duties were recast as legal duties. 
Second, there was a shift in emphasis from the father's 
rights to his duties. The shift from rights to duties 
reflected the shift in society from the rights of parents 
to the welfare of children.111 The conferring of rights 
was seen as necessary in order for parents to perform 
their parental duties and partly as recompense for the 
care and trouble in the faithful discharge of these 
duties.112 The existence of the father's rights were in a
109 England: Custody of Children Act 1891, s. 1.
110 England: Mortimore v. Wright (1840) 6 M. & W. 482, 
151 E.R. 502 at 486, 504 per Lord Abinger C.B.; Shelton v. 
Springett (1851) 11 C.B. 452, 138 E.R. 549 at 455, 550 per 
Jervis C.J.; Savre v. Hughes (1868) L.R. 5 Eq. 376 at 381 
per Sir John Stuart V.C..
111 Canada: In Frame v. Smith [1987] 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 
at 95-96 per Wilson J. explaining that the child's welfare 
increasingly became an important concern of the court and 
today is the paramount consideration. Wilson J. went on to 
say that the concept of parental rights has fallen into 
disfavour while the law has placed greater emphasis on 
parental responsibilities.
112 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 452. Ireland: 
In The State (Williams) v. Markev [1940] I.R. 421 at 427 
per Black J. who held that the parental duty is correlative 
to the parental right to custody. The High Court held that 
a court would refuse to enforce a parent's right to custody 
where the parent's conduct constituted a breach of the 
parental duty. In In Re J. An Infant [1966] I.R. 295 at 301 
per Murnaghan J. , at 3 04 per Teevan J. and at 3 07 per 
Henchy J.. The divisional High Court held that the parents
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sense accorded on condition of performing the parental 
duties.113
A mother is vested with sole parental rights and 
duties, where the child's parents are not married to each 
other. The mother was given rights in respect of her 
child in order to discharge her duties which the law 
imposes on the mother for the child's benefit.114 
Statutory provision was made obliging the father to
need custody of the child in order to perform the 
inalienable right and duty to provide for their child's 
religious, moral, intellectual, physical and social 
education. England: Vansittart v. Vansittart (1858) 2 De G. 
& J. 249, 44 E.R. 984 at 256, 987 per Chelmsford L.C. and 
at 2 59, 98 8 per Turner L.J.; Gillick v. West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 170 per 
Lord Fraser and at 184-185 per Lord Scarman; In Re K.D, (A 
Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] A.C. 806 at 825- 
827 per Lord Oliver discussing the difficulty of defining 
the rights of parents; In Re K. (A Minor) (Ward: Care and 
Control of Access) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 431 at 434 per Fox L.J.;
F. v. Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council and another
[1991] Fam. 69 at 92-96 per Purchas L.J..
113 England: In Re Fynn (1848) 2 De G. & Sm. 457, 64
E.R. 205 at 474, 212 per Knight-Bruce V.C.; In Re Newton
(Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 at 750 per Kay L.J.; J. v. C.
[1970] A.C. 668 at 692-693 per Lord Guest.
114 Ireland: In Re M. (An Infant) [1946] I.R. 334 at 345 
per Gavan Duffy P.; G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 
85-8 6 per Henchy J.. England: In Humphrvs v. Polak [1901] 
2 K.B. 385 at 388-389 per Vaughan Williams L.J. and 389-390 
per Striling L.J. holding that an unmarried mother has a 
legal duty to maintain and protect her child with 
corresponding rights. One of this is the prima facie right 
to the custody. This duty was not created by the Poor Law 
Acts but merely recognised and defined this duty. Poor Law 
Amendment Act 1834, s. 71. In Humphrvs v. Polak [1901] 2
K.B. 385 at 389 per Vaughan Williams L.J. held that the 
Poor Law Statutes placed a mother under an obligation to 
maintain her non-marital child. Canada: In Re Baby Duffell 
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 1 at 7 per Cartwright J.; In Re Agar [1958] 
11 D.L.R.(2nd) 721 at 724 per Locke J..
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maintain the child.115 However, the father is restricted 
to a statutory right to apply to court to be appointed as 
a guardian to the child.116
The welfare model and the rights model recognise the 
existence of parental duties and parental rights.117 
There are three parental duties. These are the duties to 
maintain,118 protect119 and educate children 120.121
115 England: 1576, s. 2 imposed an obligation on both 
parents to maintain an illegitimate child; Poor Law 
Amendment Act 1834, s. 72 allowed the court to order the 
putative father to provide maintenance where the mother was 
unable to maintain the child. Ireland: In In Re M. (An 
Infant) [194 6] I.R. 334 at 341 per Gavan Duffy P. who 
explained that neither parent was liable to maintain an 
illegitimate child under common law; Family Law 
(Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, s. 5A(1), 
as amended by Status of Children Act 1987, s. 18.
116 Ireland: Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, s. 6A as 
amended by Status of Children Act 1987, s. 12 and Children 
Act 1997, s. 6. J.K. y. V.W. [1990] 2 I.R. 437 at 446 per 
Finlay C.J.; P.O. v. C .L ., unreported, Circuit Court, 
Sheridan J., 13 June, 1990; case note at [1990] I.L.T. 269 
at 2 70; G .W . v . D .G ., unreported, High Court, 1 May, 1992 
at 3 per O'Hanlon J.; W.O'R. v. E.H. [1996] 2 I.R. 248 at 
265-266 per Hamilton C.J..
117 United States: Meyer v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S. 
390 (1923) at 399 per McReynolds J.; Pierce v. Society of
Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925) at 535 per McReynolds J. ;
Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 (1944) at 166 per
Rutledge J. ; Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629 (1968) at
389 per Brennan J.; Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
at 214 per Burger C.J.; Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) 
at 602 per Burger C.J.; Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622
(1979) at 637-639 per Powell J.; H.L. v. Matheson 450 U.S. 
398 (1981) at 410 per Burger C.J.; Lehr v. Robertson 4 63
U.S. 248 (1983) at 257-258 per Stevens J. ; Hodgson v.
Minnesota 497 U.S. 417 (1990) at 445-446 per Stevens J..
118 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 P- 447 .
119 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 P* 450 .
120 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 P* 451.
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The first is the most important duty. This is the duty to 
maintain the child. Both the welfare model and the rights 
model hold that parents voluntarily enter into a duty to 
support and preserve the life that they are responsible 
for.122 Mechanisms were established through which parents 
are obliged to fulfil this duty.123 The second is the 
duty to protect and preserve the child's health and life.
The third is the duty to educate the child. This 
duty is derivative of the duty to maintain. In the same 
way that the parent cannot allow a child to perish, the 
parent cannot ignore his or her child's education. The 
rights model finds that the duty is fulfilled where 
parents provide an education within their means that 
qualifies a child for such reasonable standard of life as 
an adult as is clearly within the child's ability with 
appropriate education.124 However, the welfare model only 
requires that a child is provided with a minimum 
education.
The welfare model accords greater consideration to 
the rights of parents than their duties. However, the 
rights model renders the rights of parents derivative
121 Stephen (1787-1864) Vol. 2 p. 508-510. Canada: In 
Racine v. Woods 1 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 202 per Wilson J.
holding that parents have important obligations to their 
child.
122 United States: Parham v . J .R . 442 U.S. 584 (1979) 
at 602 per Burger C.J..
123 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 449. England:
Poor Relief Act 1601 and Poor Relief Act 1718.
124 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best
[2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 41 per Lynch J..
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from their duties to the child. Parents are accorded 
rights in respect of their child in order to fulfil the 
parental duties.125 The Constitution implicitly 
recognises the parents' right to custody and control of 
the child is necessary to satisfy the parental duties to 
the child's welfare.126 This has been seen in cases 
involving medical intervention127, education128 and 
travel outside the State.129
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 may reflect this 
welfare model. The State acknowledges that the primary 
and natural educator of the child is the family based 
upon marriage. The Constitution protects this family unit 
from unjustified State interference.130 The State must
125 Ireland: The People (P.P.P.) v. J.T. (1988) 3 Frewen 
141 at 159 per Walsh J. who held that the Constitution 
gives special recognition, protection and rights to parents 
in relation to their children. However, Walsh J. held that 
it must follow that each and every right so given carries 
with it correlative duties.
126 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1 
defines welfare as including the child's religious, moral, 
intellectual, physical and social welfare. In Re J. An 
Infant [1966] I.R. 295 at 308 per Henchy J.; G. v. An Bord 
Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 85 per Henchy J. holding that it 
is necessary for parents to have custody in order to fulfil 
the parental role; In Re J.H. [1985] I.R. 375 at 394-395 
per Finlay C.J..
127 Ireland: North Western Health Board v. H.W. and
C.W., unreported,, High Court, Barr J ., 27 October, 2000.
128 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best
[2000] 2 I.L.R.M . 1 .
129 Ireland: The State (K.M. and R.D.) v. Minister for
Foreign Affairs [1979] I.R. 73 at 81 per Finlay J..
130 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.2.
37
protect the constitution and authority of the family 
based on marriage.131 The provisions of Article 41 create 
not merely a State interest but a State obligation to 
protect the family.132 The family is recognised as the 
natural primary and fundamental unit of society 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights 
antecedent and superior to positive law.133 Parents are 
invested with natural, constitutional and legal authority 
for the education, care and control of their child. The 
State guarantees to respect the inalienable right and 
duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for 
the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and 
social education of their children.134 The most important 
right of married parents is the right to raise and
131 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.2. 
In W.O'R. v. E.H. [1996] 2 I.R. 248 at 265 per Hamilton
C.J. and at 2 72 per Denham J. holding that the family not 
based on marriage is not recognised by the Constitution and 
is not afforded any constitutional protection.
132 Ireland: O'B. v. S . [1984] I.R. 316 at 333-334 per
Walsh J..
133 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.1; 
North Western Health Board v. H.W. and C.W., unreported, 
High Court, 27 October, 2000 at 12-13 per Barr J.. Canada: 
In B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto
[1995] 122 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 41-42 La Forest J. holding that 
the Canadian Charter of Rights protects individual rights, 
not the integrity of the family unit as such.
134 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1. 
In Re J.H. [1985] I.R. 375 at 394-396 per Finlay C.J..
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educate their child.135 Parents have the right to 
determine whether the child on or soon after birth is 
inducted into a religion, and the nature of the child's 
education. The right of parents to determine the child's 
education is detached from the parental duty, where the 
child is receiving the minimum education. Such parents 
have a scope of discretion over which the State cannot 
intervene.
The United States Supreme Court and the Canadian 
Supreme Court have each found that parents have an 
independent right to establish a home, raise children and 
control the education of their children, and make 
decisions for their children.136 The United State Supreme
135 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1, 
Art. 42.2, Art. 42.3.1, Art. 42.3.4, and Art. 44.2.4. In 
McGee v. Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 at 311 per Walsh 
J. holding that Articles 41 and 42 recognise parents as the 
natural guardians of their children. The parents have 
authority for the family and have the right to determine 
how family life shall be conducted, having due regard to 
the rights of the children not merely as members of that 
family but as individuals. In Landers v. Attorney General 
(1972) 109 I.L.T.R. 1 at 5 per Finlay J. holding that
Article 41 protected the privacy of the family and its 
constitution. Finlay J. held that parental decisions 
concerning a child's upbringing and education are protected 
by Article 41. A similar conclusion was reached in In Re 
J.H. [1985] I.R. 375 at 394 per Finlay C.J..
136 United States: Mever v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S. 
390 (1923) at 399 per McReynolds J.; Prince v.
Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 (1944) at 166 per Rutledge J. ; 
May v. Anderson 345 U.S. 528 (1953) at 533 per Burton J.;
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972) at 651 per White
J.; Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) at 213-214 per
Burger C.J.; Moore v. East Cleveland 431 U.S. 4 94 (1977) at 
499 per Powell J.; Ouilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246 (1978) 
at 255 per Marshall J.; Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) 
at 602 per Burger C.J.; H.L. v. Matheson 450 U.S. 398
(1981) at 410 per Burger C.J.; Lassiter v. Department of
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Court has held that the State's laws should protect and 
assist the parent in exercising these rights.137 The 
United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional 
protection was not limited to members of the nuclear 
family. Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the 
biological connection between parent and child.138 
However, the mere existence of a biological link does not 
merit equivalent constitutional protection.139 The United 
States Supreme Court has favoured the unitary family over 
the position of the unmarried father.140 The State has an 
interest in securing that a child should have secure,
Social Services 452 U.S. 18 (1981) at 38-39 per Stewart J. ; 
Santoskv v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) at 753-754 per
Blackmun J. ; Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S. 417 (1990) at
445-446 per Stevens J.; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., individually and 
as next friend of the minor children, S.L.J. and M.L.J.. 
unreported, Supreme Court, December 16, 1996 at 8-12 per
Ginsburg J.; Troxel v. Granville, unreported, Supreme 
Court, 5 June, 2000 at 5-8 per O'Connor J.. Canada: R . v . 
Jones [1986] 31 D.L.R.(4th) 569 at 583 per Wilson J. and at 
596 Dickson C.J., La Forest J. , Beetz J. , McIntyre J. , 
Lamer J. and Le Dain J. were willing to assume that such a 
right exists; B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 40-42 per 
La Forest J.; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v. G.(J.) [1999] 177 D.L.R.(4th) 124 at
166-167 per L'Heureux Dube J..
137 United States: In Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629 
(1968), the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute 
that restricted the sale of pornographic magazines to 
children under 17.
138 United States: Caban v. Mohammed 441 U.S. 380 (1979) 
at 397 per Powell J.; Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248 (1983) 
at 260-263 per Stevens J..
139 United States: Moore v. East Cleveland 431 U.S. 494
(1977) at 503-505 per Powell J..
140 United States: Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110
(1989) at 124-127 per Scalia J..
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stable, long-term, continuous relationships with his or 
her parents or guardians.141
The difficulty arises where courts are called on to 
decide whether parents are fulfilling their parental 
duties. The welfare model provides that the law can only 
interfere with families in exceptional circumstances.142 
The State has an obligation to preserve and defend the 
family group, and this has been interpreted as relating 
solely to the rights and duties of parents. The State 
cannot interfere because a better decision can be made in 
relation to the child.143 To this end, the law presumes 
that it is in the child's best interests to be brought up 
in his or her natural family.144 The law presumes that 
parents will act in the child's best interests when
141 United States : Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's 
Services 458 U.S. 502 (1982) at 513-514 per Powell J..
142 Ireland: North Western Health Board v. H.W. and
C .W ., unreported, High Court, 27 October, 2000 at 11 and 14 
per Barr J..
143 United States: Troxel v. Granville, unreported,
Supreme Court, 5 June, 2000 at 8-14 per O'Connor J..
144 Ireland: In Re J.H. [1985] I.R. 375 at 394-395 per 
Finlay C.J.; Child Care Act 1991, s. 3(2)(c) requires the 
health board to have regard to the principle that generally 
it is in the child's best interests to be brought up in his 
or her own family. England: In In Re K.D. (A Minor)(Ward: 
Termination of Access) [1988] A.C. 806 at 812 per Lord 
Templeman and at 82 5 per Lord Oliver holding that the best 
person to bring up a child is the natural parent. The House 
of Lords held that a court should not make an order in 
opposition to a natural parent, unless satisfied that the 
child's welfare requires the suspension or suppression of 
parental rights. In Re K. (A Minor)(Ward: Care and Control 
of Access) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 431 at 434 per Fox L.J. and at
436-437 per Waite J. . Canada: Hepton v. Maat [1957] 102
D.L.R.(2nd) 1 at 1-2 per Rand J..
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parents decide on the exercise of the child's rights.145 
Parents should act in the child's best interests because 
of their love and affection for the child.146
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
parental interest in children is an interest far more 
precious than any property right.139 The United States 
Supreme Court has allowed the imposition of the clear and 
convincing standard of proof in proceedings when the 
termination of parental rights is sought. This is an 
intermediate standard of proof that is greater than that 
of the balance of probabilities, but falls short of the 
criminal standard, beyond a reasonable doubt. Best 
interests is not the legal standard that governs 
interference with parents' or guardians' exercise of
145 England: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 173 per Lord Fraser 
holding that parents are the best judges of what is in
their child's best interests in the majority of situations. 
United States: Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 602
per Burger C.J.; Troxel v. Granville, unreported, Supreme 
Court, 5 June, 2 000 at 8-14 per O'Connor J.. Canada: Frame 
v. Smith [1987] 42 D.L.R.(4th) 81 at 104 per Wilson J.;
M.(K.) v. M.(H.) [1992] 96 D.L.R.(4th) 289 at 323-328 per
La Forest J. describing the child-parent relationship as 
fiduciary; B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 40 per La Forest J..
146 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 447. United
States: Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 602 per
Burger C .J . .
139 United States: May v. Anderson 345 U.S. 528 (1953) 
at 553 per Burton J.; Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645
(1972) at 651 per White J. .-Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services 452 U.S. 18 (1981) at 18 per Blackmun J.; Santosky 
v . Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) at 758-759 per Blackmun J..
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custody.140
This approach is at variance with the rights model 
as the child's welfare and rights are imperilled by the 
paternalist attitude of protecting the family unit. This 
thesis suggests that the court should deny a parent's 
decision as to the exercise of the child's rights where 
this decision is not in the child's best interests.141
Paternalism is fostered by the best interests test 
as it is difficult to determine when a decision is or is 
not in the best interests of a child. Society's general 
understanding of children and parenting is very limited. 
It is very difficult to assess or adjudicate a parental 
decision as "good" or "bad", "reasonable" or 
"unreasonable" as the instinctual nature of parenting, 
and the acceptance by society of the very personal nature 
of parental decisions. There is a substantive discretion 
afforded to parents, in which their subjective decisions 
will be upheld, but there is a point, which denotes
140 United States: Ouilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246
(1978) at 255 per Marshall J. ; Reno v. Flores 123 L. Ed. 
2d. 1 (1993) at 18 per Scalia J..
141 Ireland: The State (K.M. and R.D.) v. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs [1979] I.R. 73 at 81-82 per Finlay P.. In 
P ,W. v. A.W., unreported, High Court, 21 April, 1980, at 
70-72 per Ellis J. holding that G. v. An Bord Uchtala
[1980] I.R. 32, must be interpreted as affording no 
constitutional primacy to parents' rights. Ellis J. opined 
that the child's rights were to be determined by reference 
to what was best for the child's welfare, even if the 
child's welfare was to be found in the custody of a
stranger. Ellis J. held that it is in the child's best
interests to be in the custody of a stranger because of
parental misconduct, inadequacy, or indeed other causes 
such as the child's special needs. Canada: P . (D.) v. S. (C. ) 
[1993] 108 D.L.R.(4th) 287 at 289 per L'Heureux Dube J..
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decisions which no reasonable parent could subjectively 
make. However, society has increased understanding and 
knowledge of the best interests of children in the fields 
of medicine, education and to a lesser extent juvenile 
justice. This knowledge and understanding should inform 
parental decisions and reduce the risk of bad parental 
decisions.
1.3.2. Duty of State to protect and provide for child
The welfare model and the rights model both provide 
that the State may be obliged to protect and provide for 
the child.142 Neither Canadian nor United States make 
provision for children a constitutional aim. The United 
States Supreme Court held that the State has an interest 
to protect the welfare of its youth.143 It is submitted 
that it is the interest of youth and of the whole 
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses 
and given opportunities for growth into free, independent
142 Canada : B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 43 per La 
Forest J.; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W. 191
D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 15 per Arbour J. and at 36-37 per
L'Heureux Dube J..
143 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 165 and 168 per Rutledge J.; Ginsberg v. New York 
390 U.S. 629 (1968) at 639-641 per Brennan J.; Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services 452 U.S. 18 (1981) at 27 per 
Stewart J.; Santoskv v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) at 766
per Blackmun J.; Reno v. Flores 123 L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1993) at 
17 per Scalia J. . In DeShanev v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services 489 U.S. 189 (1989) at 196
per Rehnquist C.J. holding that the Due Process clause does 
not impose a duty on the State to provide members of public 
with adequate protective services.
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and well-developed adults.144 A democratic society rests, 
for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into maturity as citizens. This 
will arise where parents fail to fulfil their duties to 
maintain, protect and educate their children. The duty of 
the State will be to intervene to protect and provide for 
the child. This duty of the State derives from the parens 
patriae prerogative. The State as parens patriae may 
restrict parental rights by requiring school attendance 
and prohibiting the employment of children.145 The court 
may act in the stead of a parent for the protection of a 
child.146
The rights model requires the State to assume this 
duty where parents do not act in the child's best 
interests. The welfare model obliges the State to defend 
the integrity of the family unit. This has been 
interpreted as requiring the State to protect and defend 
the rights and duties of parents.147
144 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 165 and 168 per Rutledge J..
145 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 168-169 per Rutledge J..
146 Canada : B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 43 per La 
Forest J. ; Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v. D.F.G. [1997] 152 D.L.R.(4th) 193 at 218-219 per
Major J.; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community 
Services) v. G.(J.) [1999] 177 D.L.R.(4th) 124 at 150 per
Lamer C .J .; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W.
[2000] 191 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 15 per Arbour J. and at 36-37
per L'Heureux-Dube J..
147 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 166 per Rutledge J.; Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 
622 (1979) at 637-639 per Powell J..
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The welfare model allows the State to assume the 
duty to protect and provide for the child where there are 
exceptional circumstances, where parents fail for 
physical or moral reasons.148 This may arise where the 
child's physical or mental health is jeopardised.149 This 
does not mean that the child becomes the child of the 
State, or can be disposed of as such.150 The State must 
have due regard for the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of the child, when supplying the place of 
parents.151 The Canadian Supreme Court has come to a 
similar conclusion, but does not require culpable 
parental failure before interfering with the decisions of 
parents.152 The thesis submits that a child can suffer 
irredeemable damage before the exceptional circumstances 
justifying State intervention have arisen.
The United States Supreme Court sees the legitimate
148 Ireland: In Re Doyle, unreported, Supreme Court, 21 
December, 1955 at 4-5 per Maguire C. J. . In In Re J.H.
[1985] I . R . 375 at 395-396 per Finlay C.J. holding that
Article 42.5 provides that the State could only deprive 
parents of the custody of their children, where there was 
culpable failure in their physical or moral duty to their 
children.
149 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 168-170 per Rutledge J.; Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 
584 (1979) at 603 per Burger C.J.; Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 
U.S. 205 (1972) at 233-234 per Burger C.J..
150 Ireland: In Re Article 26 and The Adoption (No. 2)
Bill 1987 [1989] I.R. 656 at 663 per Finlay C.J..
151 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5. 
G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 79 per Walsh J. and 
at 86 per Henchy J..
152 Canada: Hepton v. Maat [1957] 10 D.L.R. (2nd) 1 at
2 per Rand J..
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State interest in protecting children not only from 
parents but from themselves. Children lack the maturity 
and experience to exercise their rights wisely.
Therefore, the State has a greater ability to restrict 
the rights of children than that of adults.153
The State has a duty to provide a child with 
necessities of life where the parents are not making such 
provision.154 The courts are called upon to protect and 
provide for the child. The courts are called upon to 
protect and provide for the child. In Ireland, the courts 
have required the State to provide facilities for 
children suffering from attention deficiency disorder and 
hyperkinetic conduct disorder.155 In F.N. (a minor) v. 
Minister for Education156 Geoghegan J. held the State was
153 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158
(1944) at 165 and 168-170 per Rutledge J. ; Ginsbercr v. New 
York 390 U.S. 629 (1968) at 640-641 per Brennan J.; Carey
v. Population Services International 431 U.S. 678 (1977) at 
692 per Brennan J. ; Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S. 417
(1990) at 444-445 per Stevens J..
154 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.3.1 
and Art. 4 0.3.2; In Re Article 26 and The Adoption (No.2) 
Bill 1987 [1989] I.R. 656 at 663 per Finlay C.J.. England: 
Poor Relief Act 1601, s. 1 and s. 3. Church wardens of 
every parish, with the consent of the justices of the 
peace, could either put a child to work or bind the child 
into an apprenticeship, when parents were not maintaining 
the child. The Poor Relief Act 1601 made lawful would 
otherwise be an unlawful interference with the father's 
right in respect of his children's services. See also the 
Poor Relief Act 1718.
155 Ireland: In P. S. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board, 
unreported, High Court, 27 July, 1994 at 1-2 per Geoghegan 
J. holding that a health board was a creature of statute 
and could not be held responsible for any potential 
constitutional duty on the State to cater for the special 
needs of the child.
156 Ireland: [1995] 1 I.R. 409 at 416.
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under a constitutional duty to meet a child's special 
needs in order to vindicate the child's rights, where the 
parents cannot meet the child's special needs.157 The 
court's jurisdiction extends to making whatever order is 
necessary for the child's welfare, including detaining 
the child.158 This has extended to detaining a child in a 
prison.159 The State's duty to a child with special need 
is not absolute. The High Court has yet to determine the 
limits on this duty.160 The State is obliged to provide 
for free primary education.161
The welfare model provides that the State has a 
silent and implied right of control in relation to the 
child. This right is designed to influence the type of 
adult the child will become.
157 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 193 7, Art. 42.5; 
G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 56 per O'Higgins
C.J., at 79 per Walsh J. and at 85-8 6 per Henchy J.; M.F . 
v. Superintendent. Ballymun Garda Station, John Rynne and 
Eastern Health Board (Notice Parties) [1991] 1 I.R. 189 at 
2 01 per O'Flaherty J. ; In Re Article 2 6 and The Adoption 
(No.2) Bill 1987 [1989] I.R. 656 at 663 per Finlay C.J..
158 Ireland: D.T. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and 
Ireland, unreported, High Court, Geoghegan J. , 24 March,
1995 at 2-3; P.P. v. Eastern Health Board, Minister for 
Health, Minister for Education and Ireland, unreported, 
High Court, Costello P., 3 May, 1995 at 6-7; D.H. v.
Ireland, unreported, High Court, Kelly J., 23 May, 2000 at 
9-11. In P.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland 
[1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 532 per Benham J. and at 538-539 per 
Murphy J. assumed that the High Court has the jurisdiction 
to order the detention of a child.
159 Ireland: P.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and 
Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 522 per Hamilton C.J. and at
525 per O'Flaherty J..
160 Ireland: F.N. (a minor) v. Minister for Education 
and Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 409 at 416 per Geoghegan J..
161 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.4.
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1.3.3. Welfare rights of child
The recognition of a child's welfare rights is a 
recent development. This recognition comprises a more 
important role in the welfare model. It could be argued 
that there is no need to recognise such rights as the 
parental duties and the court's duty to act in the 
child's best interests achieves the same purpose: 
satisfying the child's needs and promoting the child's 
welfare.
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 states that a child 
has natural and imprescriptible rights162 but does not 
describe these.163 The Irish courts have enumerated 
constitutional rights for children, not found in the text 
of the Constitution.164 The Constitution confers 
additional rights for their well being and protection 
during childhood.165 In G. v. An Bord Uchtala166, the
162 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5.
163 Ireland: In S.C. v. Minister for Education [1997] 
2 I.L.R.M. 134 at 145, McGuinness J. pointed out that the 
extensive rights of parents and the family in respect of 
the child are expressly established in the Constitution, 
whereas those of the child in respect of his or her parents 
and family are not. This could result in greater weight 
being accorded to the express rights of parents than the 
implied rights of the child.
164 Ireland: Rvan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294 
at 311 and 313 per Kenny J.; The State (K.M. and R.D.) v. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs [1979] I.R. 73 at 80-81 per 
Finlay P.; Norris v. Attorney General [1984] I.R. 36 at 
100-101 per McCarthy J.; Kennedy and Arnold v. Ireland 
[1987] I.R. 587 at 590 per Hamilton P..
165 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best
[2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 41 per Lynch J..
166 Ireland: [1980] I.R. 32.
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Supreme Court enumerated the welfare rights of the child. 
In the Supreme Court, 0'Higgins C.J. held that every 
child has the right to be fed, the right to be brought 
up, educated, and to have the opportunity of working and 
of realising his or her full personality and dignity as a 
human being. These rights derive from the child's right 
to life. The child has a right to maintain that life at a 
proper standard in matters of food, clothing, and 
habitation.167 The Supreme Court found that the parents 
are charged primarily with the vindication of these 
rights. The parents have a duty not to injure or 
otherwise transgress these rights by interfering with the 
health or life of the child or by terminating the child's 
existence. The Supreme Court held that the State must 
step in where there has been parental failure. The rights 
and duties described in G. v. An Bord Uchtala168 are 
designed to care and protect the child. It could be 
argued that the welfare rights of the child are a 
corollary of the parental duty to care and educate.169
167 Ireland: ibid. at 55-56 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 
69 per Walsh J.. In D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board 
and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 523 per Hamilton C.J. and 
at 53 7 per Denham J. approving of the rights enumerated in
G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32. In Eastern Health 
Board v. An Bord Uchtala [1994] 3 I.R. 207 at 230, 
O'Flaherty J. added the right to adequate medical care. 
O'Flaherty J. held that these constitute the universal 
rights of the child found in Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
168 Ireland: [1980] I.R. 32.
169 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 79 
per Walsh J.; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best
[2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 37-38 per Murphy J..
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A child whose parents are married to each other has 
a constitutional right to belong to that family.170 A 
child whose parents are not married to each other and has 
not been adopted has a right to know the identity of his 
or her mother.171
The Constitution expressly requires the State to 
provide for free primary education.172 This has been 
interpreted as conferring a corresponding right on a 
child to receive free primary education.173 This right 
entitles each child access to such advice, instruction 
and teaching as will enable that child to make the best 
possible use of his or her inherent and potential 
physical, mental and moral capacities, however limited 
these may be.174
1.3.4. Civil rights of child
The welfare model and the rights model both provide
170 Ireland: In Re J.H. [1985] I.R. 375 at 394 per 
Finlay C .J ..
171 Ireland: I . O'T. v. B. [1998] 1 I.R. 321 at 348 per 
Hamilton C .J ..
172 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.4. 
Constitution of the Irish Free State, Art. 10 conferred a 
right to free elementary education on all citizens.
173 Ireland: Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102 at 121- 
122 per O'Higgins C.J..
174 Ireland: O'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for Health
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J.; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 21 per Denham 
J. and at 41 per Lynch J..
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that a child is entitled to civil rights.175 These 
include the rights to bodily integrity,176 liberty,177 
privacy,178 travel179 and a trial in due course of law 
in respect of a criminal charge.180 The rights model 
requires that children have equal entitlement to civil 
rights. The rights model accommodates children's varying
175 Ireland: The State (K.M. and R.D.) v. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs [1979] I.R. 73 at 80-81 per Finlay P.; G . 
v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 44 per Finlay P.; D.G. 
(a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 
511 at 523 per Hamilton C.J. and at 533-534 per Denham J.. 
United States: In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at 27-30 per
Fortas J.; Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 
503 (1969) at 511-513 per Fortas J.; Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 
565 (1975) at 581 per White J.; Breed v. Jones 421 U.S. 519
(1975) at 529-532 per Burger C.J.; Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (1976) at 74-75
per Blackmun J. finding that rights do not generally mature 
on the age of majority; Carev v. Population Services 
International 431 U.S. 678 (1977) at 693 per Brennan J. ;
Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979) at 633-635 per Powell 
J.; Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S. 417 (1990) at 434-435 per 
Stevens J..
176 Ireland: The State (C.) v. Frawlev [1976] I.R. 365 
at 371 per Finlay P.; G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 
at 44 per Finlay P. ; In Re a Ward of Court (withholding 
medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 124-125 per
Hamilton C.J. and at 156 per Denham J.; D.G. (a minor) v. 
Eastern Health Board and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 535
per Denham J..
177 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.4.1.
D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland [1997] 
3 I.R. 511 at 523 per Hamilton C.J. and at 534 per Denham 
J. . United States: Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 
600 per Burger C.J..
178 Ireland: Kennedy and Arnold v. Ireland [1987] I.R. 
587 at 592 per Hamilton P..
179 Ireland: The State (K.M. and R.D.) v. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs [1979] I.R. 73 at 80-81 per Finlay P..
180 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38.1; 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v. P.T. [1998] 1
I.L.R.M. 344 at 361 per McGuinness J..
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capacities by allowing the State to impose greater 
restrictions on the rights of children than on the rights 
of adults.
The welfare model has developed a number of concepts 
that prevent children acquiring the same civil rights as 
adults. The welfare model views children as either being 
in parental or State custody.181 The welfare model uses a 
child's lack of experience, perspective and judgment as 
an opportunity for the exercise of paternalism.182
The welfare model and the rights model allow for 
parents or the State to decide on the exercise of the 
child's rights where the child is incompetent to make 
decisions for himself or herself. In Bellotti v. Baird183 
Powell J. held that a child's rights differed from those 
of an adult for three reasons. First, children are 
peculiarly vulnerable. Secondly, children are unable to 
make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner. 
Children often lack experience, perspective and judgment. 
They may not recognise and avoid choices that would be to 
their detriment. Parents are presumed to possess what a
181 United States: In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at 17
per Fortas J.; Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629 (1968) at
640-643 per Brennan J. ; Schall v. Martin 467 U.S. 253
(1984) at 265 per Rehnquist J.; Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292 
(1993) at 302-303 per Scalia J. speaking for a majority of 
the court; Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
unreported, Supreme Court, 26 June, 1995 at 8-10 Scalia J. 
speaking for a majority of the court.
182 United States: Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979) 
at 635 per Powell J. ; Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104
(1982) at 115-117 per Powell J..
183 United States: 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for 
judgment required for making life's difficult 
decisions.184 Third, the parental role in child rearing 
must be respected. This role justifies the imposition of 
limitations on the rights of children. One of these 
limitations is the requirement that for important 
decisions, parental consent is a pre-requisite. This 
requirement acts as a protection for children from their 
own immaturity, and from adverse State action. Legal 
restrictions on children, specially those supportive of 
the parental role, may be important to the child for the 
full growth and maturity that may make eventual 
participation in society meaningful and rewarding.
Parents and others responsible for children's well being 
are entitled to the support of the laws designed to 
enable them to discharge their duty.185 This aspect of 
the welfare model reflects the need to support and 
respect parental autonomy. Parents should act in the 
child's best interests when deciding on the exercise of 
the child's civil rights.
1.3.5. Conflicting rights of child
A conflict may arise between the child's welfare and 
civil rights. For example, it maybe necessary to detain a 
child for medical treatment. There will then be a
184 United States: Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
at 602 per Burger C.J.; Troxel v. Granville, unreported,
Supreme Court, 5 June, 2000 at 8-14 per O'Connor J..
185 United States: 443 U.S. 622 (1979) at 634-639 per
Powell J..
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conflict with the child's right not to be deprived of 
liberty save in accordance with law186 and the welfare 
rights of the child: the right to be born, the right to 
be fed and to live, to be reared and educated and to have 
the opportunity of working and of realising his or her 
full personality and dignity as a human being.187
It may not be possible to vindicate both civil and 
welfare rights. The parents or the State will have to 
accord supremacy either to the child's civil rights or 
welfare rights.188 The welfare model accords supremacy to 
the child's welfare by subordinating the child's civil 
rights. The welfare model's approach flows from the 
requirement that the court must act in the child's best 
interests when exercising the child's rights.189 In D . G .
186 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.4.1. 
In D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland
[1997] 2 I . R . 511 at 535 Denham J. held that a child's
rights to equality under Art. 40.1. and good name under 
Art. 40.3.2 may be implicated when a child is detained.
187 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 55- 
56 per O'Higgins C.J.; D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health 
Board and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 523-524 per Hamilton
C.J. and at 53 6 per Denham J..
188 Ireland: Attorney General v. X. [1992] 1 I.R. 1 at
57-58 per Finlay C.J..
189 Ireland: In Southern Health Board v. C.H. [1996] 1
I.R. 219 at 238, O'Flaherty J. in the Supreme Court held 
that judges must always harken to the constitutional 
command which mandates, as a prime consideration the 
interests of the child in any legal proceedings. 0'Flaherty 
J. held that the paramountcy of the child's welfare was not 
only ordained by statute, but was inherent in the 
Constitution. Many statutes require the courts and/or 
responsible State bodies to regard the welfare of the child 
as the paramount consideration. Guardianship of Infants Act 
1964, s. 3; Adoption Act 1974, s. 2; Child Care Act 1991, 
s. 3(2)(b)(i) and s. 24(a). England: See also In Re E.
(S.A .)(A Minor)(Wardship: Court's Duty) [1984] 1 W.L.R. 156
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(a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland190 the
Supreme Court accorded paramountcy to the child's welfare 
rights. These rights took precedence over the child's 
right to liberty.191 The child's welfare required his 
detention. The rights model requires that such a solution 
must provide the least intrusive interference with the 
rights that are being subordinated and safeguards must be 
provided. This has not occurred in the cases where the 
detention of the child has been ordered. In D .G . (a 
minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland192 no 
appropriate unit existed and the child was detained in 
the only available facility, a prison. Hamilton C.J. held 
that a court can order the detention of a child in a 
prison where the court is satisfied that such detention 
is necessary for a short period, in the interests of the 
child's welfare, and where no facility is available that
at 158-159 per Lord Scarman.
190 Ireland: [1997] 3 I.R. 511.
191 England: Children Act 1908, s. 24(1) allows a police 
officer to detain a child in a place of safety where that 
child is being assaulted or neglected. In M.F. v. 
Superintendent, Ballvmun Garda Station, John Rvnne and 
Eastern Health Board (Notice Parties) [1991] 1 I.R. 189 at 
205-206 per O'Flaherty J. who held that the word 
"detention” must be interpreted by reference to preserving 
the life and health of a child or young person and for the 
purpose of vindicating his or her constitutional rights. 
O'Flaherty J. held that it was in no sense to be construed 
as meaning depriving the child of his or her liberty or of 
any other of the child's rights.
192 Ireland: [1997] 3 I.R. 511.
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meets the child's needs193.194
Denham J., dissenting, decided that the High Court 
did not have jurisdiction to promote a child's welfare by- 
imprisoning the child, where the child had neither been 
charged nor convicted of an offence. Denham J. drew a 
distinction between a court ordering the detention of a 
child in a child care facility and in a prison. In a 
child care facility, the child's educational, physical, 
moral and social welfare are accommodated. Denham J. held 
that in such a facility there was a harmonisation of the 
children's conflicting rights of welfare and liberty. 
Detention in a prison did not provide for the 
harmonisation of these rights.195
Denham J. found that by being detained in prison, 
the child's moral welfare was at risk. Denham J. stated 
that one of the functions of prison is to punish those 
convicted of a crime. Denham J. held that it was not 
possible to compare the detention of a child in prison, 
with keeping a child in an educational institution 
possessing appropriate facilities. A child's moral
193 Ireland: ibid. at 524.
194 Ireland: In D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board 
and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 539 Murphy J. suggesting 
that on the review date, the High Court should make no 
order continuing the child's detention in the prison. In
G.L. (a minor) v. Minister for Justice, Minister for 
Education, Minister for Health and Ireland, unreported, 
High Court, 24 March, 1995, at 3 Geoghegan J. pointed out 
that it was doubtful that a reformatory school could meet 
the needs of the very disturbed young boy. The boy would be 
mixing with those older than him who would be likely to be 
a bad influence.
195 Ireland: ibid. at 536-538.
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welfare is threatened where the child is placed in a 
prison, when the child has been neither charged nor 
convicted of a criminal offence. The State was attempting 
to inculcate in this child an autonomous sense of right 
and wrong, while at the same time detaining him in 
prison, when he had been neither charged with nor 
convicted of any criminal offence. Such detention was 
contrary to one of the basic principles of constitutional 
and natural justice.196
Denham J. considered the child's right to 
equality.197 Denham J. noted that it is unconstitutional 
to detain an adult in a prison if that adult has not been 
charged with or convicted of a criminal offence. The 
child's right to equality was not breached merely because 
it is illegal to imprison an adult who has not been 
charged or convicted. The constitutional guarantee of 
equality permits people of different capacity to be 
treated differently. The reason for the child's 
deprivation of liberty was to promote his welfare. This 
could only be achieved by detention in an institution 
with the necessary facilities and services required to 
promote the child's welfare. A prison does not have the 
necessary facilities and services. The justification in 
treating a child differently from an adult was lost, 
since detaining him in a prison, of itself, did not 
advance his welfare. Therefore, it infringed his right to
196 Ireland: ibid. at 534-535.
197 Ireland: ibid. at 535.
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welfare.
Denham J. held that the child's detention in a 
prison when he has not been charged with nor convicted of 
a criminal offence, infringes his right to bodily 
integrity, his social welfare, his rights of "person" and 
his right to a good name.198 Denham J. held that when the 
State is fulfilling its constitutional obligation to 
supply the place of parents, the State must pay regard to 
the child's rights. Denham J. queried whether a child 
from a different socio-economic background than the 
applicant in this case would have been imprisoned.199
Denham J. held that ordering the child's 
imprisonment infringed both the child's civil and welfare 
rights. Denham J. allowed the appeal.
The rights model advanced in this thesis endorses 
Denham J.'s approach. Detention of itself does not 
promote the child's welfare, nor afford the child the 
opportunity to reach his or her potential. These can only 
be brought about where the detained child is provided 
with an appropriate care and treatment regime in a proper 
setting or facility.
Deprivation of liberty constitutes a denial of human 
rights. Therefore, the rights model requires that such a 
denial must be circumscribed by a full panoply of rights, 
including automatic review and power to appeal against 
the decision permitting detention. The High Court has not
198 Ireland: ibid. at 538.
199 Ireland: ibid. at 538.
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put in place such safeguards. Many of the cases in which 
the High Court has ordered the detention of children have 
not expressly provided for a periodic review of the 
child's detention. The purpose of any review is to 
consider the availability of appropriate places or 
services for the child, rather than considering the 
appropriateness of continuing the child's detention.
1.3.6. Developing competence of child
The common law provided that a child on reaching the 
"age of discretion" was entitled to take decisions for 
himself or herself, such as marrying. 200 The age of 
discretion was determined on the basis of the child's
chronological age and not on the basis of a child's
developing competence.201 The common law age of 
discretion was 14 for boys202 and 16 for girls. 203 The
common law age of discretion was replaced by the concept
that a father had a right to the control and custody of 
his child until the child reaches his or her age of 
majority.204
200 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Edge
[1943] I.R . 115 at 163-165 per Gavan Duffy J..
201 England: R. v. Howes (1860) 3 El. & El. 332, 121
E.R. 467 at 336-337, 468-469 per Cockburn C.J..
202 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Edge
[1943] I.R. 115 at 139-140 per Geoghegan J. and at 166 per 
Gavan Duffy J..
203 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Edge
[1943] I.R. 115 at 145 per O'Byrne J..
204 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Edge
[1943] I.R. 115 at 145 per O'Byrne J.. In The People 
(Attorney General) v. Edge [1943] I.R. 115 at 149 per Black 
J. who stated obiter that perhaps the age of consent might
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The welfare model provides that parents or the State 
decide on the exercise of the child's rights where the 
child is incompetent to make decisions for himself or 
herself. However, a child is a person with developing 
physical and intellectual capacities. The rights model 
provides that the parent or State's ability to exercise a 
particular right of a child is lost where a child is 
competent to make the decision for himself or herself.205
The rationale underlying this approach is equality. 
Children cannot be classified as one homogenous class.
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 guarantees that all 
citizens are held equal before the law. 206 However, the 
law must take into account the differences of capacity 
that exist between children. The Constitution of Ireland 
1937 does allow for differences of capacity, physical and 
moral, and of social function. 207 The constitutional 
guarantee of equality prohibits invidious
be interpreted as meaning nothing more than that at that 
age there arises a rebuttable presumption that the child is 
fit to make a rational choice which the court would not 
override except in special circumstances.
205 England: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 186 and 188-189 per 
Lord Scarman. United States: Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622
(1979) at 643-644 per Powell J.; Ohio v. Akron Center 497 
U.S. 502 (1990) at 511 per Kennedy J. and at 524-542 per
Blackmun J.; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 899-900 per
O' Connor J . .
205 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.1.
207 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.1.
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discrimination. 208 It constitutes invidious 
discrimination to treat all children in the same way by 
denying competent children the right to make decisions 
for themselves.
The rights model requires that the child's voice 
must be considered even where the child does not have the 
intellectual capacity to make the decision for himself or 
herself. The weight to be attached to the child's wishes 
or views depends on the child's age and understanding.
208 Ireland: O'Brien v. Keogh [1972] I.R. 144 at 155-156 
per O'Dalaigh C.J.; Landers v. Attorney General (1972) 109 
I.L.T.R. 1 at 3-4 per Finlay J..
CHAPTER TWO
2.0. Introduction
This Chapter surveys the academic literature 
discussing the concepts discussed in this thesis. The 
chapter considers whether or not the literature supports 
the existence of the welfare model and rights model 
discussed by this thesis and whether the researcher's 
conclusions are supported by the literature.
2.1. Parens patriae
The thesis claims that the welfare model of 
children's rights owes its origin to the parens patriae 
role of the State that has been delegated to the courts.
Freeman (1983d) and Dingwall et al. (1983) claim
that the parens patriae prerogative accords the State 
ultimate responsibility for its citizens who cannot care 
for and protect themselves, particularly children and the 
mentally ill. Mack (1910), Dobson (1970) and Yackle
(1997) support this view, claiming that the parens 
patriae prerogative provides that the State is the 
ultimate guardian of the child. Coupet (2000) believes 
that the earliest development of the child welfare system 
was based on the parens patriae concept. This concept 
provides that the State can substitute and enforce its 
judgment about what it believes to be in the best 
interests of children. Kneeper (1994-95) adopted a 
similar view.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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It can be argued that the parens patriae prerogative 
can exist in a medieval State with a monarch but not in a 
modern republic such as the United States of America or 
Ireland. However, Kleinfeld (1970c) claims that the 
theory of parens patriae has not changed a great deal 
during its passage through time. Both Mack (1910) and 
Kleinfeld (1970c) provide contemporary examples of the 
American courts invoking the parens patriae prerogative, 
and this supports the idea that the doctrine is 
compatible with contemporary democratic ideals.
The literature casts some doubt on the continuous 
basis of the court's wardship and parens patriae 
jurisdiction. Seymour (1994) finds that the courts cannot 
claim that the parens patriae jurisdiction has been 
continuous. Bradney (1988) explained that wardship's 
origins in the monarch's position as parens patriae may 
explain the jurisdiction but it does nothing to justify 
it. Freeman (1983d) claims legal-historical justification 
may have been nothing more than a cloak or a way of 
giving the juvenile court status. Eekelaar (1986a), 
Bradney (1988) and Foster and Freed (1972) do not attempt 
to trace the origins of the jurisdiction, but are content 
to describe the jurisdiction as being inherent.
The manner in which the judiciary have used the 
wardship and parens patriae prerogative has reflected 
society's changing view of childhood. Herr (1992) noted 
the Chancery Courts were more concerned with the child's 
property rather than the personal well-being of the
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child. Brenner (1982-83) saw the move in the parens 
patriae jurisdiction away from property to issues of 
child welfare reflected society's changing view of 
childhood. Coupet (2000) found that the parens patriae 
prerogative provided a theoretical justification for 
intervention in the lives of children and families. 
Seymour (1994) was not surprised at this change of 
judicial attitude in the use of wardship. Seymour claims 
that this change reflected society's greater willingness 
to interfere with the family through statutes punishing 
child neglect, restricting the employment of children, 
making education compulsory and granting equality to 
parents in guardianship and custody matters. Seymour 
explained how the courts viewed their parens patriae 
jurisdiction as parental. Engum (1982) took a similar 
view describing how the State's parens patriae interest 
in children allowed a court to supersede parental 
autonomy where a parental decision threatened a child's 
health or welfare.
The welfare model assumes that the parens patriae 
jurisdiction has invested the courts with powers more 
extensive than parents.1 Seymour (1994) is unable to 
locate the origin of these extensive powers. Seymour 
distinguishes between the situation where a court dons 
the mantle of a parent in order to do what that parent is 
competent to do, from the situation where a court 
exercises powers beyond those that are not possessed by a
1 See Chapter 1 at p . 25-26.
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parent. Seymour's comments must be viewed cautiously. A 
court will always have wider powers than a parent, for 
example ordering a Minister to provide appropriate 
facilities for a child. However, the rights model 
requires that the court's powers must be exercised within 
limits to avoid paternalism and arbitrariness.
The rights model holds that once a child is 
competent to make a decision for himself or herself, the 
parens patriae prerogative is extinguished. Anon (1980) 
and Pritz (1991) view the mature minor doctrine of the 
United States as a restraining influence on the State's 
parens patriae power. Pritz refers to three cases to 
prove this assertion. However, these cases demonstrate 
the existing influence of parens patriae even though in 
one case it was established that the child was competent. 
Eekelaar (1986a) has queried the basis on which the 
courts retain the parental jurisdiction when the parent 
loses it, not through deprivation, but due to the 
superior right of the child.
2.2. Duty and rights of parents
The welfare model was primarily concerned with the 
rights of parents until the mid-nineteenth century. Hafen
(1976) explains that the common law parental rights to 
custody were seen as sacred and as a matter of natural 
law. These rights were seen as more important than 
property rights.
Bainham (1986) believes that the twentieth century 
has witnessed a substantial dilution of the doctrine of
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parental rights. This dilution reflects a jurisprudential 
change. Dickens (1981) sees the shift from the rights of 
parents to their duties as a rejection of nature to a 
utilitarian base. Brenner (1982-83) offers a different 
perspective. Society viewed children as creatures who 
were dependent, incapable of caring for themselves, and 
dependence itself became idealised as carrying with it 
certain "moral" qualities, such as innocence. This had a 
significant effect upon the role of parents by placing 
more emphasis on the parental duties to protect and 
structure their children's development. Hall (1972) 
believes that the erosion of parental rights was driven 
by the increasing concern of society for the well-being 
and welfare of its youngest members.
The welfare model and rights model each accord 
parents both duties and rights. The principal focus of 
the rights model is on the performance of parental 
duties. Parental rights are to be exercised in order to 
perform parental duties. Cohen (1992) points out that 
Thomas Aquinas saw that parental rights over children 
were restrained by the parent's obligation to maintain 
the child and provide the child with physical, mental, 
moral and religious education. The welfare model places 
more emphasis on parental rights than on parental duties. 
Staines (1976), Osborough (1978), and Duncan (1978a); 
(1987); (1993) believe that the Irish courts have treated
the "inalienable.... rights" of parents as more important 
that the child's welfare. This is despite the fact that
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the Constitution describes the rights of the child as 
"natural and imprescriptible." O'Reilly (1977) stresses 
the importance of the constitutional protection offered 
to the family in Ireland. Duncan (1987) identified cases 
where the welfare of the child was treated as paramount. 
However, the rights of parents have been upheld in other 
cases. Duncan concludes that the courts tend to favour 
parental rights by requiring compelling reasons before 
setting aside parental rights. Duncan (1978b) argues that 
the Constitution should redress the preeminence given to 
the rights of parents. This can be achieved in one of two 
ways. First, the judges should accord children implied 
rights by relying on the Constitution's description of 
the rights of the child as being natural and 
imprescriptible. Second, the courts could rely on the 
concept of best interests.
The academic literature may be taken to support both 
the welfare model and the rights model advanced in this 
thesis. Eekelaar (1973) noted that parental rights of 
custody, education and consent to medical intervention 
are related to the performance of parental duties. Katz 
et al. (1973) state that a parent in the United States
has duties to a child's maintenance, health and 
education. Katz et al. claim that the parent is vested 
with the custody and control of the child in order to 
perform these obligations. Kleinfeld (1970b), Maidment
(1981), Dickens (1981) and Seymour (1992) express similar 
views. Dickens (1981) believes that the focus is upon the
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preservation of life and health, to enable the child to 
grow into maturity and consequent autonomy. Parental 
duties and rights exist to preserve and to prepare 
children for adulthood and emerging autonomy. Bainham 
(1986) argues that the conceptualisation of the parental 
position in terms of duties as opposed to rights 
demonstrating a movement in the court's view of looking 
at family relationships from the perspective of the 
child's welfare. Eekelaar (1993a) supports this view. 
Eekelaar believes that the parental duties are embedded 
in the coniunction of two sources. One is the a priori 
duty to promote human flourishing, which exists 
independently of the actual organisation of any society. 
That moral duty binds everyone and is not specifically 
directed towards parents. The duty falls primarily on 
parents for no other reason than their physical proximity 
to their children. The other source derives from the 
nature of society. Social practice determines the 
application of that duty within its structure. However, 
Dingwall et al. (1983) did not view the relationship
between parents and children as one based on duties and 
rights. These authors preferred the trust analogy. The 
object of this trust is the promotion of the children's 
welfare and this restricts parental autonomy.
The shift from parental rights to duties should 
reflect a change with greater focus on the interests of 
children rather than that of parents. Eekelaar (1991) 
highlights the difficulty with this approach. Eekelaar
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points out that parental duties are open to two 
interpretations. First, it can be interpreted as the 
requirement that parents must act dutifully to their 
children. Second, it can be interpreted as showing that 
responsibility for child care lies with the parents not 
the State. Respect for non state intervention in families 
may arise where undue emphasis is attributed to the 
second interpretation.
The welfare model and rights model both require 
parents to exercise the rights of an incompetent child. 
Steinberg (1995-96) supports this by pointing out that an 
incompetent child cannot be trusted to make important 
decisions on his or her own behalf.
The welfare model provides that parents are ex 
hypothesi presumed capable of performing these duties and 
exercising these rights. Inherent in this is the 
difficulty experienced when children themselves become 
parents. Richards (1980), Engum (1982), Baron (1983), 
Worrell (1986) and Parker (1993) identifies parents' 
motivation to do what is best for their child, love and 
affection as the sources of this presumption. Panneton
(1977) found that it is a fundamental principle that a 
child's parents are best suited to speak for the child. 
The academic literature differs as to the strength of 
this presumption. Foster and Freed (1968) do not grant 
this presumption any special weight. However, Hafen
(1976), Goldstein (1977) and Schoeman (1983) found that 
there is a strong rebuttable presumption in favour of
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privacy in family affairs and parental authority. Hafen
(1976) argues that this presumption owes its origins to 
the common law. These presumptions preclude what is seen 
as coercive State interference. The views of Goldstein
(1977) and Schoeman (1983) are incompatible with the 
rights model. The views of both sacrifice the rights of 
the child in order to maintain parental autonomy. Hafen
(1976) and Goldstein (1977) attempt to avoid such a 
conclusion by claiming that a child has a biological and 
psychological need for unthreatened and unbroken 
continuity to care by his or her natural parents. De 
Langen (1992) describes State interference in family life 
as a violation of the child's right to respect for his 
private and family life.
The welfare model harbours a strong bias towards 
preserving parental autonomy: it protects the rights of 
parents to make decisions touching on the welfare of 
their children. Hafen (1976) and Schoeman (1983) support 
this bias by suggesting that State intervention should 
only be permitted where the parents' acts or omissions 
pose an imminent danger to the child's health or safety. 
Richards (1980) and Dickens (1981) believe that the law 
accords so much respect to the parental role, that 
natural parents have an absolute right of custody. Anon
(1980) recognised that the State cannot intervene unless 
parents are clearly and convincingly shown to be at 
fault. Worrell (1986) believes that this bias gives rise 
to a conflict of interest. The State must protect the
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vulnerable child but at the same time respect and protect 
the family. Pound (1916) discussed the failure of the 
courts to enforce parental duties and limits on parental 
rights in favour of children. These, Pound argues, could 
be attributed partly to the judicial commitment to 
maintaining family unity, and partly to an historical 
quirk that family law became fixed relatively early, at a 
time when the law was more concerned with family than 
with individual interests. Freeman (1997) notes that the 
usage of the term "families", as in family autonomy, has 
too often come to be identified with "parents".
The rights model seeks to undermine this bias by 
underscoring the danger that family privacy and authority 
may be a cover for parental abuse. The bias is based on 
the presumption that parents invariably act in the 
child's best interests. Panneton (1977) adduces evidence 
to show that parents do not always act in the child's 
best interests.
The rights model requires intervention at an earlier 
stage than does the welfare model, as the child's 
developing capacities may be permanently damaged by 
failure to intervene promptly. However, Rodham (1973), 
Freeman (1983c) and Coons et al. (1991) find that it is
difficult to define what parental conduct triggers the 
State's duty to intervene to protect the child.
Therefore, parental autonomy is preferred. Freeman 
(1983a) believes that if the welfare model is to err it 
should be on the side of protecting the child.
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Teitelbaum and Ellis (1978) have gone so far as to 
argue that the courts have granted recognition to an 
independent parental power over children that creates a 
sphere of personal domination which resembles the 
relationship of the early Roman father over his children. 
Richards (1980) reached a similar conclusion. Duncan 
(1993) believes that it is insufficient to describe the 
powers which parents exercise in respect of their 
children solely in terms of duties. The rights model 
views parental rights as deriving from parental duties.
2.3. Best interests
The welfare model and rights model require parents 
to perform these duties and rights in the child's best 
interests. Schoeman (1983) points out that those who 
exercise discretion on behalf of the child must do so 
with the child's best interests in mind. Bates (1980) and 
Maidment (1981) view this requirement as a move away from 
and a limitation on parental rights. However, Dickens
(1981) is concerned that these duties and rights appear 
to be defined by reference not to the positive standard 
of achieving good for children, but by reference to the 
negative standard of protecting children from harm. This 
allows parents to control children for purposes not 
violating children's interests, but equally not advancing 
their welfare. Goldstein (1977) is of the opinion that 
parents must meet minimal standards of child care 
negatively set in neglect, abuse, and abandonment 
statutes and affirmatively set in provisions such as
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those obligating parents to send their children to school 
and prevent them from taking employment. However, Baskin 
(1974) disagrees with the requirement of compelling 
reasons before State intervention is permissible. Baskin 
allows for State intervention when the child's personal 
interests are threatened. Steinberg (1995-96) goes 
further by allowing for State intervention where parents 
are not acting in the child's best interests. Duncan
(1986) is concerned that the Irish courts accord too much 
weight to the rights of parents and find that welfare of 
the child is not the guiding factor when assessing 
parental actions.
The rights model is concerned at the vagueness of 
the best interest standard. This vagueness gives rise to 
a greater risk of judicial paternalism in protecting 
parental autonomy. This concern is shared by Wolf (1992) 
and Fitzgerald (1994). Wolfson (1992) notes that it is 
remarkable at the persistence of the best interests 
standard considering its complete lack of definite, or 
seemingly necessary, content. Freeman (1983e) however 
states that it has to be recognised that in many cases 
there is a band of reasonable parenting decisions. Rodham
(1973) finds that this vagueness allows for best 
interests to become value-laden. Anon (1980) declares 
that there is no societal consensus as to the best way to 
raise children. Anon states that the State's parens 
patriae prerogative would still compel a presumption that 
parents are better qualified than the State to promote
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the child's best interests.
The vagueness attaching to the best interests 
standard is less obvious when it comes to examination of 
parental decisions concerning medical intervention. Baron
(1983) argues that in such cases, an objective cost- 
benefit analysis may make one of the choices seem 
overwhelmingly right and the other clearly wrong. The 
courts accord greater weight to parental discretion where 
the evidence indicates that the efficacy or safety of the 
proposed treatment is open to question. Kneeper (1994-95) 
explains that the court will intervene when the proposed 
treatment promises a clear medical benefit and the 
child's condition is life threatening. The court will not 
intervene with parental autonomy when the treatment has 
only marginal benefits and/or in which the child's 
condition is not life threatening. Fox and McHale (1997) 
came to a similar conclusion. Parents may legitimately 
object to proposed treatment where it is deemed "heroic" 
in nature and parental opposition is rooted in the 
experimental, invasive and/or prolonged nature of the 
procedure.
Despite the approach of Baron (1983), Kneeper (1994- 
95), and Fox and McHale (1997), Goldstein (1977) 
advocates an approach that strengthens the presumption of 
parental autonomy in cases concerned with medical 
intervention. Goldstein allows for State intervention 
only in life-or-death cases where (a) the clinical 
opinion is that the non-experimental medical treatment is
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right for the child; (b) the expected outcome is what 
society agrees to be right for any child, a chance for 
normal healthy growth toward adulthood or a life worth 
living; and (c) that the expected outcome of denial of 
that treatment would mean for the child's death.
Goldstein argues that there is no justification for State 
intrusion in life-or-death cases where (a) there is no 
proven medical procedure (b) parents are confronted with 
conflicting medical advice about which, if any treatment 
procedure to follow; or (c) even if the medical experts 
agree about treatment, there is less than a high 
probability that the non-experimental treatment will 
enable the child to pursue either a life worth living or 
a life of relatively normal healthy growth toward 
adulthood. Goldstein points out that there is little 
societal consensus as to what life is worth living. 
Sokolosky (1981-82) opposes the stance taken by Goldstein 
by finding ample expression of a public policy allowing 
State intervention in parent decisions concerning medical 
treatment even where no threat to the child's life 
exists. Engum (1982) believes that the parental right to 
determine medical intervention is accorded greater 
recognition that the parental duty to protect the child's 
health. Davies (1998) believes that the best interests of 
children in cases involving medical intervention can 
still lead to recognition of parental autonomy rather 
than the protection of the independent rights of the 
child. Bainham (1997) warned against the danger of the
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court conflating the parental and child interests.
2.4. Duty of State to protect and provide for child
The welfare model and rights model both provide that 
the State may be obliged to protect and provide for the 
child. The source of this obligation is parens patriae. 
Rodham (1973) and Anon (1980) note that the parens 
patriae prerogative has long justified State interference 
with parental rights. Dobson (1970) views the parens 
patriae prerogative as not being entirely altruistic. 
There is significant emphasis on the correlation between 
the welfare of the child and of the State. To this end, 
the State has the right and duty to establish reasonable 
standards for a child's care.
The rights model permits the invocation of the 
parens patriae prerogative where parents seek to take 
actions inconsistent with the child's best interests. 
Duncan (1987) believes that the State has a right, if not 
a duty, to control any conduct or decision by a parent 
which threatens the child's constitutional rights such as 
the right to bodily integrity and right to life where a 
parent refuses to consent to medical intervention. 
However, Goldstein (1977) believes that the State 
exercising its parens patriae prerogative is too crude an 
instrument to become an adequate substitute for parents. 
The welfare model and rights model provide that when the 
State assumes the parental role it must act in the 
child's best interests. Bainham (1986) found that the 
best interests principle endows the courts with a broad
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discretion to determine their own view of an individual 
child's best interests and to make appropriate orders. 
Kneeper (1994-95) believes that the best interests 
standard requires the judge to behave as a responsible 
and loving parent.
The rights model finds that the best interests is an 
inapplicable approach where the court is concerned with 
trying a child with a criminal offence. Mack (1910) 
Freeman (1983d) and Coupet (2000) explained that the 
parens patriae concept in the juvenile court system 
provides that the judge must act as a benevolent parent 
would act for his or her own child. This could not be 
achieved where the court had to comply with the same 
procedural rules as govern a criminal trial. Worrell
(1986) explains that the juvenile court promises to act 
in the child's best interests rather than punishing the 
child in exchange for a relinquishment of a child's 
constitutional rights in the criminal process. Children 
were seen as being more amenable to rehabilitation than 
an adult criminal. The court focused on the child's 
welfare and character. The child was to receive the 
appropriate "treatment". Findlay (1979-80) found that 
Ireland shares the desires of many of other common law 
jurisdictions that social enquiry information should made 
be available to judges dealing with juvenile offenders. 
Smoot (1973) explained that the juvenile court afforded 
the juvenile fewer procedural rights than an adult 
accused. This renders the juvenile an easier target for
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arbitrary action. However, Polier (1974) and Fox (1976) 
discuss the failings of the juvenile system including 
that judges were not provided with the appropriate 
personnel to assist them. Fortas (1967) concluded that 
the parens patriae jurisdiction of the juvenile courts in 
the United States denied children access to 
constitutional protection. Fortas is of the opinion that 
the effect of this was to treat juveniles as non-persons 
and thereby to discriminate against the child. The 
solution, according to Freeman (1983d), is a shift away 
from a welfare model to the system that includes the 
panoply of rights accorded to a person accused of a 
crime. Parker (1970) notes that a judge can prescribe a 
sentence that protects society while at the same time 
contains the best possible chance of rehabilitation for 
the offending child.
The rights model supports a shift away from State 
intervention based on parens patriae to that based on the 
police power. Anon (1980) identifies another source for 
State regulation of the family: the police power. This is 
the State's inherent plenary power both to prevent its 
citizens from harming one another and to promote all 
aspects of the public welfare, such as public morality, 
health and safety. Anon finds that the police power 
cannot be invoked to support parental authority over 
children that are competent.
The welfare model and the rights model oblige the 
State to provide services necessary for the child to
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reach his or her potential. The performance of these 
duties may lead to greater interference with the rights 
of parents and children. Duncan (1987) believes that the 
State's increased responsibility for matters affecting 
children such as education and health results in 
increasing State involvement in the socialisation, 
education and protection of children. The fulfilment of 
these State duties have placed limitations on parental 
rights. Kleinfeld (1970b) states that the State's 
intervention in education restricts the rights of 
children.
The rights model allows for the evolution and 
development of the child's welfare rights. The academic 
literature focuses on the State's duty to educate 
children. The first issue for the welfare model and 
rights model is the definition of education. Both 
Osborough (1978) and Kelly (1990-1992) believe that 
education can be interpreted in a broader sense than that 
of purely scholastic education. It can mean the 
upbringing of children.
The second aspect is the State's interest in 
ensuring that a child receive a minimum education. The 
State has an interest in ensuring that the child on 
becoming an adult can function in society. Duncan (1987) 
explains that society has a legitimate interest in its 
children deriving from the need for them to become 
functioning members of society, and from their condition 
of vulnerability and consequent need for protection.
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Fitzgerald (1994) claims that we view children as 
potential adults and childhood as the gradual preparation 
for adulthood. Our law concerns itself with utilitarian 
policies designed to raise children into better adults. 
Children are educated so that they become self-sufficient 
and join a responsible electorate as adults.
Kelly (1990-92) believes that this State interest in 
its children's education has evolved. Kelly argues that a 
State would have no interest in the education of its 
people in a simple and primitive society. However, the 
State's interest in the education of its people is 
different in a modern society. The complication of life 
on every front, along with the multiplicity of 
governmental activities, make an educated population an 
absolute necessity. Scarcely any economic, industrial or 
administrative task can be performed by a person who is 
illiterate and/or has no numeral skills. Kelly views this 
as a basis for the State's justification for compulsory 
education. The State can intervene to ensure that a child 
receives a certain minimum education in view of actual 
conditions. Kelly considered the Irish version of Article 
42.3.2 of the Constitution and the phrase for "in view of 
actual conditions": toisc cor an lae. Kelly translated 
this phrase as "because of the turn that the world has 
taken". Therefore, the requirement of actual conditions 
provides the yardstick when determining the level of "the 
certain minimum education" that the State can compel. The 
minimum education today might seem, in view of the actual
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conditions, quite inadequate twenty years from now. Walsh 
(1980); (1981) was of the view that what constitutes
primary education evolves over time. Walsh stated that 
the basic requirements of primary education naturally 
become greater with the progress of society, increasing 
standards of living and improvements in the quality of 
lif e .
The effect of this approach is that the parental 
authority over the child's education is circumscribed by 
the State's duty to provide a child with minimum 
education. The nature of the minimum education may become 
so complex to curtail the parent's ability to educate a 
child at home. Therefore, whether an exercise of parental 
autonomy concerning education is or is not in the child's 
best interests is determined by society's evolving 
requirements of a minimum education. Whyte (1990-1992) 
notes that although the parents have a right to determine 
a child's education, the majority of parents avail of 
State education.
Kleinfeld (1970c) takes a different perspective. 
Kleinfeld establishes two possible theories for the 
State's ability to require that a child receive a minimum 
education. First, parents owe a duty to their child to 
educate the child, and the State as protector of the 
child's interests may compel parents to perform this 
duty. Second, parents owe a duty to the State to educate 
their children, which the State may compel parents to 
perform.
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Gilles (1996) argues for broad parental autonomy in 
determining a child's education. Gilles bases this claim 
on unproven foundations: few parents in our society will 
choose to educate their children in ways that fail to 
satisfy the teaching of civic toleration, respect for law 
and acquiesce in our basic constitutional arrangements.
2.5. Welfare rights of child
It could be argued that there is no need to 
recognise welfare rights. Parental duties and the court's 
duty to act in the child's best interests achieves the 
same purpose. It satisfies the child's needs and promotes 
the child's welfare. Freeman (1994) noted that it had 
been assumed that the need for and development of child's 
rights was otiose, as parents were seen as the guardians 
of their children's welfare.
The development of rights for children depends on 
how society views children. Freeman (1983b), Roche (1988) 
and Freeman (1997) argue that childhood, like adulthood 
or old age, is to a large extent a social construct. 
Flekkoy (1992) highlights the different attitudes that 
adults can have of children. Adult perception of children 
and the child's perception of the adult is always to some 
extent influenced by personal needs and interests. Adults 
have imposed their conceptions of childishness on whom 
they consider to be children. There have been different 
conceptions of the nature of childhood at different 
periods of history. There has in the modern period been a 
tendency to associate children with all sorts of negative
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qualities, weakness, irrationality, imbecility, pre- 
logicism and primitivism. Freeman (1983b) draws heavily 
from Aries (1960) . Freeman (1997) concludes that children 
have become objects of social concern and intervention 
rather than persons in their own right. Roche (1988) 
finds that the law reflects society's perception through 
inter alia judicial decisions. This view of children 
allows the court to recognise the welfare rights of a 
child.
There is support in the academic literature for the 
recognition and nature of welfare rights. Wringe (1992) 
highlights the importance of welfare rights in the 
context of the inevitable dependency of children. Wald 
(1979) and Freeman (1983c) argue for the creation of 
welfare rights for children. Neither the United States 
Supreme Court nor the House of Lords has recognised 
welfare rights. The academic literature does contain 
calls for the recognition of such rights. Fitzgerald 
(1994) is critical of the United States Supreme Court's 
failure to recognise welfare rights in order to meet 
children's needs. Bitensky (1992) argues that the United 
States courts should afford recognition for a 
constitutionally grounded for a right to education 
through the due process, free speech and equal protection 
clauses. Pyfer (1972) makes a strong argument for a 
constitutional right of a child committed to juvenile 
facilities to receive treatment. Herr (1992) discuses how 
the equitable parens patriae jurisdiction could be used
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to afford treatment and special services to children with 
disabilities. Foster and Freed (1972) argue for certain 
welfare rights for children including a right to 
education and medical care.
The academic literature does describe the nature of 
these rights. Wringe (1992) views a welfare right as 
entitling a dependent child to necessities to be provided 
by the community. Freeman (1983c) defines welfare rights 
as ensuring children are provided with facilities and 
services necessary for their normal development. This 
will include the child's right to nutrition, shelter, 
medical treatment and education. Eekelaar (1983);
(1986a); (1992) defines welfare rights in a similar
manner. Children should at the minimum be afforded 
general physical, emotional and intellectual care within 
the social capabilities of his or her immediate 
caregivers.
The academic commentators consider the detrimental 
effects of children where deprived of these rights. Wald 
(1979) points out that the denial of such rights may 
result in denial of opportunity in society. Eekelaar
(1992) finds that these rights afford children an equal 
opportunity to maximise the resources available to them 
during their childhood (including their own inherent 
abilities) so as to minimise the degree to which they 
enter adult life affected by avoidable prejudices 
incurred during childhood. Children's capacities must be 
developed to their best advantage. Freeman (1983c) argues
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that the denial of these rights prevents the child from 
acquiring rational autonomy.
The academic literature attempts to identify who is 
responsible for satisfying these welfare rights. Wald
(1979), Freeman (1983c) and Eekelaar (1986a) state that 
it is the duty of society to vindicate the child's 
welfare rights. Wald (1979) explains that these rights 
benefit both children and society. Freeman (1983c) 
believes that it is difficult to define the content of 
these rights. Freeman believes that these rights protect 
the child's welfare. In addition, Freeman (1994) argues 
that these rights safeguard children's present and future 
autonomy.
The Irish courts have identified a number of welfare 
rights. Martin (2000a) comments on how the Irish superior 
courts have creatively interpreted the Constitution in 
order to "discover" unenumerated children's rights.
Clarke (1982) views these welfare rights as independent 
of any rights of the parents. These rights are not 
parasitic on the duties of the parents. The child has 
rights, just like any other citizen, exclusively by 
virtue of his or her own human personality. Parents could 
also have duties to satisfy welfare rights of child. 
Duncan (1987) believes that according children welfare 
rights leads to a corresponding increase in State 
intervention into family affairs.
The recognition of welfare rights in Ireland has 
fallen upon the judiciary. Martin (2000b) states that the
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Irish judiciary is prepared to take on the role of 
interventionist champion of children's rights if children 
have any legal disability within the legal system, such 
as their inability as children to assert their 
constitutional rights, in the absence of the State 
fulfilling its obligation to protect children. This role 
may result in a paternalistic approach when considering 
the argument that competent children have the ability to 
make decisions for themselves.
2.6. Civil rights of child
Worsfold (1974) describes that historically rights 
were ascribed only to adults. Children were treated 
paternalistically. The welfare model and the rights model 
both provide children with civil rights. Engum (1982) 
believes that it is clear that the State must provide 
children with the same rights and choices that it 
provides adults. Engum and Worrell (1986) warn that 
children may be deprived of civil rights because of the 
parens patriae prerogative that children require a 
greater degree of care and protection. The parens patriae 
prerogative is used as justification for treating 
children as having lesser rights.
There are a number of proponents in favour of 
children's civil rights within the established 
literature. These academic proponents may be placed on a 
spectrum. Freeman (1992b) argues that children should be 
afforded civil rights from a moral perspective. Freeman 
believes that rights are important because possession of
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them is part of what is necessary to constitute 
personality. Those who lack rights are like slaves, means 
to others' ends, and never their own masters.
Holt (1974) and Farson (1974) are at one end of the 
spectrum. They believe children should enjoy the same 
rights as adults. They hold children are entitled to 
exercise these rights in the same manner as an adult.
They argue children should be free to exercise their 
rights irrespective of their competence, and without any 
inhibition because of the adverse consequences that might 
flow from such an exercise of rights.
Worsfold's (1974) approach is less radical. Worsfold 
takes a utilitarian perspective. Worsfold assumes that 
once a child is held to be entitled to rights, he or she 
must be responsible for the consequences of his or her 
actions. Worsfold thus subscribes to Rawls's theory of 
the interconnection between rights and autonomy. Like 
Roche (1988), Worsfold would argue that the presumption 
should be that children should be deemed to be 
responsible for their actions unless the contrary is 
shown. Only where a child is shown to be under a 
particular disability should paternalistic intervention 
be permitted. Foster and Freed (1972) argue that a child 
has a right to be free of legal disabilities save where 
these are convincingly shown to be necessary as 
protective of the child's best interests.
Farson (1974) rejects the utilitarian perspective of 
Worsfold. Farson argues that children should be granted
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greater freedoms not because it may make children better 
people, but because expanding the freedoms of children is 
itself worthwhile.
Minow (1995) points out that advocates for 
children's rights sometimes resolved the tension between 
protection and liberation through a conception of 
children as potential adults, deserving rights but 
needing care on the way to adulthood. Roche (198 8) argues 
that children require some control but need 
simultaneously sufficient opportunities for growth and 
experimentation. Freeman (1983c); (1992a); (1992b);
(1994) argues that there is a need to restrict the acts 
or omissions of children which would prevent them from 
reaching an independent adulthood, "liberal paternalism". 
This version of paternalism is a double-edged sword in 
that, since the goal is rational independence, those who 
exercise constraints must do so in such a way as to 
enable children to develop their full capacities.
However, Hafen (1976) is concerned at any attempt to 
shift away from the legal presumption of parental 
autonomy to a legal presumption that children have rights 
and competent children may exercise these rights. Hafen 
argues that a legitimate shift in these presumptions can 
only occur after it has been conclusively shown that 
there is no longer any basis for the premise underlying 
the traditional view of children. Hafen stated that the 
development of the capacity to function as a mature 
independent member of society is essential to the
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meaningful exercise of the full range of rights 
characteristic of the individual tradition. Children 
should enjoy some protection against their own 
immaturity. This will mean that children will optimise 
their opportunities for the development of mature 
capabilities that are in their best interests. Children 
will outgrow their restricted state, but the more 
important question is whether they will outgrow it with 
maximised capacities. O'Neill (1992) also opposes 
according children civil rights. O'Neill believes that 
children's fundamental rights are best grounded by 
embedding them in a wider account of fundamental 
obligations. Mature and maturing children who are 
restricted and damaged by civil disabilities and 
infantilising social practices can use the rhetoric of 
rights to help secure greater recognition and 
independence. There are good reasons to think that 
paternalism may be much of what is ethically needed in 
dealing with children even it is inadequate in dealings 
with mature and maturing children.
Some commentators argue that family privacy and 
autonomy are threatened by according children civil 
rights. Wald (1979) argues that opponents of children's 
rights such as Hafen do not explain how giving children 
some autonomy to make major decisions threatens family 
privacy. The child makes the decision and family privacy 
is not threatened. Wald accepts that according rights to 
children may lead to conflict and the breakdown of the
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child-parental relationship. Wald identified the most 
legitimate concern as being that parents will be less 
willing to assume responsibility for children if they 
lose ultimate authority.
The effect of invoking the rights of children has 
been described by Duncan (1993) as a powerful antidote to 
the doctrine of family or parental autonomy. However, 
Duncan states that the doctrine of children's rights is 
not so much a recognition of children's autonomy as an 
expression of society's values about what is essential 
and what is impermissible in the rearing of children. 
Dickens (1981) came to a different conclusion finding 
that the rights of children are a limitation on the 
rights of parents.
There have been a number of cases in the United 
States concerning the civil rights of children.2 These 
cases have been criticised as they have only accorded 
children procedural rights. Minow (1987) rejects this 
criticism. Minow is of the opinion that these cases have 
focused attention on to the children's needs and this at 
least holds the possibility of engaging society in a 
debate on the needs and rights of children.
Inherent in the rights model is the presumption that 
the State cannot unduly restrict the rights of children. 
Anon (1984) argues for restricting the effect that the 
parens patriae prerogative has on the rights of children.
2 United States: In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Goss v.
Lopez 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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Anon recognises that the State may have special interests 
in protecting and guiding children, but if the rights of 
children are to have any content, the State's power to 
override those by asserting special interests cannot be 
plenary. Rather, the State's special interests should 
extend only to a relatively narrow band of concerns that 
relate to the unique developmental and emotional 
vulnerabilities of children. Only if the courts require a 
strict correlation between the child's special needs and 
the actions of the State can the State's unique interests 
be served with minimal infringement of children's 
constitutional rights.
2.7. Conflicting rights of child
The welfare model and rights model both recognise 
the potential conflict between the child's welfare and 
civil rights. The welfare model accords supremacy to the 
child's welfare rights. Eekelaar (1986a); (1992) supports
this view.
Harvie-Wilkinson III (1975) was critical of the 
United States Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez3 for its 
failure to afford sufficient procedural safeguards when 
depriving a child of the welfare right to education.
Sebba (1992) considers the possible conflict between 
civil and welfare rights in the juvenile justice system. 
Sebba does not believe that it is not simply a choice 
between a welfare or a justice model when determining how 
to run a juvenile justice system. There may rather be a
3 United States: 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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continuum extending from extreme welfarism to extreme 
liberalism. However, Sebba makes no attempt to justify 
such an approach.
2.8. Developing competence of child
The rights model presupposes that children can 
acquire the intellectual competence to make decisions for 
themselves. The ability of parents or the courts to take 
decisions is lost, when children have the competence to 
make decisions for themselves. Montgomery (1988) argues 
that once a child has reached an age at which he or she 
is mature enough to become the judge of his or her own 
interests, the paternalistic arguments justifying the 
existence of parental rights crumble. Wald (1979),
Freeman (1983c) and Mason (1993) believe that children 
should be entitled to exercise their rights when they are 
competent, and there is then no need to obtain consent 
for the exercise of these rights from anyone else. Hafen 
(1976) points out that Locke and Mill excluded children 
from their philosophical theories. However, Locke and 
Mill did not discriminate arbitrarily on the basis of a 
chronological age. The issue was one of capacity. Neither 
would have justified discrimination against children once 
capacity had been attained. Cretney (1989) was of the 
opinion that if the principle of competence is accepted, 
it would emancipate children from many of the legal 
disabilities of infancy.
Pritz (1991) defined a mature minor as a child 
possessing the requisite degree of maturity so that,
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under certain circumstances, the courts may find that 
child legally competent, possessing those constitutional 
and common law rights due to adults. Steinberg (1995-96) 
argues that there is no justification for treating the 
rights of children and adults differently where a child 
can show that he or she is of sufficient maturity to make 
a conscious and intelligent choice. Duncan (1987); (1993)
states that it may be possible that the Irish 
Constitution accords children a principle of limited 
self-determination for children. It is difficult to 
support Duncan's claim, considering the recent 
paternalistic attitude of the Irish Supreme Court in D .G . 
(a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland.4
The rights model requires the law to respect the 
competent child's decision. Eekelaar (1986a) believes 
that the effect of the decision in Gillick v. West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority5 was to accord 
children the most dangerous but most precious rights: the 
right to make their own mistakes. Freeman (1992a) 
believes that the law should respect a child's autonomy 
even if this leads to deleterious effect on a child's 
life.
The welfare model has developed two methods deriving 
from parens patriae that prevent competent children from 
exercising their rights.
First, the courts have recognised that parents and
4 Ireland: [1997] 3 I.R. 511
5 England: [1986] A.C. 112.
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the State can override the decision of a competent child. 
The academic literature has been critical of this 
approach. Eekelaar (1986b) believed that neither the 
parent nor the court had the power to override the 
decision of a competent child. This was so, irrespective 
of whether or not the decision is in the child's best 
interests. Freeman (1992-93), Eekelaar (1993b), Murphy 
(1992a) and Edwards (1993) noted that the court's powers 
are wider than those of the parent and can include 
overriding a competent child's decision. Thornton (1992) 
could not understand why a parent or a court can override 
the decision of a competent child to refuse medical 
intervention. Masson (1991) , Douglas (1992), Haughton- 
James (1992), Brennan (1993), Bridgeman (1993) and 
Nicholls (1994) have criticised such an approach as 
blatant paternalism. Huxtable (2000) believes that the 
court is focusing on beneficence, non-maleficence and 
paternalism. Parker and Dewar (1992) found that a cynical 
view is that the courts are only willing to allow 
children to say yes to those things where there are 
already good policy arguments in favour of saying yes.
For example, a competent girl can consent to 
contraceptive treatment because the overall consequences 
such as avoiding pregnancy are more desirable that the 
consequences which might flow from allowing a parental 
veto. This smacks of handing over decision-making to a 
child only when it suits. Bainham (1992a) found that the 
court's paternalistic approach was based on what adult
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decision-makers consider to be "good" for children. 
Bainham states that the temptation to deem the child 
incompetent must be almost irresistible where any adult 
decision-maker disagrees strongly with a child's 
decision. Smith (1997) puts forward another proposition. 
Smith believes that the court's approach may be explained 
by reference to the State's vested interest in ensuring 
that children grow up to become responsible citizens. 
Therefore, the problem does not lie with whether children 
of whatever age are competent. The resistance to change 
lies with a particular ideological approach to social 
regulation in general, and the way thus impacts upon 
children as an investment in society's continued well­
being .
However, some academic commentators support the 
paternalistic judicial approach that allows parents or 
court to override the decision of a competent child. 
Bainham (1992b) finds that there is no inconsistency 
involved in recognising that parents or children may have 
rights contemporaneously. Lowe and Juss (1993) identify 
the rationale underpinning the paternalistic view: a 
court will not allow a child to refuse treatment that 
would cause the child irreparable harm. In the final 
analysis, a child is still a child. Brazier and Bridge
(1996) believe that any philosophy of autonomy yields to 
the pragmatic consideration to preserve life and health. 
Brazier and Bridge point out that philosophers enjoy the 
luxury of propounding abstract theory. Responsibility for
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the actual outcome of applying such theory rests with 
others, including judges, and of course, parents.
The second method is to determine that the child is 
incompetent. De Cruz (1999) believes that the courts 
consistently justify the enforcement of medical treatment 
on non-consenting teenagers by arguing that the children 
were not competent to make decisions in a rational way.
De Langen (1992) claims that adolescents in general are 
not regarded as competent to assert their rights, even 
though they are recognised as being competent. Scott et 
al. (1995) were concerned at the court's use of the
informed consent standard to assess adolescent's 
competence. Some adults may be unable to satisfy this 
standard. Fitzgerald (1994) is of the view that our 
search for maturity in children is a search for an adult 
perspective. A child has to mirror the decisions and 
choices of an adult. Scott et al. (1995) claim that there
is insufficient scientific evidence to demonstrate that 
adolescents do not possess the competence to make 
decisions. This results in courts approaching problems on 
a case by case basis. Adolescents should not be treated 
as a homogenous group unless scientific evidence warrants 
such a conclusion. Variations existing within the 
adolescent group may exceed the differences between 
adolescents and adults.
Engum (1982) questioned the use of courts to 
determine whether a child is or is not competent to 
consent to or refuse treatment. Engum is of the view that
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this does not emancipate the child but rather transfers 
to the State and the judiciary the parental control and 
responsibility for determining when to consult some 
psychological sage and when to abide by the child's 
choice. Bainham (1986) believes that the court in the 
Gillick decision is substituting one adult decision 
maker, the parent, for another, the clinician. The 
decision is entirely consistent with paternalistic and 
protectionist orientation of family law. The real 
decision-making control is in the adult applying the 
test. Goldstein (1977) raise similar concern of about 
body of wise persons deciding on a case by case basis 
that the particular child is competent. Huxtable (2000) 
is concerned that the court's finding of a power to 
override the wishes of a competent child affect the 
court's assessment of competence. Smith (1997) advocates 
separating the assessment of the child's competence from 
any assessment of the child's best interests.
The rights model presupposes that children can 
acquire the competence to make decisions for themselves. 
The academic literature contains evidence to support this 
argument. Batey (1982) found that the Anglo-American 
jurisprudential perspective that adolescents lack the 
capacity to make moral choices is incorrect. A number of 
studies demonstrate that most adolescents possess the 
moral reasoning skills of adults. Foster and Freed 
(1972), Rodham (1973); (1977), Batey (1982) and Murphy
(1992b) argue for a rebuttable legal presumption: the
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State can only defer the desires of an adolescent where 
it has been shown that the adolescent is not competent to 
make the decision. Woods (1980) argues that the 
rebuttable presumption should start at 14.
Batey (1982) argues that State intervention in the
life of an adolescent solely because his parents 
disapprove of the adolescent's choices should be
tolerated only if the adolescent is incompetent. Batey
argues that adolescence marks the end of a child's 
transition to adulthood, to autonomous interaction in 
society. The law has largely ignored this transitional 
process, adhering instead to the concept that childhood 
is a legally disabling condition that vanishes completely 
on the attainment of a certain birthday.
The academic literature suggest different 
chronological ages at which children may be competent. 
Wald (1979) argues that children aged between 10 and 12 
lack the cognitive abilities and judgmental skills 
necessary to make decisions about major events which 
could severely affect their lives. Freeman (1994) states 
that both in moral and cognitive development, many 
children reach adult levels between 12 and 14, though the 
ability to reason improves quite obviously through 
adolescence. Roche (1988) finds that the best 
contemporary evidence from social science indicates that 
moral and intellectual development does not change 
significantly after about the age of 14. However, Engum 
(1982) found that the child's right to self­
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determination, embodied in "mature minor" statutes is 
typically recognised when the consenting child is at 
least 15 years of age. Batterman (1994) found that few 
courts have found a child below 16 as competent to make 
decisions for himself or herself.
Freeman (1992a); (1992b) suggests that paternalist
intervention can only be justified in the case of an 
irrational decision. The concept of irrationality must be 
restricted. The subjective values of the would-be 
protector cannot be allowed to intrude. Freeman (1983c); 
(1992a) ; (1992b) believes that a child should mature to
independent adulthood. Irrational decisions are decisions 
that preclude the achievement of this goal. Freeman calls 
this concept of "future-oriented consent". This 
paternalism is justified as to whether the child would 
appreciate and accept the reason for the restriction 
imposed upon the child, given what the former child now 
knows as a rationally autonomous and mature adult. 
Richards (1980) believes that irrational conduct of 
itself does not justify paternalism. It is only when this 
irrationality leads to serious harm or injury that 
paternalistic intervention is justified. However, Federle 
(1993) argues that the focus of the law should not be 
competence. Tying rights to capacity permits opponents of 
children's rights to claim that children, for their own 
protection, should not have political and legal rights. 
There is a need to acknowledge that rights have value 
because of their power to eliminate hierarchy and
100
exclusion. Minow (1986) believes that granting autonomy 
to an individual is a political or moral choice made by 
each society to fulfil its own purposes - not a rational 
decision gauged by assessing competence or incompetence. 
Both Federle (1993) and Minow (1986) believe that 
competence and incompetence are used as proxies to 
address a variety of concerns about what societal 
decision-makers think children may need, and about what 
they simultaneously think allows adults to choose for 
themselves.
Worrell (1986) points out that competence is not 
relevant in relation to the vindication of rights that 
are designed to protect the individual against 
governmental harm, such as the right not to be imprisoned 
or not to be subject to cruel or unusual punishment.
The rights model accepts that the nature of the 
competence required of the child depends on the nature of 
the decision to be made. Batterman (1994) believes that 
the nature of medical treatment affects the degree of 
competence required from a child. A child is competent to 
make a decision where the child can understand the 
condition, the nature and purpose of the proposed 
treatment, the risks and consequences of the proposed 
treatment, the probability that the proposed treatment 
will be successful and the feasible alternative options 
including no treatment at all. Devereux (1991) came to a 
similar conclusion. The empirical research of Grisso
(1980) found that children under 15 failed to understand
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the right to remain silent and right to a lawyer during 
interrogation established in Miranda v. Arizona.6 The 
inescapable conclusion is that children under 15 require 
some form of assistance if they are to waive these 
rights.
Smith (1997) believes that the most effective way to 
redress the balance between rights and welfare is to 
persuade the judiciary that children are the most 
accurate arbiters of their own best interests. Smith 
argues that the judiciary are amenable to empirical 
evidence that children are capable of making informed 
choices and are as able as many adults to form a rational 
and balanced view about their own best interests. Wald 
(1979), Engum (1982) and Freeman (1983c) highlight the 
need for research into the children's developing 
capacities. Freeman (1983c) argues for a constant re­
examination of age limits in light of such research.
Some academic commentators support the judiciary's 
view that adolescents cannot be competent. The research 
of Scherer (1991) suggests that 14 and 15 year old 
adolescents are less likely than young adults to make 
autonomous decisions involving medical treatment.
The rights model stresses that the court must 
consider the wishes of the child even where a child is 
determined to be incompetent. Melton and Limber (1992) 
highlight the need to consider the views of children when 
defining and implementing the rights of children. Evans
6 United States: 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
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(1995) surveyed a limited number of cases involving the 
withdrawal of life saving treatment from children. Evans 
found that greater attention is given to the children's 
preferences. Melton and Limber (1992) highlight the need 
to consider the views of children when defining and 
implementing the rights of children.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHILD AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
3.0. Introduction
The majority of parental decisions do not require 
the involvement of a third party. The consequence is that 
the State may never find out if and when parents fail in 
their duties to their child. Such a failure is perhaps 
most likely to be associated with the symptoms of 
physical and mental morbidity. In such a case, parents 
will need a clinician's advice and skill when their child 
displays symptoms or undergoes procedures requiring 
diagnosis or intervention.
This participation has five consequences. First, a 
clinician has a duty of care when treating a child.1 This 
duty is subject to the qualification that a clinician 
must obtain the parent or court's consent before 
undertaking serious invasive treatment, except in 
emergencies where the child is unconscious. Diagnosis and 
treatment is determined by what is in the child's best 
interests and not necessarily what the parents may 
desire.
Second, clinicians must respect the rights of
1 England: In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1991] Fam. 33 at 41 per Lord Donaldson M.R. . In Thomson v. James 
and others (1997) 41 B.M.L.R. 144 at 151 Beldam L.J. explained
that the duty can be satisfied by taking reasonable care to 
ensure that the child's parents are in a position to make an 
informed choice in the child's best interests.
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parents to decide on medical intervention for the child.2 
The desirable result is that a treatment decision is to 
some degree a joint decision of parents and clinicians.3
Third, the participation of clinicians affords an 
opportunity to review parental decisions and decision­
making .
Fourth, the State discovers situations in which its 
parens patriae duty to children must be invoked.
Fifth, a clinician may refuse to provide a course 
of treatment sought by a parent, a child or court where 
such treatment is contrary to clinical practice or is 
unethical.4 This has the effect of indirectly inhibiting
2 Ireland: In In Re Article 26 and The Regulation of 
Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies) Bill 1995 [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81, it was argued that 
the Bill was unconstitutional as it allowed for children to 
receive information relating to abortion without the parents' 
knowledge or consent. The Supreme Court, at 114-115, held that 
those offering information, advice or counselling must have 
regard to the rights of persons likely to be affected by such 
information, counselling and advice. This would mean taking into 
account the rights of parents when offering information, 
counselling or advice to a child. The Supreme Court held that any 
departure from this constitutional obligation would be 
j usticiable.
3 England: In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1991] 2 Fam. 3 3 at 41 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re J. (A
Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 at 27 per 
Lord Donaldson M.R. and at 29-30 per Balcombe L.J.; In Re C. 
(Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 F.L.R. 384 at 389 per Sir Stephen
Brown P ..
4 Ireland: D.H. v. Ireland, unreported, High Court, 23 May, 
2000 at 13-14 and 17-18 per Kelly J. . England: In Re J. (A 
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33 at 41 per Lord 
Donaldson M.R.; In Re R. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1992] Fam. 11 at 22-26 per Lord Donaldson M.R. ; In Re J. (A 
Minor)(Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 at 26-27 
per Lord Donaldson M.R. and 29-30 per Balcombe L.J.; In Re W. (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 
at 81 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re C. (a baby) (1996) 32
B.M.L.R. 44 at 46 per Sir Stephen Brown P.; In Re C. (Medical
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the rights of parents and the wide ranging parens patriae 
powers of the courts.
Legal proceedings will arise where the clinicians 
disagree with the parents and/or child as to what is in 
the child patient's best interests. Many aspects of the 
welfare model and rights model have arisen in cases 
involving medical intervention and children.
3.1. Duties and rights of parents
The welfare model and rights model provide that 
parents have a duty to procure medical assistance for an 
ill child.5 The parental right to consent or refuse 
medical treatment on the child's behalf derives from this 
duty.
The common law provides that parents have a duty to 
maintain a child. This duty is fulfilled by the provision 
of food, clothing, shelter and medical treatment.
Parents' failure to procure necessary medical treatment 
for a child constitutes a breach of this duty. The Poor 
Law Amendment Act 18 68 made it a criminal offence for a 
parent to neglect a child by failing to provide the child
Treatment) [1998] 1 F.L.R. 384 at 389-390 per Sir Stephen Brown 
P.; A National Health Trust v. D. [2000] 2 F.L.R. 677 at 686 per 
Cazalet J ..
5 England: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 184 per Lord Scarman; In Re A.
(Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 
480 at 510 per Ward L.J.; United States: In Parham v. J.R. 442 
U.S. 584 (1979) at 602 per Burger C.J. holding that the parental 
duty is to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow 
medical advice.
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with inter alia medical treatment.6 This statutory 
provision imposes a duty on parents to procure necessary 
medical assistance for their child which outranks any 
common law parental discretion to consent to or refuse 
medical intervention on behalf of their child.
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 provides that 
parents are invested with natural, constitutional and 
legal authority to educate, care and control their 
child.7 In Ryan v. Attorney General8 the Irish Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that parents have a right to 
omit to provide for the health of their children. The 
Irish Supreme Court held that parents have a duty to ward 
off dangers to the health of their children. The Supreme 
Court found that there is nothing in the Constitution 
that recognises a parental right to refuse medical 
intervention on behalf of a child, when the medical 
intervention is not fraught with danger to the child and
6 England: Poor Law Amendment Act 1868, s. 37. In R . v .
Senior [1899] 1 Q.B.D. 283 at 289 per Lord Russell C.J. it was
held that this provision was enacted as the common law allowed 
parents to defend their failure to procure medical assistance by 
claiming that they acted in the child's best interests: See R. 
v. Wagstaffe (1868) 10 Cox C. C. 530 at 532-534 per Willes J..
The Poor Law Amendment Act 1868 was repealed and replaced by the 
Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of Children Act 1889, 
s. 1; Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894; Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children Act 1904, s. 1(1). Ireland: Child Care Act 
1991, s. 1(2) repealed the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 
1904. There is currently no statutory offence in Irish law for 
parents who fail to provide necessary medical treatment for their 
child.
7 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1.
8 Ireland: [1965] I.R. 294.
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is within the parent's procurement.9 The Supreme Court's 
approach accords with the rights model by subordinating 
the parental right to consent or refuse consent to 
medical treatment to the parental duty to procure medical 
assistance.10
Recently, the High Court in North Western Health 
Board v. H.W. and C.W.11 cast doubt on the Supreme 
Court's approach in Ryan. There, McCracken J. held that 
the Constitution placed the rights of the parents in 
relation to their children high up in the hierarchy of 
constitutional rights.12 McCracken J. considered that the 
court was being asked to balance the parental rights 
against the individual rights of the child. In this case, 
the parents refused to allow their new born baby to 
undergo a P.K.U. test.13 The test involves a pin prick of 
the baby's heel. This test identifies four metabolic
9 Ireland: ibid. at 350 per O'Dalaigh C.J.. In In Re a Ward 
of Court (withholding medical treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79
at 15 6, in the Supreme Court, Denham J. held that medical 
treatment could not be given to an individual without his or her 
consent. Denham J. stated obiter that if the patient is a child, 
then consent may be given on the child's behalf by parents or a 
guardian.
10 Ireland: In The People (P.P.P.) v. J.T. (1988) 3 Frewen 
141 at 15 9 Walsh J. approving of the approach of the Supreme 
Court in Ryan v. Attorney General.
11 Ireland: Unreported, High Court, McCracken J., 27
October, 2000.
12 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Article 41.1.1.
13 Ireland: Pepartment of Health and Children records show 
that on average there are 6 cases every year in which parents 
refuse to consent to the P.K.U. test.
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conditions and one endocrine condition in children. Some 
of these conditions are relatively common. The failure to 
diagnose and treat some of these conditions may result in 
severe mental handicap. McCracken J. agreed that it was 
in the child's best interests to undergo a P.K.U. test. 
The parents did not want the child to have the discomfort 
of a pinprick in his heel. The parents were prepared to 
take the risk that the child might suffer from any one of 
the conditions. McCracken J. pointed out that parents 
constantly make decisions where they subject children to 
risks which objectively may not be justified. McCracken 
distinguished Ryan v. Attorney General.14 McCracken J. 
held that the parental refusal in this case did not 
constitute a parental failure in their duty to the child, 
even though the medical evidence was clear that the 
parent's decision was, objectively speaking, 
indefensible.15
McCracken J.'s approach is impossible to reconcile 
with the rights model. It accords with the welfare model, 
which attaches greater importance to parental rights 
rather than to parental duties and the individual rights 
of the child. McCracken J. treats the parental right to 
refuse medical intervention as more important than the
14 Ireland: [1965] I.R. 294. In Ryan, if the plaintiff's 
claim were successful, everyone would have been deprived of the 
benefit of fluoridation of water. However, the declaration sought 
in this case would not affect the availability of the P.K.U. 
test.
15 Ireland: North Western Health Board v. H.W. and C.W..
unreported, High Court, 27 October, 2000 at 13-15 per McCracken 
J. .
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child's right to a healthy future.
The House of Lords' approach in Gillick v. West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority16 accords with 
the rights model. There, the House of Lords held that 
parents have a duty to obtain medical assistance for 
their child.17 The right of parents to consent to medical 
treatment exists for the benefit of the child, not the 
parent. Parental rights exist to enable parents more 
effectively to perform their paramount parental duty. The 
United States Supreme Court took a similar approach in 
Parham v. J.R. .18 There, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the parent has an interest in and obligation to 
ensure the welfare and health of children. This 
obligation includes recognising symptoms of illness, 
seeking medical advice and following such advice.19 The 
Canadian Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in
B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto.20 The majority of the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that parents have a right to consent to or refuse 
medical treatment on their child's behalf.21 The purpose
16 England: [1986] A.C. 112.
17 England: ibid. at 170-171 per Lord Fraser and at 185 per 
Lord Scarman. This approach was most recently endorsed in In Re
A. (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2
W.L.R. 480 at 510 per Ward L.J..
18 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
19 United States: ibid. at 602 per Burger C.J..
20 Canada: [1995] 122 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
21 Canada: ibid. at 41 per La Forest J. holding that there 
is a protected sphere of parental decision making.
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of this right is to enable parents to discharge their 
obligations to their children. The minority held that 
parental liberty does not allow parents to refuse 
necessary medical treatment for their children.22 
Otherwise, there would be a reversion to the discredited 
concept that the child is the property of his or her 
parent.23 Parents are free to make martyrs of themselves 
but are not entitled to make martyrs of their children 
before such children have reached the age of full and 
legal discretion.24
The rights model and welfare model both require 
parents to be guided by the child's best interests when
deciding whether to consent to or refuse medical
intervention for their child. In In Re J. (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)25 in the English 
Court of Appeal, Lord Donaldson M.R. held that parents 
owe the child a duty to give or withhold consent
depending on what is in the child's best interests.26 The
welfare model presumes that parents act in the child's 
best interests when deciding on medical treatment for the
22 Canada: ibid. at 86 per Iacobucci, Major and Cory JJ. 
holding that parents can choose between equally effective medical 
treatments for their children.
23 Canada: ibid. at 86-87 per Iacobucci, Major and Cory JJ..
24 United States: Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) at 170 per Rutledge J. and at 166-167 per Rutledge J. 
holding that parents do not have a right to expose their children 
to ill-health or death. This was approved of in Parham v. J.R. 
442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 630 per Brennan J..
25 England: [1991] Fam. 33.
26 England: ibid. at 41 per Lord Donaldson M.R..
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child.27 Parents are best suited to make such decisions 
because of their deep personal interest as parents in 
fostering the growth of their own children.28 This 
presumption can be rebutted.29
It may be difficult in most cases to rebut such a 
presumption. For the most part, no received objective 
criteria exist which can be used to decide whether a 
particular parental decision in respect of a child is or 
is not in that child's best interests. However medical 
intervention provides an exception. Medicine is a 
scientific discipline, based on scientific evidence. In 
the light of medical knowledge, it could reasonably be 
said that to commence or continue treatment would or 
would not be in a child's best interests, and what type 
or form of treatment would be best.
3.2. Duty of State to protect and provide for child
The welfare model and rights model both provide that 
the parental right to consent or refuse medical treatment 
for a child is restricted by the State's duty to protect 
the child. This derives from the parens patriae
27 Canada : B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 41-42 per La Forest J. and
at 87 per Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ..
28 England: In Re M.M. (Medical Treatment) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 
224 at 234 per Black J. holding that parents are best placed to 
take decisions about their children.
29 United States: Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 602 
and 604 per Burger C.J. and at 624 per Stewart J..
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concept.30 However, the rights model permits interference 
where parents are not acting in the child's best 
interests when deciding on medical intervention. Where 
parents refuse to consent to medical treatment, 
clinicians or statutory bodies challenge the refusal by 
invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction of the courts.
The rights model provides that the court can 
exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction and assume the 
parental role, where a parental decision relating to 
medical intervention is not in the child's best 
interests.31 However, the welfare model pre-eminently 
requires protection and preservation of the family 
integrity. This means that the State can only interfere 
with a parental decision in exceptional circumstances 
where a parent fails in his or her parental duty for 
physical or moral reasons. In North Western Health Board 
v. H.W. and C.W.32 McCracken J. held that the State has a 
duty to protect, defend and vindicate the personal rights
30 England: In Re B. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 at 1423-1424 per Templeman L.J. and at 1424 
per Dunn L.J.; In Re A. (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical
Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 at 511 per Ward L.J.. Canada:
B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 
122 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 43 per La Forest J. and at 87 per Iacobucci, 
Major, and Cory JJ..
31 Canada: In Hepton v. Maat [1957] 10 D.L.R. (2nd) 1 at 2
per Rand J. holding that the parens patriae concept allows the 
State to displace parents and assume parental duties when through 
a failure, with or without parental fault, parents fail to 
protect the child and the child's welfare is threatened.
32 Ireland: Unreported, High Court, McCracken J., 27 
October, 2000.
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of the citizen, including children.33 However, the duty 
of the State is not absolute34 and the State's duty to 
vindicate the rights of the child only arises where 
nobody else can do so.35 McCracken J. held that where 
there is a conflict between the duties of the State to 
children and the rights of parents, the court will allow 
the State to intervene in exceptional cases where parents 
fail in their parental duty to the child for physical or 
moral reasons.36 McCracken J. held that the parental 
refusal of the P.K.U. test did not constitute a failure 
in parental duty to the child for physical or moral 
reasons, even though medical opinion was unequivocal that 
the refusal was wrong and not in the child's best 
interests.37 The United States Supreme Court expressed a 
similar view in Parham v. J .R . .38 There, Burger C.J. held
33 Ireland: ibid. at 10 per McCracken J.; Constitution of 
Ireland 1937, Art. 40.3.2.
34 Ireland: Hanrahan v. Merck. Sharp and Dohme [1988]
I.L.R.M. 629 at 629-636 per Henchy J..
35 Ireland: F.N. (a minor) v. Minister for Education and
Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 409 at 415 per Geoghegan J. ; D.G. (a minor) 
v. Eastern Health Board and Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 522 per 
Hamilton C.J. stating that if the courts are under an obligation 
to defend and vindicate personal rights of citizens, it
inevitably then follows that the courts have the jurisdiction to 
do all things necessary to vindicate such rights.
36 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5. In Re 
Article 26 and The Adoption (No.2) Bill 1987 [1989] I.R. 656 at
663 per Finlay C.J..
37 Canada: In B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 42 per La Forest 
J. holding that the State will intervene to protect the child's 
rights only when the decision of the parent breaches the socially 
accepted threshold dictated by public policy.
38 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979) .
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that the State is not without constitutional control over
parental discretion in dealing with children when their 
physical or mental health is jeopardised. The State is 
not entitled to interfere because the decision of the 
parent is disagreeable to the child or because it 
involves risk.39
The welfare model and rights model both provide that 
the court will act in a quasi-parental role when 
interfering with a parental decision concerning medical 
intervention. The court decides whether it is in the 
child's best interests to commence or continue treatment, 
and if the child is to be treated what type or form of 
treatment the child shall receive.40 The court's function
39 United States: ibid. at 603-604 per Burger C.J..
40 England: In Re B. (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation)
[1988] A.C. 199 at 202 per Lord Hailsham L.C. and at 205-206 per 
Lord Tempieman; In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1991] Fam. 33 at 40 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and at 49 per 
Balcombe L.J.; Devon County Council v. S. (1992) 11 B.M.L.R. 105 
at 109 per Thorpe J.; In Re E. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical
Treatment) [1993] 1 F.L.R. 386 at 391-395 per Ward J.; In Re R.
(A Minor)(Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 757 at 760-761 per 
Booth J.; In Re 0. (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 
149 at 152-153 per Johnson J.; South Glamorgan C.C. v. B. and W. 
[1993] 1 F.L.R. 574 at 585 per Douglas Brown J. ; In Re C. (a
baby) (1996) 32 B.M.L.R. 44 at 45 per Sir Stephen Brown P.; In 
Re T. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 
at 250-252 per Butler-Sloss L.J.; In Re C. (Detention: Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 at 188-189 per Wall J. authorising 
the doctors to treat the girl including detaining the girl and 
using reasonable force; In Re C. (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1
F.L.R. 384 at 813 per Sir Stephen Brown P.; In Re L. (Medical 
Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 810 at 813 per Sir 
Stephen Brown P.; In Re M.M. (Medical Treatment) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 
224 at 234 per Black J. ; Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals N.H.S. 
Trust v. B. [2000] 1 F.L.R. 953 at 955-956 per Bodey J.; In Re
C. (A Child) (H. I.V. Testing) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 270 at 278 per
Wilson J. authorising a blood transfusion for the child; A 
National Health Trust v. D. [2000] 2 F.L.R. 677 at 686 per
Cazalet J. authorising doctors to treat without artificial 
ventilation unless such a course seemed inappropriate to the
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is to act as the judicial reasonable parent.41 The court 
is not expected to adopt any higher or different standard 
than that of a reasonable and responsible parent.42
The court, like parents, will seek assistance from 
the views of clinicians. However, the court determines 
the child's best interests by considering all aspects of 
the child's welfare. It will not restrict its 
considerations to the clinical perspective.43 This may 
involve the court considering factors such as the 
sanctity of life, the legal presumption in favour of 
preserving life, the child's quality of life, the degree 
of pain and suffering inherent in the treatment, risks, 
choices and other circumstances, the views of the parents 
and the child's wishes.44 The court considers all the
doctor in charge; In Re A. (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 at 512 per Ward L.J. authorising 
the separation of Siamese twins; Children Act 1989, s. 1.
41 England: J . v . C . [1970] A.C. 668 at 723 per Lord Upjohn; 
In Re R. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11 
at 25 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re S. (A Minor) (Consent To 
Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 1065 at 1069 per Johnson J..
42 England: In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1991] Fam. 33 at 50 per Balcombe L.J.; In Re E. (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 F.L.R. 386 at 392- 
393 per Ward J.; In Re 0. (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2
F.L.R. 149 at 153 per Johnson J..
43 England: In Re T. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 at 249-251 per Butler-Sloss L.J.; In Re M.B.
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426 at 439 per Butler-Sloss 
L.J. ; In Re A. (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549 at 555
per Butler-Sloss L.J..
44 England: In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1991] Fam. 33 at 46 per Lord Donaldson M.R., at 51 per Balcombe
L.J. and at 55 per Taylor L.J.; Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals 
N.H. S. Trust v. B. [2000] 1 F.L.R. 953 at 956 per Bodey J.; A
National Health Trust v. D. [2000] 2 F.L.R. 677 at 686 per
Cazalet J. . In In Re A. (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical
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child's interests and needs. The court will weigh these, 
and then bring into balance the advantages against the 
disadvantages, the risks of harm against the hopes of 
benefit which flow from the course of medical 
intervention under consideration. Medical intervention is 
in the child's best interests if, but only if, if it is 
carried out in order to save the child's life or to 
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in the 
child's physical or mental health.45
The courts have placed cases involving parental 
refusal to medical intervention on a scale.46 At one end 
of the scale, there lies the case where parental 
opposition to medical intervention is prompted by scruple 
or dogma of a kind which is patently irreconcilable with 
principles of child health and welfare widely accepted by 
society. These are cases where the evidence is 
overwhelming that medical intervention is in the child's 
best interests.47 At the other end of the scale, there
Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 at 512 per Ward L.J. holding that 
welfare encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare 
issues.
45 England: In Re A. (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical
Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 at 516 per Ward L.J. relying upon 
In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 55
per Lord Brandon.
46 England: In Re T. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 at 254 per Waite L.J..
47 England: Devon County Council v. S. (1992) 11 B.M.L.R. 
105 at 109 per Thorpe J. holding that the court was being asked 
to choose between two medical procedures one with a prospect of 
success and one without any chance of success; In Re R. (A 
Minor) (Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 757 at 760 per Booth 
J. ; In Re Q . (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 149 at 
152-153 per Johnson J..
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are highly problematical cases where there is a genuine 
difference of view between the parent(s) and the court. 
The evidence will be more equivocal in such cases. Such 
cases involve the withdrawal or refusal of treatment that 
is invasive, painful, with no better than even odds and 
offering limited benefit to the child's quality of 
life.48 In these cases, the court is influenced by the 
reflection, that in the last analysis, the best interests 
of every child include an expectation that difficult 
decisions affecting the length and quality of the child's 
life will be taken for the child by the parent to whom 
his care has been entrusted by nature.49
The court attaches significant weight to parental 
wishes.50 The weight to be attached to the child's wishes 
depends to a great extent on the child's intellectual 
development. The court attaches more weight to the 
child's wishes, the closer the child is to adulthood.51
48 England: In Re T. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 at 255 per Waite L.J.; In Re C. (Medical
Treatment) [1998] 1 F.L.R. 384 at 384 per Sir Stephen Brown P..
49 England: In Re T. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 at 255 per Waite L.J.; In Re C. (A 
Child) (H.I.V. Testing) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 270 at 279 per Wilson J. .
50 England: In Re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of 
Access) [1988] 1 A.C. 806 at 824-825 per Lord Oliver; In Re T.
(A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 at 250 
per Butler-Sloss L.J.; A National Health Trust v. D. [2000] 2
F.L.R. 677 at 686 per Cazalet J.; In Re A. (Children)(Conjoined 
Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 at 525 per Ward 
L. J. .
51 England: B.R.B. v. J.B. [1968] P. 466 at 473-474 per Lord 
Denning M.R.. In In Re E. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1993] 1 F.L.R. 386 at 391-392 per Ward J. holding that a 15 year 
old Jehovah's Witness child suffering from leukaemia was
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The judge should give effect to the child's wishes on the 
basis that prima facie this will be in the child's best 
interests.52 However, the role of the court is to 
exercise an independent and objective judgment as to the 
child's welfare.53 If that judgment is in accord with 
that of the parents and/or the child, well and good. If 
it is not, then it is the duty of the court, after giving 
due weight to the wishes of the parents and/or the child, 
to give effect to its own judgment. The court may of 
course be wrong. So may that of the parent or child. 
However, once the jurisdiction of the court is invoked 
the court's duty is to reach and express the best
incompetent to refuse a blood transfusion necessary to save his 
life. Ward J. invoked the court's parens patriae jurisdiction. 
Ward J. held that the court has to take into account the boy's 
own wishes, considering his age and maturity. Ward J. questioned 
what weight he should place on the boy's rejection of treatment. 
Ward J. approached the case on the basis that freedom of adult 
choice is a human right, and the boy here was close to adulthood, 
and therefore a court should be slow to override his wishes. In 
In Re C. (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 at
195 per Wall J. holding that if a child is competent to give or 
refuse consent then the weight which should be given to the 
child's wishes increased. In In Re M. (Medical Treatment: 
Consent) [1999] 2 F.L.R. 1097 at 1099-1110 per Johnson J. who
went to great lengths to ascertain the child's wishes, even 
though the child's condition was serious and time was of the 
essence.
52 England: In Re W. (A Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court's 
Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 at 84 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and 
at 8 8 per Balcombe L.J..
53 England: In Re Z. (A Minor)(Identification: Restrictions 
on Publication) [1997] Fam. 1 at 32-33 per Sir Thomas Bingham 
M.R.; In Re T. (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 
at 250 per Butler-Sloss L.J. at 254 per Waite L.J.; A National 
Health Trust v. D. [2000] 2 F.L.R. 677 at 686 per Cazalet J. ; In 
Re A. (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 2 
W.L.R. 480 at 52 7 per Ward L.J..
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judgment it can.54 A court may limit its intervention 
with the parental right to make decisions by requiring 
clinicians to consult with parents where treatment is 
ongoing and the parents' views do not pose a danger to 
the child's health.55
The second aspect of the State's parens patriae duty 
is that of providing necessary medical treatment for a 
child. This has been considered in a number of English 
cases. The English courts have curtailed this aspect of 
the parens patriae duty. The English courts consider that 
any order funding treatment violates the separation of 
powers in two ways. First, any court order will dictate 
to the executive how taxes should be spent. Second, the 
court would be interfering with parliament's delegation 
of responsibility to a statutory body.56 There is
54 England: In Re Z. (A Minor)(Identification: Restriction 
on Publication) [1997] Fam. 1 at 32-33 per Sir Thomas Bingham 
M.R. ; In Re T. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1997] 1 
W.L.R. 242 at 250 per Butler-Sloss L.J.. In Re C . (A 
Child)(H.I.V. Testing) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 270 at 278-280 per Wilson 
J. holding that a court must be extremely cautious when it is 
asked to override the natural parent's wishes.
55 England: In Re R. (A Minor)(Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 
F.L.R. 757 at 761 per Booth J.; In Re M.M. (Medical Treatment) 
[2000] 1 F.L.R. 224 at 234 per Black J..
56 England: In Re J. (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1991] Fam. 33 at 41-42 per Lord Donaldson M.R. holds that the 
court had no jurisdiction to determine the allocation of limited 
health care resources between patients; See also In Re J. (A 
Minor)(Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 at 29 per 
Lord Donaldson M.R.. In R. v. Cambridgeshire Health Authority, 
ex parte B.(a minor) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 898 at 906 per Sir Thomas
Bingham M.R., there was a refusal to interfere with a local 
authority's decision not to fund medical treatment for a child, 
even though the consequence of this decision was the child's 
death. See also R. v. East Lancashire Authority, ex parte B., 
unreported, High Court, 27 February, 1997.
120
different balance in Ireland between the powers of the 
judiciary and those of the Oireachtas. The Irish courts 
are obliged to vindicate the constitutional rights of the 
individual.57
The welfare model and rights model both hold that 
children should be provided with medical care. The Irish 
courts have ordered the State to provide facilities for 
children suffering from hyperkinetic and attention 
deficiency disorders. These cases would form the basis 
for a claim that the State has a duty to provide a child 
with medical treatment.
3.3. Welfare rights of child
In G. v. An Bord Uchtala58, the Supreme Court 
described the implied welfare rights of the child. The 
Supreme Court held that every child has the right to be 
fed, the right to be brought up, educated, and to have 
the opportunity of working and of realising his or her 
full personality and dignity as a human being. These 
rights derive from the child's right to life. The child's 
right to life means that a child has a right to maintain
57 Ireland: D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and 
Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 522 per Hamilton C.J.. However, in 
S.C. v. Minister for Education [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 134 at 146 per 
McGuinness J., it was held that it was not the court's function 
to determine how the State's expenditure should be allocated 
between its different priorities, nor should the court suggest 
how expenditure should be limited. These decisions fell within 
the prerogative of the executive. A judicial readjustment of a 
Department's budget might result in the advantaging of one group 
of children at the expense of another. McGuinness J. held that 
the court should bear in mind these possible financial 
consequences of any order it might make.
58 Ireland: [1980] I.R. 32.
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that life at a proper standard in matters of food, 
clothing, and habitation.59 In Eastern Health Board v. An 
Bord Uchtala60 0'Flaherty J. stated obiter that parents 
and the State had a duty to provide inter alia medical 
care. 0'Flaherty J. stated that the right to medical care 
was an unenumerated right of the child.61
3.4. Civil rights of child
A number of civil rights of a patient are involved 
in medical intervention. These may include the rights to 
bodily integrity,62 privacy,63 liberty,64 and to 
exercise his or her religious faith.65
It is both a constitutional and common law principle 
that a clinician must obtain the patient's consent prior 
to medical intervention. Failure to obtain consent 
results in the clinician committing a criminal and
59 Ireland: ibid. at 55-56 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 69 per 
Walsh J. . See also D.G. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and 
Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 511 at 523 per Hamilton C.J. and at 537 per 
Denham J. approving of the rights enumerated in G. v. An Bord 
Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32.
60 Ireland: [1994] 3 I.R. 207.
61 Ireland: ibid. at 230 per 0'Flaherty J. .
62 Ireland: Rvan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294 at 313 
per Kenny J.; The State (C.) v. Frawley [1976] I.R. 365 at 372 
per Finlay P.; In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical 
treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 124 per Hamilton C.J. and 
15 6 per Denham J..
63 Ireland: Kennedy and Arnold v. Ireland [1987] I.R. 587 at 
592 per Hamilton P..
64 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.4.1.
65 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 44.2.1.
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tortious assault,66 unless the patient has a communicable 
disease, or it is an emergency and the patient cannot 
communicate.67 A competent adult has a right to refuse 
medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, 
or for no reason at all, even where that decision may 
lead to that patient's death.68
The law presumes that every adult is competent to 
consent to or to refuse medical treatment unless and 
until that presumption is rebutted.69 The court cannot 
order a competent adult to undergo a medical procedure.70 
The reason for this is that law goes to great lengths to 
protect the personal liberty and autonomy of a competent 
adult from unwarrantable interference.
A child may not have the competence to consent to 
medical intervention. The welfare model and rights model
66 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical
treatment) (No .2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 156 per Denham J. . England:
In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 73
per Lord Goff.
67 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical
treatment)(No.2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 156 per Denham J..
68 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical
treatment) (No .2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 159-160 per Denham J..
England: In Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] 
Fam. 95 at 112 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re M.B. (Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426 at 436 per Butler-Sloss L.J..
69 England: In Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
[1993] Fam. 95 at 112 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; In Re M.B. 
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426 at 436 per Butler-Sloss 
L. J. .
70 Ireland: In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical
treatment) (No .2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at 156 per Denham J. . England:
In Re L. (An Infant) [1968] P. 119 at 159 per Lord Denning; S . 
v . McC., W . v . W . [1972] A.C. 24 at 43 per Lord Reid and at 57
per Lord Hodson.
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both provide that in such circumstances the clinician 
will seek consent from the child's parents or the courts. 
In Parham v. J.R.71 the United States Supreme Court 
explained that the law's concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required 
for making life's difficult decisions.72 It is not 
illegal for a parent or person authorised by the parent 
to constrain a young child provided what is done is 
neither cruel or excessive.73 A parent does not commit an 
assault when he or she uses reasonable restraint to 
facilitate diagnosis and treatment.74
A court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction 
can authorise a clinician to use reasonable force and/or 
a power of detention to treat a child who is not 
competent and where treatment is in the child's best 
interests for the purpose of imposing intrusive necessary 
medical treatment, where a life-threatening situation 
arises or where a serious deterioration to health may 
occur if appropriate treatment is not administered. The 
treating clinicians or statutory body are given a
71 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
72 United States: ibid. at 600 per Burger C.J..
73 England: S . v. McC. , W. v. W. [1972] A.C. 24 at 43 per 
Lord Reid and at 57 per Lord Hodson.
74 England: In S . v. McC. , W. v. W. [1972] A.C. 24 at 43 per 
Lord Reid holding that there are differences of opinion as to the
age beyond which it is unwise to use constraint but that does not
apply to babies or very young children.
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discretion to determine what treatment is necessary.75
3.5. Conflicting rights of child
There are two possible conflicts. First, there is 
the conflict between the civil and welfare rights of the 
child. For example, a child may refuse to consent to 
medical treatment even though this refusal endangers that 
child's health or right to life. The rights model 
stresses respect of the autonomous competent child's 
decision to refuse medical intervention.76
Second, a conflict arises between the civil rights 
of the child. For example, it may be necessary to deprive 
a child of liberty because the child suffers from a 
mental disorder. It is one of the principles of law that 
a deprivation of liberty may only occur following due
75 England: South Glamorgan C.C. v. B. and W. [1993] 1
F.L.R. 574 at 585 per Douglas Brown J.; In Re S. (A 
Minor) (Consent To Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 1065 at 1076 
per Johnson J.; A Metropolitan Borough Council v. D.B. [1997] 1 
F.L.R. 767 at 777 per Cazalet J. , authorising the use of 
reasonable force for the purpose of imposing intrusive necessary 
medical treatment on a girl where a life threatening situation 
arose or where a serious deterioration in her health might occur 
if appropriate medical treatment was not administered; In Re C.
(Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 at 200 per 
Wall J. authorising the girl's detention at a clinic for the 
purpose of such treatment as may in the opinion of the clinicians 
be necessary. The clinicians were give permission to use 
reasonable force to detain or return the girl to the clinic. The 
clinicians were given permission to provide such medical 
intervention necessary to ensure that the child suffers the least 
distress and retains the greatest dignity.
76 England: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 169-170 per Lord Fraser, and at 185- 
18 6 and 18 9 per Lord Scarman. In In Re R. (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11 at 24-25, and In Re W. (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 
at 83-84 per Lord Donaldson M.R. according paramountcy to the 
child's welfare rights. United States: Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 
622 (1979) at 643 per Powell J..
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process. In addition, there must be a periodic review of 
such detention.
This arose for consideration in the United States 
Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R. .77 A Georgia statute 
allowed parents to voluntarily commit their child to a 
mental institution. The statute had safeguards. Parents 
could seek the release of the child, and the person in 
charge of the facility was legally obliged to discharge a 
child when in-patient care was no longer necessary.
In the Supreme Court, Burger C.J., speaking for a 
majority of the Supreme Court, held that the child's 
liberty interest is inexorably linked with the parents' 
concerns, and the parent's duty to the child's health and 
welfare. The private interest at stake was a combination 
of the child and parents' concerns.78
Burger C.J. held that the child, like an adult, has 
a substantial liberty interest in not being confined 
unnecessarily for medical treatment. The State was 
involved in the committal procedure. This constituted the 
State involvement described in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Psychiatric treatment may be taken by some as a social 
stigma, but not such a severe stigma as occurs when a 
person is labelled by the State as delinquent or 
criminal. Burger C.J. considered that the risk of social 
disapprobation was higher where a child in need of 
treatment remained untreated. It was imperative that a
77 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
78 United States: ibid. at 600 per Burger C.J..
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child should receive necessary diagnostic and therapeutic 
treatment. The child's protectable interest is not merely 
that of freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints, but 
in not being wrongly labelled by virtue of the hospital's 
improper decision.
Burger C.J. held that the law assumes that the role 
of parents is to take decisions for an incompetent child. 
Parents are motivated by natural bonds to take such 
decisions in the best interests of children, and not 
their own interests. However, Burger C.J. held that this 
was only a presumption. Parents may not act in the 
child's best interests.79
Burger C.J. said that even in adolescence, most 
children are unable to make mature decisions about their 
own medical care and treatment. Parents can and must make 
these decisions on the child's behalf.80 Burger C.J. 
distinguished this legislation from that struck down in 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.81 In 
Danforth, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
statute which gave an absolute veto to the parents over 
their child's abortion. Burger C.J. pointed out that 
under the Georgia statute, parental discretion or 
authority to commit or detain a child could not be said 
to be absolute. It was subject to a clinician's
79 United States: ibid. at 601-602 per Burger C.J..
80 United States: ibid. at 603 per Burger C.J..
81 United States: 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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independent examination and judgment.82
Burger C.J. identified the various aspects of the 
State's interests. First, the State has an interest in 
ensuring that psychiatric resources are expended on 
people in need of treatment. The statute ensures that 
there is State control of this by according the clinician 
a discretion to admit persons in need of treatment and to 
discharge patients from hospitals when this is not 
necessary.
Second, the State should not place procedural 
obstacles in the way of parents invoking the parens 
patriae protection for the child. Parents of children in 
need of treatment may be discouraged from coming forward 
if formalistic rules were laid down, or an adversarial 
procedure like a trial was required.
Third, the State must accord priority to diagnosis 
and treatment. It is necessary that the time of 
psychiatrists and other carers should be concentrated on 
patient care, not in administrative procedures.83 Burger
C.J. said that if further constraints were put on 
clinicians, this would worsen the situation.84
Burger C.J. held that any such process must not 
unduly infringe parental authority, nor impede the
82 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 604 per Burger
C. J. .
83 United States: ibid. at 605 per Burger C. J. . In an amicus 
curiae brief, the American Psychiatric Association claimed that 
on average 47% of a psychiatrist's time was spent on direct 
patient therapy.
84 United States: ibid. at 606 per Burger C.J..
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legitimate interests of both the State and the patient in 
the existence of a system of voluntary psychiatric 
hospitalisation. Burger C.J. recognised that some form of 
broad-ranging enquiry was required, conducted by an 
impartial person, to prevent abuse of hospitalisation by 
parents. The enquiry would involve interviewing the 
child. Once detained, the child's condition must be 
periodically reviewed. Such procedures would 
satisfactorily protect the child against erroneous 
detention, and neither unduly burdened the State nor 
inhibited parental decisions to seek help. Burger C.J. 
held that the decision of the admitting clinician 
satisfied these requirements, provided the clinician were 
free to independently evaluate the child's mental and 
emotional condition, and need for treatment. There was no 
need for a quasi-judicial hearing, as these issues were 
essentially medical in character.85
Burger C.J. recognised that there was still a risk
that a clinician would make the wrong decision, but this
risk could not be averted by handing the decision over to 
someone else who was independent. Burger C.J. held that a 
fact-finding adversarial hearing would strain the parent- 
child relationship, and possibly prejudice the child's 
recovery.86 However, the child could be sufficiently 
protected if an independent clinician were to consider 
the parental decision in the light of the child's best
85 United States: ibid. at 607-609 per Burger C.J..
86 United States: ibid. at 610 per Burger C.J..
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medical interests87.88
Brennan J., dissenting, held that placing a child in 
a mental institution did not just interfere with the 
child's liberty, but also deprived the child of family, 
friends and community.89 The consequences of erroneously 
detaining a child on the say-so of the parents are more 
serious than the consequences accruing to an adult who is 
involuntarily detained. There was evidence to show that 
children were confined for longer periods than adults. 
Moreover, detention of this nature occurs at a formative 
period of the child's life, and if improperly managed, 
may scar the child for life. This may result in permanent 
damage to the child's potential. Also, proper 
satisfactory institutional care requires a substantial 
financial investment that has too often not been made.
The chances of an erroneous commitment of a child are 
higher than for an adult.90
Brennan J. held that the parental decision to commit 
a child for detention to a psychiatric facility is an 
atypical parental decision. Psychiatric hospitalisation
87 United States: ibid. at 613 per Burger C.J..
88 United States: In Secretary of Public Welfare v.
Institutionalized Juveniles 442 U.S. 640 (1979) a majority of the 
Supreme Court adopts the same approach as that used in Parham 
with some minor amendments. Burger C.J., at 649-650, held that 
the clinician's inquiry must carefully probe the child's 
background and include an interview with the child. The decision 
maker must have the authority to refuse to admit any child where 
it is not in the child's best interests. Finally, the child's 
continuing need for commitment must be reviewed periodically.
89 United States: 442 U.S. 584 (1979) at 626 per Brennan J..
90 United States: ibid. at 626-629 per Brennan J..
130
of children leads to the inevitable breakdown of family 
autonomy. Children who are detained in care, and who are 
thus removed from family protection require an 
independent advocate. The presumption that a parent would 
act in the best interests of the child does not apply 
here, as it falls outside the normal child-rearing 
decision. Even well-meaning parents lack the experience 
necessary to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
in-patient as opposed to out-patient psychiatric 
treatment. Parents could not be said to be acting in the 
child's best interests, by waiving due process rights in 
the committal procedure.
Brennan J. considered what due process procedures 
had to be afforded to a child. The law provided that 
there must be a pre-confinement adversarial hearing for 
an adult.91 Brennan J. cited three reasons as to why a 
child should not have a pre-confinement hearing. First, a 
pre-admission adversarial hearing might deter parents 
from seeking necessary medical care and treatment for the 
child. Second, the hearing itself may delay urgently 
needed treatment of the child, whose home life may become 
so impossible as to precipitate the need for involuntary 
detention. Third, adversarial hearings would involve 
challenges to parental authority, judgment or veracity, 
and this might result in setting parent against child.
The return of the child to the home would be more fraught 
as a consequence. Brennan J. held that there would have
91 United States: ibid. at 631-632 per Brennan J.
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to be a post-admission hearing. Brennan J. held that the 
existing procedures were inadequate and failed to afford 
due process. Post-admission decisions were made ex parte. 
A child was not informed of the reasons for detention.
The child had no right to be present, afforded legal 
representation, heard, confront adverse witnesses, cross- 
examine, nor tender evidence. Brennan J. was unable to 
find any state or parental interest preventing the 
carrying out of an adversarial post-admission hearing, 
invested with these rights.92
Burger C.J.'s approach accords with the welfare 
model while that of Brennan J. is more consistent with 
the rights model. The rights model requires that a child 
should not be treated any different than an adult facing 
commitment to a psychiatric facility. Therefore, there 
must be a quasi-judicial hearing where it is proposed to 
detain a child because of a mental disorder or 
behaviourial problems. The rights model requires a 
periodic review of the child's detention.
The Irish High Court has ordered the detention of 
children with serious behaviourial problems in order to 
vindicate the child's welfare rights.93 These cases are
92 United States: ibid. at 633-635 per Brennan J..
93 Ireland: D.T. (a minor) v. Eastern Health Board and 
Ireland, unreported, High Court, 24 March, 1995 at 1-2 per 
Geoghegan J. who found that there was a danger that the girl 
would commit suicide and authorising the girl's detention; P.P. 
v. Eastern Health Board, Minister for Health. Minister for 
Education and Ireland, unreported, High Court, 3 May, 1995 at 10 
per Costello P. authorising the detention of a girl; D.H. v. 
Ireland, unreported, High Court, 23 May, 2000 at 17-18 
authorising the detention of a girl in a facility that met with
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at odds with the rights model as there has been no 
provision for a periodic review of the child's detention. 
However, in an English case In Re C. (Detention: Medical 
Treatment)94 Wall J. imposed safeguards when exercising 
the parens patriae jurisdiction. The court had ordered a 
child's detention in a facility not regulated by the 
English Children Act 1989. Wall J. held that the order 
detaining the child should have safeguards and applied 
the statutory criteria for detaining a child in secure 
accommodation under the Children Act 19 8 9 . 95 Wall J. 
allowed the treating psychiatrist to release the girl 
from the clinic prior to the review date in consultation 
with the other psychiatrist where they were of the 
opinion that the girl had made sufficient progress to 
make discharge appropriate.96
3.6. Developing competence of child
The welfare model holds that the ability of parents 
or court to exercise the rights of the child on that 
child's behalf arises because of the child's intellectual 
incompetence to make decisions for himself or herself.
The rights model is slower to assume that the necessity 
to intervene is predicated on any deficiency on the 
child's behalf. It must be viewed as systemic rather, 
than as a consequence of any individual shortcomings.
the approval of a child psychiatrist.
94 England: [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180.
95 England: ibid. at 197-198. Children Act 1989, s. 25.
96 England: [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 at 200 per Wall J..
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The rights model provides that parents lose the 
ability to make decision for their children when their 
children have the intellectual competence to make the 
decision for themselves.97
In Bellotti v. Baird98 a majority of the United 
States Supreme Court supported in general terms this 
aspect of the rights model.99 In this case, a 
Massachusetts statute required parental consent before an 
abortion could be performed on an unmarried girl under 
the age of 18. A girl could apply to obtain the consent 
of the court where the child's parents refused consent.
The court was obliged to give consent if "good cause" was 
shown.
In the Supreme Court, Powell J. held that the state 
statute was an attempt to reconcile two issues. First, 
the child's constitutional right, in consultation with 
the clinician, to decide whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.100 The constitutional right to seek an 
abortion is very different from other decisions 
concerning a child. It may not be possible to postpone 
making such a decision until the child reaches her age of 
majority. A termination may have particularly serious 
detrimental affects on a pregnant child. Bearing a child
97 Canada: B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto [1995] 122 D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 88 per Iacobucci, Major and 
Cory JJ..
98 United States: 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
99 United States: ibid. at 639 et sea, per Powell J..
100 United States: ibid. at 639 per Powell J..
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brings with it adult responsibilities. Second, the 
State's interest in encouraging the child to seek the 
advice of her parents before making a decision about 
termination. Parental advice and counsel could obviously 
not be supplied in an abortion clinic or other 
termination situation.
Powell J. held that the statute failed to strike the 
proper balance between these competing interests. The 
statute was unconstitutional in that it required a child 
to tell her parents before applying to court for 
permission for an abortion. Parents who opposed 
terminations might obstruct the child from applying to 
court.101
Powell J. held that the court must be accessible to 
the girl without first having to consult her parents. The 
girl can make the decision for herself where the girl can 
satisfy the court that she is competent to make the 
decision. If the girl is unable to satisfy the court that 
she is competent, the girl must show to the court that an 
abortion in is her best interests. No parental 
consultation will be required in this situation. Powell 
J. held that there was still an important state interest 
in encouraging the resolution of this problem in the 
family rather than by a court. Parents are naturally 
concerned with the child's welfare in a loving family. 
These were factors which a court was entitled to take 
into account, particularly when considering the child's
101 United States: ibid. at 647 per Powell J.
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best interests. Powell J. held a court could defer a
decision until there is parental consultation, in which 
the court may participate. This was the full extent to 
which parental involvement may be required in such 
circumstances.102
Powell J. considered whether a court could prevent a 
termination, where a child is competent to make a 
decision to have an abortion. Powell J. reiterated that 
the State can require a child to wait until the child 
reaches 18 before being permitted to exercise her legal 
rights. However, the court was here concerned with the 
exercise of a constitutional right of a unique nature, if 
the child is able to demonstrate to the court that she is 
able to make an informed and reasonable decision, she is 
entitled to make that decision independently.103 The 
rights model would support this approach but would not 
restrict the right of a competent child to make decisions 
to those which cannot be postponed until the child 
reaches the age of majority.
102 United States: ibid. at 648 per Powell J. . In H.L. v. 
Matheson 450 U.S. 398 (1981) at 409 per Burger C.J. and at 418- 
419 per Powell J. holding that a statute requiring parental 
notice does not violate constitutional rights of an immature 
dependent child. Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S. 417 (1990) at 445 
per Stevens J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court.
103 United States: ibid. at 650 per Powell J., In Carev v. 
Population Services International 431 U.S. 678 (1977) at 694 per 
Brennan J. holding that a child has a right to privacy in 
connection with decisions affecting procreation. The State may 
not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement 
of parental consent for a child to obtain contraceptives. In 
Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft 462 U.S. 476 (1983) 
at 490-493 per Powell J. upholding a law requiring consent for 
the performance of an abortion on a girl from either the girl's 
parents or from the juvenile court.
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The House of Lords took a similar approach in 
Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health 
Authority.104 There, Lord Fraser held that a child's 
consent to medical intervention is valid where a child 
has the intellectual competence to consent to or refuse 
medical intervention. Lord Fraser held that it was 
contrary to the ordinary experience of mankind, at least 
in Western Europe, to argue that a child remained under 
the control of his or her parents until he or she was 
aged 18. In practice, most wise parents relax their 
control gradually as the child approaches adulthood. The 
degree of parental control over a particular child will 
wane as the child's own understanding increases.105 Lord 
Fraser referred to Lord Denning's remarks in Hewer v. 
Bryant.106 There, Lord Denning M.R. said that the legal 
right to custody of a child ends at 18, but is a 
"dwindling" right. The older the child is, the greater 
the court's hesitation in enforcing a parental right or 
decision which is contrary to the child's wishes. The 
parental right starts as a right of control, and 
diminishes to the occasional opportunity to offer 
advice.107 Lord Scarman accepted that there would be 
certainty in the law if the law fixed on a chronological 
age for determining when a child can consent to or refuse
104 England: [1986] A.C. 112.
105 England: ibid. at 171-172 per Lord Fraser.
106 England: [1969] 3 All E.R. 578.
107 England: ibid. at 582.
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medical treatment. However, the law would be inflexible 
and rigid. Lord Scarman held that the law relating to 
parent and child must take cognisance of the process of 
growth and maturity of the child. The law could not
impose fixed limits on this continuing process. Such
limits would impose an artificiality, a lack of realism.
Lord Scarman held that judges should ensure that the law
should maintain such flexibility as might enable them to 
cater for particular cases. Lord Scarman concluded that 
the parental right to decide for or against medical 
intervention for a child terminates when the child 
acquires the maturity to understand what is proposed.
This is a question of fact.108
The issue in this case was the prescription of 
contraceptives. Lord Scarman held that a child was 
competent to consent to contraceptives where the child 
understood their prophylactic nature and purpose, their 
relationships with parents and others, pregnancy and its 
termination and awareness of the health issues involved 
in indiscriminate sex. These were problems which 
contraception might diminish but not eradicate. The 
clinician must ensure that the child understood all these 
factors before concluding that such a girl was 
competent.109 Lord Templeman, dissenting, held that the 
non-medical implications of contraception or their 
assessment will necessarily require more extensive life
108 England: [1986] A.C. 112 at 186-189 per Lord Scarman.
109 England: ibid. at 18 9 per Lord Scarman.
138
experience than can be normally possessed by children.110
After Gillick, there are several English courts 
considering the competence of particular adults to 
consent to or refuse medical intervention. These cases 
established three questions that must be considered when 
assessing a person's competence to consent to or refuse 
medical intervention. First, whether the person 
comprehends and retains information relating to the 
medical intervention. Second, whether the person is 
capable of believing this information. Third, whether the 
person can weigh the treatment information in the 
balance, to arrive at a choice especially as to the 
likely consequences of undergoing or refusing medical 
intervention.111 The graver the consequences of 
consenting to or refusing medical intervention, the 
commensurately greater the level of competence is 
required to take the decision.112 These three questions 
must be considered when assessing a child's competence to
110 England: ibid. at 2 01 per Lord Templeman. In In Re R. (A 
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam. 11 Lord Donaldson 
M.R., at 25-26 held that Gillick competence is an assessment of 
mental and emotional age, as contrasted with chronological age. 
In the case of a child with a mental disability, that disability 
must also be taken into account, particularly where it is 
fluctuating in its effect.
111 England: In Re C. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994]
1 W.L.R. 290 at 2 95 per Thorpe J. ; In Re M.B. (Medical Treatment)
[1997] 2 F.L.R. 426 at 433 per Butler-Sloss L.J..
112 England: In Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
[1993] Fam. 95 at 113 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; Gillick v. West 
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 189 
per Lord Scarman.
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consent to or refuse medical intervention.113 Children 
have difficulty in satisfying the third question.114 This 
is because the reported cases involve issues such as 
abortion, contraception and end-of-life decisions.115 
Children may not have the extensive life experience 
necessary to assess the non-medical implications involved 
in such decisions. For example, in In Re E. (A 
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)116 the court 
considered whether a 15 year old Jehovah's Witness 
suffering from leukaemia was competent to refuse a blood 
transfusion necessary to save his life. In the High 
Court, Ward J. held that the boy was of sufficient 
intelligence to take most decisions about his own well­
being, but there were certain decisions, the implications 
and effects of which were beyond his current experience 
and ability. The boy was unable to appreciate the pain, 
suffering and distress he would have to endure were he to 
reject blood transfusion. Therefore, the boy was
113 England: In Re R. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1992] Fam. 11 at 26 per Lord Donaldson M.R.; A Metropolitan 
Borough Council v. D.B. [1997] 1 F.L.R. 767 at 773 per Cazalet 
J .; In Re C. (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 
at 195 per Wall J..
114 England: In Re S. (A Minor) (Consent To Medical Treatment)
[1994] 2 F.L.R. 1065 at 1075-1076 per Johnson J..
115 England: The court has considered the position of 
teenagers suffering from anorexia nervosa (In Re W. (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64 
and In Re C. (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 180) , 
teenager in need of a heart transplant (In Re M. (Medical 
Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 F.L.R. 1097) and a teenager who as 
a consequence of serious burns needed a blood transfusion (In Re 
L. (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 810).
116 England: [1993] 1 F.L.R. 386.
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incompetent. Ward J. invoked the court's parens patriae 
jurisdiction, holding that the best interests of the 
child dictated that he should undergo blood 
transfusion.117 It is difficult to accuse Ward J. of 
acting in a paternalistic manner, since Ward J. accepts 
the principle that a child's refusal is acceptable if the 
child be competent.
However, there has been a retreat from the approach 
taken by the House of Lords in Gillick. There have been 
subsequent English cases where there has been a shift 
from the rights model back to the welfare model. This has 
seen unsupervised paternalism come to the fore. In In Re 
R. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)118 in the Court 
of Appeal, Lord Donaldson M.R. held that a Gillick 
competent child can consent to treatment. However, Lord 
Donaldson M.R. held that there are concurrent powers of 
consent where a Gillick competent child refuses 
treatment. These concurrent powers of consent are held by 
those with parental rights or responsibilities, where the 
child refuses to consent to treatment. Lord Donaldson 
M.R. held that the parens patriae jurisdiction confers 
the court with greater authority than that possessed by 
parents. This is because the concept derives from the 
State's duty to care for those who needed care and 
protection, rather than from parenthood. A court
117 England: ibid. at 391-392 per Ward J. . On attaining his 
majority, E. rejected any further treatment and died.
118 England: [1992] Fam. 11.
exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can override 
the decision of a Gillick competent child as well as that 
of a child's parents.119 In In Re W. (A Minor) (Medical 
Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction)120 Nolan L.J. held that 
the court must ensure, as far as it can, that a child 
should attain the age of majority, after which the child 
acquires the absolute right to consent or refuse medical 
treatment. The court can override the wishes of the 
parents or the child.121 Lord Donaldson M.R. held that a 
court could only allow a child to make an autonomous 
decision provided the decision does not carry 
disproportionate risks to the child or have irreparable 
consequences for him or her.122
These cases support the welfare model. They accord 
supremacy to the child's best interests rather than to 
the child's autonomy. A particular complexity of the
119 England: ibid. at 24 per Lord Donaldson M.R. and at 28 
per Staughton L.J..
120 England: [1993] Fam. 64.
121 England: ibid. at 93-94 per Nolan L. J. .
122 England: ibid. at 81 per Lord Donaldson M.R.. See also:
South Glamorgan C.C. v. B. and W. [1993] 1 F.L.R. 574 at 584-585
per Douglas Brown J.; In Re C. (Detention: Medical Treatment)
[1997] 2 F.L.R. 180 at 188 per Wall J. ; In Re L. (Medical
Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 810 at 812-813 per 
Sir Stephen Brown P.; In Re M. (Medical Treatment: Consent)
[1999] 2 F.L.R. 1097 at 1097-1098 per Johnson J.. In In Re S. (A 
Minor)(Consent To Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 1065 at
1068-1071 per Johnson J. holding that the parens patriae 
jurisdiction allowed a court to prohibit treatment to which a 
Gillick competent child has consented. Canada: In B .(R.) v.
Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 122
D.L.R.(4th) 1 at 87 per Iacobucci, Major and Cory JJ. holding
that the purpose of parens patriae intervention is to promote the 
child's welfare. This may involve overriding the parents' or 
child's wishes.
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welfare model as opposed to the rights model is that the 
welfare model facilitates the taking of consent from a 
child but refuses to accept a child's refusal of 
treatment. Only in the rights model may parents or a 
court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction be 
unable to consent to treatment which a Gillick competent 
child has refused. Parents or a court exercising its 
parens patriae jurisdiction can decide on the child's 
best interests only where the child is not competent to 
make that decision for himself or herself.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHILD AND EDUCATION SYSTEM
4.0. Introduction
The welfare model and the rights model provide that 
the third duty of parents is to provide for their child's 
education. The parens patriae duty of the State is to 
ensure that children receive a basic education. The 
State's duty is not driven solely by the altruistic 
motive that it is for the betterment of children that 
they are educated. A State derives substantial benefits 
from an educated population. In Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best1 the Irish Supreme Court held that 
the Constitution envisages a population that is educated 
to a standard necessary to function in a civilised 
society. This involves the ability to communicate, 
record, organise and deal with ordinary social and 
business matters.2 The common good also requires children 
to have a sense of responsibility and the capacity to 
live within a civilised society.3 There, the United 
States Supreme Court had adopted a similar approach in
1 Ireland: [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1.
2 Ireland: ibid. at 19 and 21 per Denham J. and at 40 per
Murphy J..
3 Canada: In R. v. Jones [1986] 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at 592 La 
Forest J. held that the State has an interest in ensuring that
children receive education and at 597 La Forest J. held also that
there is a compelling public interest in the quality of education 
received by children.
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Brown v. Board of Education.4 The United States Supreme 
Court held that education is necessary to perform the 
most basic responsibilities. Education is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. It is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.5 The 
Supreme Court doubted that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if the child is denied 
education.6 Public education was the inculcation of 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system.7 Education prepares 
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient 
participants in society.
4.1. Duties and rights of parents
The welfare model and the rights model both provide 
that one of the duties of parents is to educate their 
child. Both models assume that parents are conferred with 
rights in order to perform this duty. Both the common law
4 United States: 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 493 Warren C.J. held 
that it is doubtful whether any child may reasonably be expected 
to succeed in society if denied the opportunity of education.
5 United States: Mever v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) at 400 per McReynolds J.; Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) at 213 per Burger C.J. speaking for a majority of the 
Supreme Court.
6 United States: San Antonio Independent School District et 
a.l v. Rodriquez 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 29-30 per Powell J.
speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court; Plvler v. Doe 457 
U.S. 202 (1982) at 221-223 per Brennan J..
7 United States: Bethel School District No.403 v. Fraser 478 
U.S. 675 (1986) at 681 per Burger C.J. speaking for a majority 
of the Supreme Court.
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and rules of equity provided that the father had 
authority to guide and determine the education of his 
child. This authority was said often to have been 
conferred by God and positive law had to support it.8 The 
maintenance of this authority was seen as essential to 
ensure that the reciprocal relationship between the 
father and child is happy and virtuous. However, the law 
viewed this authority as a trust and not a power and 
could be restrained when abused.9 The Guardianship of
8 Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 446; Ireland: 
Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.1. In North Western 
Health Board v. H.W. and C.W. , unreported, High Court, McCracken 
J., 27 October, 2000, at 12-13 McCracken J. held that this
constitutional provision was the nearest to accepting that there 
is a natural law in the theological sense. England: Ex Parte
Hopkins (1732) 3 P. Wms. 152, 24 E.R. 1009 at 154, 1009; Ex Parte 
Pve (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 140, 34 E.R. 271 at 153-154, 276 per
Eldon L.C.; Hodqens v. Hodgens (183 7) 4 Cl. & Fin. 323, 7 E.R. 
124 at 375, 144 per Lord Wynford; In Re Meades, Minors (1870) 5 
Ir. Eq. 98 at 103 per Lord O'Hagan L.C.; Bennet v. Bennet (18 79) 
10 Ch. D. 474 at 477-478 per Jessel M.R.; In Re Agar-Ellis. Agar- 
Ellis v. Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 at 326-329 per Brett M.R. 
and 334-336 per Bowen L.J.; R. v. Barnardo [1891] 1 Q.B. 194 at 
2 07 per Lord Esher M.R.; In Re Newton (Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 
at 747-748 per Lindley L.J.; In Re J.M. Carroll (an infant) 
[1931] 1 K.B. 317 at 353-354 per Slesser L.J..
9 England: Creuze v. Hunter (1790) 2 Cox 242, 2 R.R. 38 at 
243, 3 9 per Thurlow L.C.; Skinner v. Warner (1792) 2 Dick. 779, 
21 E.R. 473 at 780, 474; Lyons v. Blenkin (1820) Jac. 245, 23
R.R. 38 at 255-257, 43 per Lord Eldon; Lord Talbot v. The Earl 
of Shrewsbury (1840) 4 Myl. & Cr. 672, 41 E.R. 259 at 686-688, 
264 per Cottenham L.C.; In Re Browne, a minor (1852) 2 Ir. Ch. 
151 at 159 per Smith M.R.; Stourton v. Stourton (1857) 8 De G. 
M. & G. 760, 44 E.R. 583 at 771-773, 588 per Turner L.J.; Davis 
v. Davis (1862) 10 W.R. 245, 125 R.R. 947 at 246, 949-950 per
Woods V.C.; Hill v. Hill (1862) 31 L.J. Ch. 505, 133 R.R. 399 at 
508, 403 per Woods V.C.; Austin v. Austin (1865) 34 Beav. 257, 
55 E.R. 634 at 263, 636 per Romilly M.R.; In Re Meades, Minors 
(1870) 5 Ir. Eq. 98 at 103 per Lord O'Hagan L.C.; Hawksworth v. 
Hawksworth (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 539 at 542 per James L.J. and 
at 544 per Mellish L.J.; Andrews v. Salt (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 
622 at 639 per Mellish L.J.; In Re Agar-Ellis. Agar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1878) 10 Ch. D. 49 at 56 per Mallins V.C. and at 71-72 
and 75-76 per James L.J.; In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 at 329 per Brett M.R.; In Re
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Infants Act 1886 did not alter this position.10
In Ireland, many of the protections formerly 
afforded by both equity and common law are now provided 
by the provisions of the Constitution, and have 
consequentially acquired an elevated juridical status. 
The Constitution recognises the family as having a 
special place in the education of a child. The family is 
responsible for both the physical and intellectual 
nurture of the child.11 The Constitution confers on 
parents the duty and right to provide for the religious, 
moral, intellectual, physical and social education of 
their children.12
There are two aspects to the parental right of 
education. First, parents can require that the child's 
education accords with their conscience and lawful 
purpose.13 Second, parents have a choice as to how and
Scanlan (1888) 40 Ch. D. 200 at 207-210 per Stirling L.J.; In Re 
Magees, Infants (1893) 31 L.R. Ir. 513 at 523-525 per Porter
M.R.; In Re Violet Nevin [1891] 2 Ch. 299 at 316 per Kay L.J.;
In Re McGrath [1892] 2 Ch. 496 at 508 per North J.; In Re McGrath 
[1893] 1 Ch. 143 at 148-149 per Lindley L.J.; In Re Newton
(Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 at 747-748 per Lindley L.J..
10 England: In Re Scanlan (1888) 40 Ch. D. 200 at 211-214
per Stirling J..
11 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 
2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 19 per Denham J..
12 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1;
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at
19 per Denham J., at 36-3 7 per Murphy J. and at 41 per Lynch J..
13 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.3.1.
Canada: In R. v. Jones [1986] 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at 583 per
Wilson J. who held that parents have a similar right under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and at 596 per La Forest 
J., speaking for a number of judges who were willing to assume 
such a right exists.
147
where their child shall receive education. Parents may 
educate their child at home, in private schools, or in 
schools recognised or established by the State.14
The duty of parents is to provide according to their 
means for the religious, moral, intellectual, physical 
and social education of their child15 and the child's 
natural and imprescriptible rights.16 The aim of this 
duty is to enhance and not suppress the child's potential 
so that the child is qualified for such reasonable 
standard of life as an adult that the child is capable 
of, given appropriate education. Parents cannot refuse to 
exercise the inalienable right to educate their child.17 
In Meyer v. State of Nebraska18 the United States Supreme 
Court held that corresponding to the right of control, it 
is the natural duty of the parent to give his or her
14 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 193 7, Art. 42.2; In Re 
Doyle. unreported, Supreme Court, 21 December, 1955 at 3-5 per 
Maguire C .J..
15 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1; In Re 
Article 26 and The School Attendance Bill 1942 [1943] I.R. 334
at 344-345 per O'Sullivan C.J.; Campaign to Separate Church and 
State Ltd. v. Minister for Education [1998] 3 I.R. 321 at 340-341 
per Costello P. and at 357 per Barrington J.; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 549 at 559 per Geoghegan 
J .; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 
at 19-21 per Denham J. , at 3 6-37 per Murphy J. and at 41 per 
Lynch J..
16 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5.
17 Ireland: O'Shiel v. Minister for Education [1999] 2 I.R. 
321 at 347 per Laffoy J..
18 United States: 262 U.S 390 (1923).
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children education suitable to their station in life.19
The welfare model and the rights model provide that 
parents must act in the child's best interests when 
performing their duty and rights in relation to their 
child's education. Society has a greater understanding of 
child development and education. This knowledge assists 
in determining whether parents are or are not acting in 
the child's best interests when deciding on the child's 
education.
4.2. Duty of State to protect and provide for child
The welfare model and the rights model both provide 
that the State must protect and provide for the child's 
education.20 It is in the State's interest that a child 
should be brought up properly and educated.21 This 
derives from the parens patriae concept.22
The protection of the child's education arises where 
the parents actions or omissions threaten the child's
19 United States: ibid. at 400 per McReynolds J. ; Bartels v. 
State of Iowa 262 U.S. 404 (1923) at 409 per McReynolds J. 
following Mever v. State of Nebraska.
20 United States: Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) at 
213 per Burger C.J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court. 
Canada: R. v. Jones [1986] 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at 592 per La
Forest J., who held that the eduction of the young is 
particularly important and at 597 where La Forest J. held that 
there is a compelling public interest in the quality of education 
provided to children.
21 United States: Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) at 534-535 per McReynolds J..
22 England: Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort (1828) 2 Bligh
N.S. 124, 4 E.R. 1078 at 130-132, 1081 per Lord Redesdale; Hope 
v. Hope (1854) 4 De G. M. & G. 328, 43 E.R. 534 at 344, 540 per 
Cranworth L.C.; In Re Grimes (1877) 11 Ir. Eq. 465 at 470 per
Ball L.C..
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right to education. The Court of Chancery's parens 
patriae jurisdiction allowed the court to interfere with 
a child's education where the parent's decision posed a 
danger to the child's interests and welfare.23 This could 
occur where a father sought to deprive a child of 
education that the child was enjoying or to change the 
child's religious education where the child had accepted 
the tenets of a particular faith.24 The court would 
interview older children and consider their views.25
23 England: Creuze v. Hunter (1790) 2 Cox 242, 2 R.R. 38 at 
243, 39 per Thurlow L.C.; Skinner v. Warner (1792) 2 Dick. 779, 
21 E.R. 473 at 780, 474; Lyons v. Blenkin (1820) Jac. 245, 23
R.R. 38 at 255-257, 43 per Lord Eldon; Lord Talbot v. The Earl 
of Shrewsbury (1840) 4 Myl. & Cr. 672, 41 E.R. 259 at 686-688, 
264 per Cottenhara L.C.; In Re Browne, a minor (1852) 2 Ir. Ch. 
151 at 159 per Smith M.R.; Stourton v. Stourton (1857) 8 De G. 
M. Sc G. 760, 44 E.R. 583 at 771-773, 588 per Turner L.J.; Davis 
v. Davis (1862) 10 W.R. 245, 125 R.R. 947 at 246, 949-950 per
Woods V.C.; Hill v. Hill (1862) 31 L.J. Ch. 505, 133 R.R. 399 at 
508, 403 per Woods V.C.; Austin v. Austin (1865) 34 Beav. 257, 
55 E.R. 634 at 263, 636 per Romilly M.R.; In Re Meades. Minors 
(1870) 5 Ir. Eq. 98 at 103 per Lord O'Hagan L.C.; Hawksworth v. 
Hawksworth (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 53 9 at 542 per James L.J. and 
at 544 per Mellish L.J.; Andrews v. Salt (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 
622 at 639 per Mellish L.J.; In Re Agar-Ellis. Agar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1878) 10 Ch. D. 49 at 56 per Mallins V.C. and at 71-72 
and 75-76 per James L.J.; In Re Agar-Ellis. Agar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 at 329 per Brett M.R. ; In Re
Scanlan (1888) 40 Ch. D. 200 at 207-210 per Stirling L.J.; In Re 
Magees. Infants (1893) 31 L.R. Ir. 513 at 523-525 per Porter
M.R.; In Re Violet Nevin [18 91] 2 Ch. 299 at 316 per Kay L.J.; 
In Re McGrath [1892] 2 Ch. 496 at 508 per North J.; In Re McGrath 
[1893] 1 Ch. 143 at 148-149 per Lindley L.J.; In Re Newton
(Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740 at 747-748 per Lindley L.J..
24 England: Lyons v. Blenkin (1820) Jac. 245, 23 R.R. 38 at 
263, 46 per Lord Eldon; Stourton v. Stourton (1857) 8 De G. M. 
Sc G. 760, 44 E.R. 583 at 771-773, 588 per Turner L.J. ; Hawksworth 
v . Hawksworth (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 539 at 542 per James L.J. 
and at 544 per Mellish L.J.; In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 at 333-334 per Cotton L.J..
25 England: Witty v. Marshall (1841) 1 Y. & C.Ch. 68, 62
E.R. 794 at 73, 796 per Knight Bruce V.C.; Davis v. Davis (1862) 
10 W.R. 245, 125 R.R. 947 at 246, 950 per Woods V.C..
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The State's duty to protect a child's education is 
fulfilled by making education compulsory.26 The Education 
and Maintenance of Pauper Children 18 62 allowed the 
guardians of every parish to send orphan and deserted 
children under 14 to school.27 The 1862 Act provided that 
a child should not be send to a school of a religion to 
which the child did not belong, or to a school espousing 
a religion to which the parent objected.28 The Elementary 
Education in England and Wales Act 1870 required that 
children aged between five and 13 had to attend a State 
funded school, unless parents had a reasonable excuse, 
including that the child was already receiving 
appropriate education.29 The Elementary Education Act 
1876 established that it was the duty of the parent of 
every child to cause such child to receive efficient 
elementary instruction in reading, writing and 
arithmetic.30 Parents could be punished for failing in 
this duty31 and a court could order a parent to require
26 United States: In Mever v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S 390 
(1923) at 400 per McReynolds J. noting that nearly all States had 
compulsory education laws. Canada; R. v. Jones [1986] 31
D.L.R.(4th) 569 at 592 and 594 per La Forest J. and at 597 per
Dickson C.J., Beetz J., McIntyre J., Lamer J. and Le Dain J..
27 England: Education and Maintenance of Pauper Children 
18 62, s . 1 and s . 6 .
28 England: Education and Maintenance of Pauper Children 
1862, s. 7 and s. 9.
29 England: Elementary Education in England and Wales Act 
1870, s. 74.
30 The standard of proficiency is the standard of reading 
writing and arithmetic fixed by the Code of 1876.
31 England: Elementary Education Act 1876, s. 4.
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their child to attend school.32 The court could order the 
child to attend an industrial school where the parent 
disobeyed the order requiring a child to attend a 
school.33 The 1876 Act precluded the employment of 
children, unless the child attended a certified school, 
or there was a certificate that the child was proficient 
in reading, writing and arithmetic.34 The Irish Education 
Act 1892 imposed a similar duty on parents to send their 
child to school.35 The School Attendance Act 1926 and 
Education (Welfare) Act 2000 impose similar duties on 
parents.
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 allows parents to 
educate their child at home, in private schools, or in 
schools recognised or established by the State.36 
However, the duty to educate the child is shared between 
the parents and the State.37 In Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters36 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
State does not have a general power to standardise its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction in State
32 England: Elementary Education Act 1876, s. 11.
33 England: Elementary Education Act 1876, s. 12.
34 England: Elementary Education Act 1876, s. 6.
35 England: Irish Education Act 1892, s. 1(1) .
36 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.2. In Re 
Doyle. unreported, Supreme Court, 21 December, 1955 at 4-5 per 
Maguire C .J ..
37 Ireland: S.C. v. Minister for Education [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 
134 at 147 per McGuinness J.; O'Shiel v. Minister for Education
[1999] 2 I.R. 321 at 345-346 per Laffoy J..
38 United States: 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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schools.39 Such a power would infringe the parental right 
to determine the child's education. The welfare model 
requires the State to protect the integrity of the family 
unit, and the duties and rights of parents.40 The Irish 
Constitution provides that the family is the primary and 
natural educator of the child. The State guarantees to 
respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to 
provide, according to their means, for the religious, 
moral, intellectual, physical and social education of 
their children.41
The Irish Constitution provides that the State as 
guardian of the common good shall require in view of 
actual conditions that the children receive a certain 
minimum education, moral, intellectual, and social.42 The 
Constitution does not define what constitutes this 
minimum education. The Oireachtas is not obliged to 
define, what constitutes this minimum education but may 
do so. This is provided that the Oireachtas does not
39 United States: ibid. at 535 per McReynolds J. who held 
that there is a fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
Governments in the Union repose excluding any general power of 
the State to standardise its children by forcing them to accept 
intrusions from public teachers only.
40 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 41.1.1.
41 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.1.
42 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.3.2. In Re 
Article 26 and The School Attendance Bill 1942 [1943] I.R. 334
at 344-345 per O'Sullivan C.J.; Director of Public Prosecutions 
v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 21 per Denham J., at 29-31 per
Keane J. and 36, 38-39, 40 per Murphy J..
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require more than the minimum education.43 In In Re 
Article 26 and The School Attendance Bill 194244 the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not allow 
the State to regulate how or where the minimum attainment 
should be met. Parents are entitled to decide on the 
manner in which the education is being given and 
received, provided the child receives education of at 
least the minimum standard.45 In Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best46 Keane J. in the Supreme Court 
found that this approach was unduly narrow and should not 
be followed because the child's right to education47 
would be seriously violated if the State could not 
intervene.48
The Irish courts have interpreted the "minimum 
education"49 as a minimum standard of elementary
43 Ireland: In Re Article 26 and The School Attendance Bill 
1942 [1943] I.R. 334 at 345 per O'Sullivan C.J..
44 Ireland: [1943] I.R. 334.
45 Ireland: ibid. at 346 per O'Sullivan C.J..
46 Ireland: [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1.
47 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 44 per 
Finlay P., at 55-56 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 79 per Walsh J.; 
Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102 at 122 per O'Higgins C.J. 
holding the right of the child to education was correlative to 
the State's duty to educate; O'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for 
Health [1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J..
48 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 
2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 33 per Keane J..
49 Ireland: In D.P.P. v. Best [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 549 at 558 
per Geoghegan J. holding that the use of the word "minimum" does 
not mean some lowest common denominator, but imports the 
attainment of any reasonable standard of elementary education of 
general application.
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education of a general character that would include a 
basic level of literacy and numeracy.50 This supports the 
narrow view of education encapsulated in the welfare 
model, which essentially views a child as being skill 
trained and socialised by the educational process. The 
State sponsors a primary and secondary school system and 
determines the curriculum for this system.
However, the rights model commences with a 
consideration of the intellectual and other capacities of 
the individual child, and how they may best be fostered 
in order to allow the child to reach his or her full 
potential.51 The minimum education, moral, intellectual 
and social is not necessarily equivalent to the primary 
school curriculum.
It is impossible to give a universal and uniform 
definition of minimum education that will apply to every
50 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 193 7, Art. 8.1 provides 
that Irish is the first national language. A question has been 
raised as to whether a child should be taught Irish in order to 
receive the minimum education. In O'Shiel v. Minister for 
Education [1999] 2 I.R. 321 at 361 per Laffoy J. it was held that 
the State's obligation to provide free primary education mandates 
the teaching of Irish. However, in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best Geoghegan J. in the High Court ( [1998] 2 
I.L.R.M. 549 at 560) and Keane J. in the Supreme Court ([2000] 
2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 31) held that the teaching of the Irish language 
was not essential to the constitutional minimum.
51 Ireland: Rvan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294 at 350 
per O'Dalaigh C.J.; O'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for Health 
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per 0'Hanlon J. ; F.N. (a minor) v.
Minister for Education and Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 409 at 415-416 
per Geoghegan J.; S.C. v. Minister for Education [1997] 2
I.L.R.M. 134 at 143-144 per McGuinness J. ; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best [2 000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 20 per Denham J. and 
at 41 per Lynch J.. However, in Director of Public Prosecutions 
v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 40 Murphy J. viewed the minimum
education as a very basic standard indeed.
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generation of children. I submit that there are four 
reasons for this.
First, the child's individual circumstances must be 
taken into account, such as the child's development, 
aptitudes and abilities with a view to a determination of 
the child's potential. The concept of education is 
broader than solely intellectual development but will 
involve social, moral and religious considerations. The 
minimum education must be conducive to the child 
achieving intellectual and social development and not 
such as to place the child in a discriminatory 
position.52
Second, actual conditions must be considered when 
defining the minimum education. "Actual conditions" means 
the conditions in the community, the community's scheme 
of education, the primary school curriculum, the family's 
circumstances, the rights of parents to educate their 
child, society's emphasis on academic success and the 
common good.33
Third, the Constitution is a living instrument and 
it must be construed as of now. What is considered 
minimum education changes with our better understanding 
of children's education potential54 and society's
52 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 
2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 21 per Denham J..
53 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 
2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 18 and 21 per Denham J. and at 4 6 per Barron J..
54 Ireland: Q'Donocrhue (a minor) v. Minister for Health 
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J. where he explained that 
the educational potential of children can vary from child to
156
demands, for example the need for computer literacy.55
Fourth, the Constitution requires the State to 
guarantee to respect the inalienable right and duty of 
parents to provide "according to their means" for the 
education of their children. However, the means of 
parents may vary from family to family. This is not the 
only consideration for the court. The court will consider 
the child's right including the right of the child to 
reach his or her potential. An education that hinders or 
restricts the child's potential may establish 
circumstances where the rights of the child and the 
interest of the common good outweigh considerations of 
the family and parental rights.
The State's obligation to ensure that a child 
receives a minimum education allows for laws requiring a 
child to attend a State recognised school, or for parents 
to establish that their child is receiving the minimum 
education. The State is the guardian of the common good 
and must protect the child's right to a certain minimum 
education. The burden of proof is on the parents to prove 
that the child is receiving a minimum education.56 The
child and at 69-70 per O'Hanlon J., who held that there was a 
continuous obligation on the State to modify teaching techniques 
in light of ongoing research.
55 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [1998] 
2 I.L.R.M. 549 at 556 per Geoghegan J.; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 18 per Denham J. and 
at 45-4 6 per Barron J. . In Director of Public Prosecutions v. 
Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 40 per Murphy J. holding that the
concept of what constitutes basic education changes very slowly.
56 Ireland: School Attendance Act 1926, s. 18(2) .
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imposition of this burden of proof on the parents is 
appropriate. The matters which the parents must prove are 
within their knowledge as the child's parents.
In addition to this duty, the State may be obliged 
to supply the place of parents where the parents for 
physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards 
their child but always with due regard for the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of the child.57 A failure does 
not arise where it is due to the parents' financial 
circumstances or a difference of opinion as to what an 
appropriate method or standard of education might be. In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder58 the United States Supreme Court held 
that there is no doubt as to the power of a State to 
impose reasonable regulations for the control and 
duration of basic education and funding of a public 
school system.59 However the State's interest is not 
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
57 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.5. In Re 
Article 26 and The School Attendance Bill 1942 [1943] I.R. 334
at 344 O'Sullivan C.J.; G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 
56 per O'Higgins C.J.; O'Sheil v. Minister for Education [1999] 
2 I.R. 321 at 345-346 per Laffoy J. ; Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 38 per Murphy J.;
58 United States: 406 U.S. 205 (1972) at 213-214 per Burger
C.J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court.
59 United States: Mever v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) at 400-402 per McReynolds J.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
268 U.S. 510 (1925) at 534-535 per McReynolds J.; Epperson v.
Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968) at 103-107 per Fortas J. who held
that the right to prescribe the curriculum for public schools 
does not carry with it the right to prohibit the teaching of a 
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based 
upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.
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fundamental rights and interests, such as those 
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents 
with respect to the religious upbringing of their 
children. Parens patriae is not so wide as to interfere 
with religious freedoms and the role of parents in the 
upbringing of their children. The United States 
Constitution prohibits an established religion. The 
United States Supreme Court has struck down laws relating 
to schools and education that directly or indirectly 
support or oppose religious activities or institutions.60
The welfare model and the rights model each require 
the State to provide for children's education. However 
the welfare model and the rights model potentially 
diverge about the purpose of this education. Parents may 
be unable to fund the educational services necessary to 
develop the child's potential. The State is obliged to 
provide the necessary services considering the benefit 
that accrues to the State from a child who has the 
capacity to live in a civilised society.
The Constitution of Ireland 1937 provides that the
60 United States: In Everson v. Board of Education of
Education of Ewing TP. et al. 330 U.S. 1 (194 7), the Supreme
Court found that the use of public money to pay bus fares for 
students attending parochial schools violated the prohibition of 
an established religion. McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 
203 (1948). In Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Supreme 
Court held that a prayer composed by State officials to further 
religious beliefs breached the parental right to religious 
freedom.
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State must provide for free primary education.61 The 
State cannot insist that parents must avail of this 
education.62 The United States Supreme Court held that 
the federal constitution does not confer on children a 
right to education. Nevertheless, the court held that 
children have a proprietary interest in education and was 
not like any other security benefit.63
Education may be interpreted in one of two ways, 
either narrowly, as scholastic education, or more 
broadly, as enabling the achievement of personal 
potential. In Ryan v. Attorney General64 the High and 
Supreme Courts took the narrower approach. However, in 
the Supreme Court, O'Dalaigh C.J. adopted the wider 
definition. O'Dalaigh C.J. explained that education was 
the teaching and training of a child to make the best 
possible use of his inherent and potential capacities, 
physical, mental and moral.65 The High Court reconsidered
61 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.4.
62 Ireland: Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102 at 126 per 
Kenny J.; O'Shiel v. Minister for Education [1999] 2 I.R. 321 at 
345-347 per Laffoy J.; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best
[2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 38 per Murphy J..
63 United States : San Antonio Independent School District et 
al. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 35 per Powell J.; Plvler
v . Doe 457 U.S. 202 (1982) at 221 per Brennan J. and at 230 per
Marshall J. holding that a child's interest in education was 
fundamental.
64 Ireland: [1965] I.R. 294.
65 Ireland: Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294 at 310 
per Kenny J. defined education as scholastic and at 350 per 
O'Dalaigh C.J. defined education as essentially the teaching and 
training of a child to make the best possible use of the child's 
inherent capacities. In Landers v. Attorney General (1972) 109
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this issue in O'Donoqhue (a minor) v. Minister for 
Health.66 There, a mentally handicapped child claimed 
that the State was obliged to provide an educational 
regime that could not be described as scholastic.
In the High Court, O'Hanlon J. questioned whether 
the education sought for the plaintiff could be regarded 
as "primary education". O'Hanlon J. found that the 
dictionary definition of education as "the bringing up or 
training of a child". O'Hanlon J. considered the term 
"primary" and the Irish term "bun-oideachas".67 This 
translates as "principal advice, instruction or 
teaching".68 O'Hanlon J. adopted O'Dalaigh C.J.'s 
approach in Ryan.69 O'Hanlon J. held that there is a 
constitutional obligation imposed on the State to give 
each child such advice, instruction and teaching as will 
enable that child to make the best possible use of his or 
her inherent and potential capacities, physical, mental 
and moral, however limited these may be70.71 The
I.L.T.R. 1 at 5 per Finlay J. held that there was no
inconsistency between the definition of education adopted by 
Kenny J. and O'Dalaigh C.J..
66 Ireland: [1996] 2 I.R. 20.
67 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 25.5.4
provides that the Irish text of the Constitution is supreme where 
there is any conflict between the text of the Constitution in 
Irish and its English translation.
68 Ireland: O'Donoqhue (a minor) v. Minister for Health
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 64 per O'Hanlon J..
69 Ireland: [1965] I.R. 294 at 350 per O'Dalaigh C.J..
70 Ireland: O'Donoqhue (a minor) v. Minister for Health
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J..
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curriculum advocated for schools for profoundly mentally 
handicapped children was directed towards the promotion 
of the child's physical, intellectual, emotional, social, 
moral and aesthetic development. The education of 
profoundly handicapped children could, accordingly 
correctly be described as "primary education" within the 
meaning of the Constitution.72 The facilities which had 
been provided to the applicant in this cases were 
inadequate, having regard, inter alia, to the 
pupil/teacher ratio, the hours of instruction, the age of 
commencement, continuity and duration of education, and 
that the said facilities, could not, accordingly, be 
regarded as meeting the State's obligations to provide 
the applicant with free primary education. The High Court 
decided that in future the pupil/teacher ratio was to be 
6:1 and two child care assistants per class. O'Hanlon J. 
held that the child's constitutional right to primary 
education necessitated the provision of full time 
continuous education. O'Hanlon J. held that there was an 
ongoing obligation to respond to research about new 
educational techniques, and modify its practices
71 Ireland: O'Hanlon J.'s definition has been adopted in
subsequent High Court cases: F.N. (a minor) v. Minister for
Health and Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 409 at 415-416 per Geoghegan J. ; 
G.L. v. (a minor) v. Minister for Justice, Minister for 
Education. Minister for Health and Ireland, unreported, High 
Court, 24 March, 1995 at 4 per Geoghegan J.; S.C. v. Minister for 
Education [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 134 at 143-144 per McGuinness J. ;
Sinnott (A person of unsound mind) and Sinnott v. Minister for 
Education, Ireland and Attorney General, unreported, High Court, 
5 October, 2000 at 33, 39 and 43 per Barr J..
72 Ireland: O'Donoqhue (a minor) v. Minister for Health 
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 66-67 per O'Hanlon J..
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accordingly.73 This definition highlights the 
paternalistic role of judges. It should be noted that 
this definition applies equally to children with special 
needs and those with gifts or talents. 0'Hanlon J. did 
not place any limitations on the State's obligation.
In O'Shiel v. Minister for Education74, Laffoy J. 
indirectly imposed limitations on the State's duty by 
holding that primary education meant the teaching and 
training of children aged from four or five to 12, 13, 
and 14.75 However, in Sinnott (A person of unsound mind) 
and Sinnott v. Minister for Education, Ireland and 
Attorney General76 Barr J. held that the definitions of 
education adopted in O'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for 
Health77 and Ryan v. The Attorney General78 did not 
import an age limitation.79 Barr J. decided that the 
State's constitutional obligation to provide for primary 
education of the grievously disabled is "need" and not 
"age". The definition of primary education adopted in 
Ryan, 0'Donoghue, and Sinnott highlights the caring
73 Ireland: ibid. at 69-70 per O'Hanlon J. .
74 Ireland: [1999] 2 I.R. 321.
75 Ireland: [1999] 2 I.R. 321 at 327-328 per Laffoy J. .
76 Ireland: Unreported, High Court, Barr J., 5 October,
2000 .
77 Ireland: [1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J..
78 Ireland: [1965] I.R. 294 at 310 per Kenny J. and at 350
per O'Dalaigh C.J..
79 Ireland: Sinnott (A person of unsound mind) and Sinnott 
v. Minister for Education, Ireland and Attorney General, 
unreported, High Court, 5 October, 2000 at 49-50 per Barr J..
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paternalistic role of judges. O'Donoghue and Sinnott 
demonstrate the willingness of the courts to determine 
what is necessary to satisfy the parens patriae duty of 
the State to provide for children's education.
The State's duty to provide free primary education 
is discharged by giving support to schools or 
establishing and funding a primary school system.80 There 
is no constitutional duty on the State to provide 
education directly. The State may give reasonable aid to 
private and corporate educational initiatives. This would 
include subsidisation in the erection and maintenance of 
school buildings, day-to-day costs in running school and, 
prescribing and enforcing standards through provision of 
a curriculum.81 When the State relies on other bodies to 
provide the free primary education, the State retains 
primary responsibility for the nature and quality of the 
educational service which is provided on the State's 
behalf. If that were not so then the State could shelter 
behind third party incompetence and seek to avoid 
constitutional responsibility for not providing a citizen 
with appropriate primary education. The State can 
directly provide educational facilities or institutions, 
where the public good requires it.
80 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 42.4.
81 Ireland: Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102 at 122-123 
per O'Higgins C.J. and at 126 per Kenny J.; O'Shiel v. Minister 
for Education [1999] 2 I.R. 321 at 347 per Laffoy J. approving 
of the Supreme Court's approach in Crowley v. Ireland.
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In O'Shiel v. Minister for Education82 in the High 
Court Laffoy J. held that the State's duty to provide for 
free primary education is not satisfied by funding a 
single system and offering it to parents on a "take it or 
leave it" basis.83 The State must have regard to and 
accommodate the expression of conscientious choice and 
lawful parental preference. However, Laffoy J. held that 
the State does not have to accede to an application for 
financial aid from any group of parents united in their 
choice. Laffoy J. held that the State must balance its 
duty to provide free primary education and respect 
parental choice by establishing rational criteria for 
State funding. Laffoy J. held that the court was entitled 
to determine whether such criteria accorded with the 
State's constitutional duty to provide for free primary 
education.84
The State may not discriminate against schools of 
different denominations. The State cannot require parents 
to send their children to schools established or 
designated by the State in violation of those parents' 
conscience and lawful preference.85 A school in receipt 
of public funds may not compel a pupil to receive
82 Ireland: [1999] 2 I.R. 321.
83 Ireland: ibid. at 347 per Laffoy J. .
84 Ireland: ibid. at 348 per Laffoy J. .
85 Ireland: In Campaign to Separate Church and State Ltd. v.
Minister for Education [1998] 3 I.R. 321 at 356 per Barrington
J. holding that every child irrespective of his or her faith has
an equal entitlement to attend a school receiving State funds.
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religious instruction86 at that school.87
4.3. Welfare rights of child
Like the other welfare rights of the child, the 
child's right to education is not expressly stated in the 
Constitution.88 This right has been interpreted either as 
a correlation of the parental duty to provide for the 
child's education,89 the State's duty to provide for free 
primary education90 to which the family as a unit 
benefits91, or, as an unenumerated right of the child
86 Ireland: In Campaign to Separate Church and State Ltd. v. 
Minister for Education [1998] 3 I.R. 321 at 357 per Barrington
J., in the Supreme Court, holding that religious education had 
a wider meaning than that of religious instruction. Barrington 
J. believed that a child attending a school of a different 
denomination to his own will still be influenced by the religious 
ethos of the school, even though this child does not attend 
classes of religious instruction.
87 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 44.2.4; 
Education Act 1998, s. 30(2) (e) provides that the Minister cannot 
require a student to attend instruction in any subject which is 
contrary to the conscience of the student's parents.
88 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 55-56 
per O'Higgins C.J..
89 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 44 per 
Finlay P., at 55-56 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 79 per Walsh J.; 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at
19 per Denham J. approving of O'Higgins C.J. in G . v . An Bord 
Uchtala, at 3 7 per Murphy J. approving of Walsh J. in G . v . An 
Bord Uchtala and at 41 per Lynch J..
90 Ireland: Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102 at 121-122 
per O'Higgins C.J.; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best 
[2 000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 20 per Denham J..
91 Ireland: Sinnott (A person of unsound mind) and Sinnott 
v. Minister for Education, Ireland and Attorney General, 
unreported, High Court, 5 October, 2000 at 57 per Barr J..
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independent of the parents or State's duty.92 The rights 
model requires that the rights must be seen as an 
independent right of the child.
The child's right to free primary education allows 
each child to receive such advice, instruction and 
teaching as will enable the child to make the best 
possible use of his or her inherent and potential 
capacities, physical, mental and moral, however limited 
these capacities may be.93 There is a potential conflict 
between the ability of the State to vindicate this right 
of the child and the constitutional limitation on the 
State to require that a child only receive a certain 
minimum education. Parents may provide this minimum 
education but be unwilling or unable to provide the 
education necessary for the child to reach his or her 
potential. Paternalism means that the courts protect the 
rights of the family at the expense of the child's 
potential. The rights model requires a resolution of this 
conflict by equating the minimum education with an 
education necessary for child to make the best possible 
use of his or her inherent and potential capacities. The 
child's education must be such that the child can develop 
his or her capabilities and skills to the maximum and 
hasten the process of social integration and individual
92 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.3.1;
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Best [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at
41 per Lynch J..
93 Ireland: 0'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for Health 
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J..
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development.94
4.4. Civil rights of child
The welfare model and the rights model provide that 
a child is entitled to civil constitutional rights such 
as the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, freedom of 
expression and association. A child does not shed his or 
her constitutional rights at the school gates.95
4.5. Conflicting rights of child
The welfare model and the rights model each 
recognise that there may be a conflict between the 
child's right to education and civil constitutional 
rights such as right to liberty, freedom of expression 
and fair procedures. Neither the welfare model nor the 
rights model can consider this conflict in isolation in 
schools where the rights of other children are 
involved.96
The resolution of these conflicts lies with school 
management who can discipline the child. The school's 
ability to discipline the child originated in the common
94 Ireland: O'Donoghue (a minor) v. Minister for Health
[1996] 2 I.R. 20 at 65 per O'Hanlon J. approved of in Best v.
P.P.P. [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 at 41 per Lynch J..
95 United States: Tinker v. Pes Moines School Pistrict 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) at 506 per Fortas J.; Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565
(1975) at 574 per White J.; Board of Education v. Pico 457 U.S. 
853 (1982) at 865 per Brennan J.; Bethel School Pistrict No.403 
v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986) at 680 per Burger C.J.; Hazelwood 
School Pistrict v. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260 (1988) at 266 per White 
J. .
96 United States: Bethel School Pistrict No.403 v. Fraser 
478 U.S. 675 (1986) at 681 per Burger C.J. where a student had 
used a sexual metaphor during a speech to a school assembly.
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law. The common law allows parents to inflict moderate 
and reasonable punishment on his or her child for the 
purpose of disciplining the child.97 The common law 
allows parents to delegate this ability to the child's 
schoolmaster.98 The law presumed that where a parent sent 
a child to a school, the parent gave to that school the 
authority to administer moderate and reasonable 
punishment.99 The school's authority was the same as that 
of the parent, unless the parent expressly limited the 
school's ability to discipline the child.100 The welfare
97 England: R. v. Hoplev (1860) 2 F. & F . 202, 175 E.R. 1024 
at 206, 1026 per Cockburn C.J.; Scorgie v. Lawrie (1883) 20
S.L.R. 397 at 399 per Lord Justice-Clerk and per Lord Young; 
Children Act 1908, s. 37 preserves the right of any parent to 
administer punishment on a child or young person.
98 England: Blackstone (1788) Bk. 1 Chap. 16 p. 453 states 
that a father could delegate part of his parental authority 
during his lifetime to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, 
who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power 
of the parent committed to his charge viz that of restraint and 
correction; R. v. The Inhabitants of Lvtchet Matraverse (1827) 
7 B. & C. 226, 108 E.R. 707 at 231-232, 709-710 Bayley J..; R^
v. Hoplev (1860) 2 F. & F. 202, 175 E.R. 1024 at 206, 1026 per
Cockburn C.J.; Fitzgerald v. Northcote (1865) 4 F. & F. 656, 176
E.R. 734 at 689-690, 749 per Cockburn C.J.; Cleary v. Booth
[1893] 1 Q.B. 465 at 468 per Collins J. . The schoolmaster's
ability to discipline a student could be delegated to a teacher: 
Mansell v. Griffin [1908] 1 K.B. 160 at 166-167 per Phillimore 
J. and at 169 per Walton J. or a school prefect: In Re 
Basingstoke School (1877) 41 J.P. 118 at 119 per Mellor J. .
Ireland: Murtagh v. St. Emer's National School [1991] I.L.R.M, 
549 at 553 per Hederman J.; Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin 
Secondary School, unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 
4 per Kearns J..
99 England: Mansell v. Griffin [1908] 1 K.B. 160 at 169 per
Walton J..
100 England: In Hunter v. Johnson (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 225, a 
school detained a child for not doing his home work. The mother 
had informed the school that the child would not be doing 
homework. In the High Court, Matthew J. at 227 held that the 
facts made out a case of civil assault.
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model provides that the school's ability to discipline 
children arises from parental delegation. However, the 
rights model views a school's ability to discipline a 
child arising from the child's right to education and to 
the State's duty to ensure that all children receive a 
minimum.101 The rights model provides that the State and 
school officials have authority to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards.102
The courts sought to prevent abuse of such 
discipline powers by requiring that it may only be used 
if it was in the child's welfare, and that it must be 
moderate and reasonable.103 Corporal punishment has 
fallen into desuetude, as a result of changing social, 
educational and legal norms.104 This leaves suspension
101 United States: Incrraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977) at 
670 per Powell J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court; 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) at 339-340 per White J..
102 United States: Meyer v. State of Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) at 402 per McReynolds J. holding that the State has the 
power to compel attendance at school and to make reasonable 
regulations for all schools including prescribing a curriculum; 
Bartels v. State of Iowa 262 U.S. 404 (1923) at 409 per 
McReynolds J.; Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503
(1969) at 507 per Fortas J..
103 England: R. v. Hoplev (1860) 2 F. & F. 202, 175 E.R. 1024 
at 206, 1026 per Cockburn C.J.; Fitzgerald v. Northcote (1865)
4 F. & F . 656, 176 E.R. 734 at 689-690, 749 per Cockburn C.J.;
In Re Basingstoke School (1877) 41 J.P. 118 at 119 per Mellor J. ; 
Cleary v. Booth [1893] 1 Q.B. 465 at 468 per Collins J..
104 England: Children Act 1908, s. 37 preserves the right of 
a teacher to administer punishment on a child or young person. 
Ireland: Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997, s. 24 
abolished the rule of law under which teachers are immune from 
criminal liability in respect of physical chastisement of pupils.
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and expulsion as the most draconian penalties available 
to schools. However, discipline must be considered in 
light of the Constitution not the common law.
The rights model finds that school discipline may 
constitute interference with the child's right to 
education.105 The interference with fundamental rights 
will only normally occur where the rights holder has been 
afforded fair procedures and due process. The parens 
patriae concept may result in a court discounting the 
significance to be attached to the interference with the 
child's right to education, fair procedures and due 
process. This occurred in Murtagh v. St. Emer's National 
School.106 There, in the Supreme Court, Hederman J. held 
that a three day suspension was not a matter for judicial 
review. The suspension did not determine or adjudicate 
upon rights, or impose liabilities. It was the 
application of disciplinary procedures, inherent in 
school authorities, entrusted to them by the parents who 
had given them the custody of their children. It is no 
more reviewable than the imposition of detention on a 
child. Hederman J. held the manner in which discipline is
This brings Irish law into conformity with the European 
Convention of Human Rights. In Campbell and Cosans v. The United 
Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 293 at 301-303, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the use of corporal punishment in schools 
violates Art. 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
105 Ireland: Education (Welfare) Act 2000, s. 24 requires a 
recognised school to contact a educational welfare officer before 
expelling a student. The educational welfare officer must make 
all reasonable efforts to ensure that such a child still receives 
the prescribed minimum education.
106 Ireland: [1991] I.L.R.M. 549.
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carried out may give rise to private law actions.107 
However, the Supreme Court's approach in Murtagh has been 
rejected in other cases which recognise that a child has 
a right to fair procedures that must be observed by a 
school when imposing school discipline.108 The failure of 
a body to observe fair procedures is justiciable.
The concept of fair procedures in Irish law alters 
depending on the nature of the tribunal, the matter being 
considered and the consequence of an adverse decision on 
the person concerned.109 There are a number of aspects to 
be considered: the school's disciplinary code, the 
investigation, hearing and sanctions.
The rights model requires that a school's 
disciplinary code should establish generally what conduct 
constitutes a breach of the code and what sanctions may 
be imposed for infractions of the code. However, the code 
does not have to be as detailed as a criminal statute.110 
Students should be made aware of the disciplinary rules
107 Ireland: ibid. at 553 per Hederman J. .
108 England: In Fitzgerald v. Northcote (1865) 4 F. & F . 656, 
176 E.R. 734 at 690-691, 750 per Cockburn C.J. holding that a 
school's authority to discipline a student must not be exercised 
arbitrarily. Cockburn C.J. found that the school had acted 
arbitrarily by not carrying out an inquiry into the alleged 
incident before punishing the student.
109 Ireland: Flanagan v. U.C.D. [1988] I.R. 724 at 730-731 
per Barron J ..
110 United States: Bethel School District No.403 v. Fraser 
478 U.S. 675 (1986) at 686 per Burger C.J. speaking for a 
majority of the court.
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and policy.111 The investigation may be informal and the 
school does not have to adopt the same procedures as a 
court of law.112 The Irish courts are reluctant to 
interfere with the school authorities' investigation or 
hearing when the school has acted fairly.113 A greater 
willingness of the court to interfere might damage the 
school's capacity to discipline its students. The Irish 
courts require the school to act in a quasi-judicial 
manner affording fair procedures where there is the 
possibility of suspension or expulsion,114 particularly
111 Ireland: Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin Secondary 
School, unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 11 per 
Kearns J. ; Education (Welfare) Act 2000, s. 23 requires the board 
of management of a school to draft a code of behaviour. This code 
must contains the behaviour expected of students, sanctions for 
breaches of the code, fair procedures and informing students and 
parents of this code. Education Act 1998, s. 15(2) (d) obliges the 
board of management to publish the school's policy in relation 
to the expulsion and suspension of students.
112 Ireland: The State (Smullen) v. Duffy [1980] I.L.R.M. 46 
at 51 per Finlay P.; Wright (a minor) v. The Board of Management 
of Gorey Community School, unreported, High Court, 28 March, 
2000, at 10 and 11 per O'Sullivan J..
113 Ireland: The State (Smullen) v. Duffy [1980] I.L.R.M. 46 
at 51-52 per Finlay P.; Murtagh v. St. Emer's National School 
[1991] I.L.R.M. 549 at 553 per Hederman J. and at 555 per 
McCarthy J . ; Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin Secondary 
School, unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 11 per 
Kearns J.; Wright (a minor) v. The Board of Management of Gorey 
Community School, unreported, High Court, 28 March, 2000 at 11 
per O'Sullivan J..
114 England: In Fitzgerald v. Northcote (1865) 4 F. & F. 656, 
176 E.R. 734 at 676, 744 per Cockburn C.J. stating that there was 
an obvious distinction between the case of a school boy and that 
of a young man finishing his education in the position of a 
private pupil. The younger child may be subject to greater 
personal restraint and punishment than would be fit and proper 
for the young man. Ireland: Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin 
Secondary School. unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 
15 per Kearns J.; Wright (a minor) v. The Board of Management of 
Gorey Community School, unreported, High Court, 28 March, 2000 
at 11 and 15 per O'Sullivan J..
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for a final year student undertaking public examinations. 
During an investigation or hearing, a student accused of 
wrongdoing should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
hear the allegations, an account of the evidence against 
him, to respond to the evidence with evidence of his own 
and address the deciding body. A student must be given 
notice of the charges and the gist of the evidence upon 
which they are based, so as to enable a considered 
response to be given, if necessary after taking legal 
advice.115
The courts recognise that a school has a duty to 
maintain discipline and safety within the school to 
protect other students' interests.116 An immediate 
suspension without notice or fair procedures may be 
necessary where there is a danger to life and property or 
to maintain discipline within a school.117
Rules of natural justice require that a student or a 
student's parents must be given an opportunity as making 
submission as to penalty where a long term suspension or
115 Ireland: McAuIev v. Commissioner of An Garda Siochana 
[1996] 3 I.R. 208 at 230-231 per Hamilton C.J.; Student A. and 
Student B. v. Dublin Secondary School, unreported, High Court, 
25 November, 1999 at 12 per Kearns J.; Wright (a minor) v. The 
Board of Management of Gorey Community School. unreported, High 
Court, 28 March, 2000 at 11 per O'Sullivan J..
116 Ireland: The State (Smullen) v. Duffy [1980] I.L.R.M. 46 
at 51 per Finlay P.; Wright (a minor) v. The Board of Management 
of Gorey Community School, unreported, High Court, 28 March, 2000 
at 10 per Wright J..
117 Ireland: The State (Smullen) v. Duffy [1980] I.L.R.M. 46 
at 51 per Finlay P.; Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin 
Secondary School. unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 
8 and 15 per Kearns J..
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expulsion of a pupil is being considered.118 The penalty 
imposed on a student must be proportionate to the 
student's infraction of the school's disciplinary code, 
including considering how the student's actions impacted 
on the safety and welfare of other students.119
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a 
similar approach in a case involving a ten day 
suspension. In Goss v. Lopez120 White J. held that public 
education cannot be withdrawn from students because of 
misconduct without an inquiry conducted in accordance 
with lawful procedures. The State's extensive power to 
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools 
must be exercised consistently and within constitutional 
safeguards. White J. held that a recorded suspension 
could seriously damage the student's standing with fellow 
students and teachers as well as later employment
118 Ireland: Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin Secondary 
School, unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 12 and 15 
per Kearns J. .
119 Ireland: Student A. and Student B. v. Dublin Secondary 
School. unreported, High Court, 25 November, 1999 at 8 per Kearns 
J.. Education Act 1998, s. 28 allows the Minister of Education 
and Science the ability to prescribe procedures in relation to 
internal appeals against board of management's decisions, the 
procedures to be used in hearing grievances against such 
decisions and where necessary what appropriate remedial action 
can be taken. Education Act 1998, s. 2 9 grants a right of an 
appeal against the school's decision to expel or suspend a 
student to the Secretary General of the Department of Education 
and Science, provided that all internal appeal's procedures have 
been exhausted. The Minister of Education and Science may 
establish procedures to hear and determine such an appeal. The 
procedures are designed to ensure that the appeal does not become 
concerned with procedures, and to ensure that the appeal is 
promptly determined.
120 United States: 419 U.S. 565 (1975) at 576-584 per White 
J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court.
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opportunities.
White J. held that so long as there has been a 
property detriment which is not de minimis, its gravity 
is irrelevant to the question whether account must be 
taken of the due process clause. White J. held that a ten 
day suspension period from school was a serious event in 
the life of the child and is not de minimis. The 
suspension may not be imposed in disregard of procedural 
due process rights.121
White J. articulated the minimum due process rights 
to which a child is entitled prior to his or her 
suspension. White J. held that inflexible rules should 
not be applied in all circumstances.122 The public school 
system should not be overburdened with judicial 
intervention. The bare minimum of due process procedure 
requires that there has to be prior notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, appropriate to the nature of the 
case. The timing and content of the notice and the nature 
of the hearing would depend on an appropriate 
accommodation of the nature of the interests. The court 
said that suspension was not only useful as a 
disciplinary tool but also as an educational tool.123
White J. held that a student should be given notice 
of the charges against him. If the student denies the 
charge, the school must give an indication of the
121 United States: ibid. at 576 per White J. .
122 United States: ibid. at 578 per White J. .
123 United States: ibid. at 579-580 per White J..
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evidence upon which the school is relying and accord the 
student an opportunity to meet the charges against him. 
White J. held there did not have to be any delay in 
giving the notice; it may follow hard upon the alleged 
incident itself.124
White J. held that due process did not require an 
opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross- 
examine witnesses supporting the charge or to call the 
child's own witnesses to verify his version of the event. 
White J. held that to afford in each case even truncated 
trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative 
facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, 
cost more than it would save in educational 
effectiveness. Moreover, further formalising the 
suspension process and escalating its formality and 
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a 
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its 
effectiveness as part of the teaching process.
White J. held that a student may be removed without 
notice and a hearing where the student poses an imminent 
danger to life, person, property or to the academic 
progress of other students. Nevertheless, it would be 
necessary to give notice and conduct a hearing as soon as 
practicable after the hearing. The Supreme Court held 
that it was not advocating complex legal procedures but 
was requiring a school principal to do only more or less 
what any fair-minded school principal would do in the
124 United States: ibid. at 581-582 per White J.
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same position.125
White J. held that where the sanction in question is 
more severe, then the formal requirements attendant on 
procedural due process would be concomitantly more 
elaborate126.127
The United States Supreme Court has also considered 
the rights of students to freedom of speech and freedom 
from unlawful searches.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.128 White J. held that the 
Fourth Amendment was not limited to police officers but 
applies to a search by school officials.129 The standard 
governing whether a search was lawful depends on 
circumstances of the search. It was a matter of balancing 
individual privacy against the State's interest of 
dealing with breaches of public order. The court held 
that a child and an adult have similar legitimate 
expectation of privacy in relation to bags and purses.130
125 United States: ibid. at 582-583 per White J. .
126 United States: ibid. at 584 per White J. .
127 United States: In Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977) 
at 676 Powell J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court
held that the protection of life, liberty or property was
affected where a school decides to punish a child for misconduct 
by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical 
pain. The child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards 
that minimise the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the 
resolution of disputed questions of justification.
128 United States: 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
129 United States: ibid. at 336-337 per White J. speaking for 
a majority of the Supreme Court.
130 United States: ibid. at 338 per White J. speaking for a 
majority of the Supreme Court.
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The public interest lay in maintaining discipline in the 
school room and on school grounds, in order that 
education could take place.131
White J. held that the restrictions on public 
officials in relation to searches are eased for school 
officials.132 The court eased the requirements of a 
search warrant and the probable cause requirement. The 
court held that the search of a student by a school 
official will be justified when there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating 
either the law or the rules of the school.133 The search 
must be proportionate in light of the student's age, sex 
and the nature of the infraction.134
Students, like other citizens, are entitled to 
freedom of speech.135 Rights of students in public
131 United States: ibid. at 339-340 per White J. speaking for 
a majority of the Supreme Court.
132 United States: ibid. at 340 per White J. speaking for a 
majority of the Supreme Court.
133 United States: ibid. at 342 per White J. speaking for a 
majority of the Supreme Court.
134 United States: ibid. at 342 per White J. speaking for a 
majority of the court. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 
unreported, Supreme Court, 26 June, 1995 at 5-14 Scalia J., 
speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, adopted the same 
approach to student athletes asked to undergo random drug tests. 
Canada: In R. v. M.(M.R.) [1998] 166 D.L.R.(4th) 261 at 276-287 
per Cory J. , delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, adopted 
a similar approach to that of the United States Supreme Court in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
135 United States: West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943) at 637 per Jackson J.; Board of
Education v. Pico 457 U.S. 853 (1982) at 864-865 per Brennan J.; 
Bethel School District No.403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986) at
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schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings. The State has a greater 
ability to interfere with the speech of students than 
that of adults. The State can interfere with freedom of 
speech that is inconsistent with educational mission or 
interferes with the rights of other students.136
In Board of Education v. Pico137 the United States 
Supreme Court found that a school board's decision to 
remove certain books characterised as anti-American, 
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and obscene from high and 
junior high schools as breaching students' rights to 
freedom of speech.
In the Supreme Court, Brennan J. held that a 
student's first amendment rights may be directly and 
sharply implicated by the removal of school books from 
the library. Brennan J. held that State cannot 
legitimately restrict availability of information. 
Students have a right to receive information and ideas. 
This right is important for libraries as these are places 
dedicated to knowledge. Libraries provide opportunities 
for self-education and individual enrichment that are
680-681 per Burger C.J..
136 United States: Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) at 514 per Fortas J. ; Bethel School District 
No.403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986) at 681-686 per Burger C.J. 
holding that the freedom of expression of students is not as co­
extensive as that of adults; Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260 (1988) at 266-267 per White J. speaking 
for a majority of the Supreme Court.
137 United States: 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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wholly optional.138
Brennan J. held that the school has a discretion in 
relation to the contents of the library. This discretion 
is circumscribed, in that it cannot be used to deny 
access to ideas with which the Board disagrees. The Board 
was seeking to prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism religion and other matters of 
opinion.139
The United States Supreme Court has emphasised the 
importance that a student's freedom of expression may 
have as part of a student's education.140
4.6. Developing competence of child
The welfare model and the rights model view the 
child as a person with developing intellectual 
capacities. The purpose of the child's right to education 
is to develop these capacities to their maximum. This may 
mean that the child has the competence to make decisions 
in respect of their constitutional rights, such as 
freedom of expression.141
130 United States: ibid. at 866-869 per Brennan J. speaking 
for a majority of the Supreme Court.
139 United States: ibid. at 870-872 per Brennan J. speaking 
for a majority of the Supreme Court.
140 United States: In Tinker v. Des Moines School District 
393 U.S. 503 (1969) at 512-513 per Fortas J. upholding the right 
of students to wear black armbands in protest against the Vietnam 
war.
141 Ireland: Education Act 1998, s. 6(a) requires as one of 
its objects that practical effect has to be given to the 
constitutional rights of children as they relate to education, 
including those children with special educational needs. This 
will include not only the child's right to an education but other 
rights such as freedom of expression, of association, of
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The concept of education is broader than 
intellectual education. It encompasses the child's 
religious and moral, physical and social education. The 
purpose of education is to develop a sense of 
responsibility and the capacity to live within a 
civilised society. This will include the ability of the 
child as an adult to exercise his or her constitutional 
rights such as the freedoms of expression, association 
and religion.
The welfare model and the rights model require that 
children should be allowed some input into the decisions 
taken on their behalf; the closer the child to maturity, 
the greater the input. Allowing a child such input serves 
an additional function of providing the child with some 
examples of how decisions are made, which will provide 
that child with a model of behaviour for his or her 
maturity.142 Students of a post-primary school may 
establish a student council143 whose function is to 
promote the interests of the school and the involvement
religion, fair procedures and principle of autonomy.
142 Ireland: Education Act 1998, s. 27(1) provides that a 
school's board of management shall establish and maintain 
procedures for the purposes of informing students in a school of 
the activities of the school. Education Act 1998, s. 27(2) 
provides that these procedures shall facilitate the involvement 
of the students, having regard to the age and experience of the 
students, in association with their parents and teachers. 
Education Act 1998, s. 23(2) (d) provides that the principal shall 
consult the teachers, the parents and to the extent appropriate 
to their age and experience, students, in relation to the 
objectives for the school determined by the principal.
143 Ireland: Education Act 1998, s. 27(3).
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of the students in school affairs, in co-operat 
the board, parents and teachers.144
144 Ireland: Education Act 1998, s. 27(4)
CHAPTER FIVE
CHILD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
5.0. Introduction
Society, for its own protection, is entitled to 
establish a criminal process that prosecutes and punishes 
those accused of infringing the criminal law.1 However, 
the law recognises that there is a power imbalance 
between the State and a person accused of infringing the 
criminal law. The law attempts to redress the balance by 
affording rights to the person accused of crime and 
placing pre-eminence to these rights. The Irish courts 
have held that the accused's rights prevail over 
society's entitlement to require prosecution and 
punishment of crimes, where there is a real risk that the 
accused might not receive a fair trial.2
The chapter considers the constitutional rights of a 
child during the criminal process, namely investigation, 
trial and punishment of offences. The danger lies in the 
parens patriae concept obliging the State to act in the 
best interests of the child. This paternalism results in 
the child being deprived of the fundamental rights 
afforded during the criminal process.
1 Ireland: B. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 2
I.L.R.M. 118 at 12 7 per Denham J..
2 Ireland: D. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 2
I.R. 465 at 474 per Denham J. ; Z. v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1994] 2 I.R. 476 at 507 per Finlay C.J.; E.O'R. v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 128 at 136-137 
per Keane J. ; B. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 2
I.L.R.M. 118 at 127 per Denham J..
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5.1. Duties and rights of parents
Parents have a duty to protect and promote the 
child's welfare and interests. This is so even where a 
child is suspected of breaching the criminal law.
Parents are accorded a right to make decisions for 
their incompetent child in the criminal process in order 
to fulfil their parental duty. There are a number of 
decisions that may have to be made affecting the child's 
civil rights in the criminal process including: right to 
legal advice during interrogation,3 right to silence, 
right to trial by jury in non-minor offences4 and 
pleading guilty. The rights model requires that a parent 
should be excluded from the decision making where that 
parent is complicit in the commission of the offence that 
is being investigated or prosecuted.5
These parental decisions may have serious
3 Ireland: In The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) 
v. Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73 at 82-83 per Griffin J. holding that 
a family may obtain legal assistance for a detained member of the 
family.
4 England: Summary Jurisdiction Over Children (Ireland) Act 
1884, s. 4(1) provides that a child may be tried summarily for 
an indictable offence unless the parent or guardian objects. 
Summary Jurisdiction Over Children (Ireland) Act 1884, s. 9 
defines a child as a person under the age of 12.
5 United States: In Little v. Arkansas 435 U.S. 957 (1978), 
a 13 year old was suspected of murdering her father. The child 
had talked to her mother before waiving her right to remain 
silent and consult with an attorney. Marshall J., dissenting at 
958-961, held that every child is entitled to competent advice 
from an adult before waiving his or her constitutional right to 
remain silent and consult with an attorney. Marshall J. held that 
the adult adviser must not have any conflict of interest that 
could affect the competency of the advice. Marshall J. found that 
there was a conflict of interest in this case as the police 
questioned the mother as a suspect for her husband's murder.
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consequences for the child's rights to liberty, 
education, privacy and the consequences of a criminal 
conviction on a child's good name and character.6
Parents are required to make decisions in relation 
to a child in the criminal process on the basis of what 
is in the child's best interests. The difficulty is that 
it is unclear as to determining whether a decision in the 
criminal process is or is not in the child's best 
interests. Parents may not have an understanding of the 
criminal process. This further supports the rights 
model's need for a child's parents to be in receipt of 
legal advice.
5.2. Duty of State to protect and provide for child
The welfare model and rights model both provide that 
it is the duty of the State to protect and provide for 
the child. The welfare model and rights model have 
diametrically opposed views as to the manner of 
protection and provision for the child in the criminal 
process. The welfare model assumes that care and 
protection are the overriding considerations in the 
criminal process. The court acts in the child's best 
interests during the criminal process.7 The effect of 
this approach is to deprive the child of the civil rights 
afforded to the accused in the criminal process.
6 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 40.3.2.
7 England: In In Re A. (A Minor)(Wardship: Police Caution)
[1989] Fam. 103 at 111 Cazalet J. considered the child's best 
interests, when determining whether a caution should be 
administered to a ward of court.
186
The rights model require that the child is afforded 
civil rights during the criminal process. These rights 
curtail paternalism. There are three elements to the 
nature of criminal sanctions: punishment, deterrence and 
rehabilitation. It is not at odds with the rights model 
to permit the rehabilitative element to be the dominating 
element when choosing the sanction to be imposed on a 
child convicted of an offence.
5.3. Welfare rights of child
The welfare model provides that every child has the 
right to be fed, the right to be brought up, educated, 
and to have the opportunity of working and of realising 
his or her full personality and dignity as a human 
being.8 The welfare model attaches pre-eminence on the 
welfare rights rather than the civil rights of the child 
in the criminal process. The welfare model holds that the 
welfare rights of the child cannot be vindicated in the 
adversarial criminal process.
The rights model subordinates the welfare rights of 
the child to the civil rights of the accused child in the 
criminal process. This does not mean that the welfare 
rights of the child are ignored. The issue of the child's 
welfare rights may assume greater importance when the 
child has been convicted and the court must select the 
sanction to be imposed on the child.
5.4. Civil rights of child
8 Ireland: G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] I.R. 32 at 55-56 per 
O'Higgins C.J., at 69 per Walsh J., and at 91 per Henchy J..
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The Constitution of Ireland provides that no person 
shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course 
of law.9 The Irish High and Supreme Courts have 
identified 13 rights within this concept of "due course 
of law". These rights are also found in the English, 
American and Canadian criminal legal systems.
A person charged with a criminal offence:-
(a) is presumed innocent of a criminal charge until the 
contrary is proven,-10
(b) must be informed of the nature and cause of the 
charge promptly, in detail, and in a language which is 
understood;11
(c) must be tried without undue delay;12
(d) must be given a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial court established by
9 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38.1.
10 Ireland: O'Leary v. Attorney General [1995] 1 I.R. 254 at 
263 per O'Flaherty J. ; Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) 
v . P .T . [1999] 3 I.R. 254 at 270 per McGuinness J..
11 Ireland: The State (Buchan) v. Coyne (1936) 70 I.L.T.R.
185 at 186 per O'Sullivan P.; In Re Haughev [1971] I.R. 217 at
262-264 per O'Dalaigh C.J.; The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] 
I.R. 325 at 335 per Gannon J. and at 349-350 per O'Higgins C.J.; 
The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Shaw [1982] I.R. 
1 at 2 9 per Walsh J.; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doyle
[1994] 2 I.R. 286 at 302 per Denham J..
12 Ireland: The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at
3 35 per Gannon J. and at 349-350 per O'Higgins C.J.; Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236 at 244-245 per
Finlay C.J., at 253-254 per Blayney J. and at 257 per Denham J.; 
Cahalane v. Murphy [1994] 2 I.R. 262 at 283 per Finlay C.J.;
Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v. P.T. [1999] 3 I.R.
254 at 270 per McGuinness J.
(e) must be allowed to appear, defend himself or herself 
and be present throughout his or her trial;14
(f) must be given reasonable time and opportunity for the 
preparation of a defence;15
(g) must be given the assistance of an interpreter, where 
necessary;16
(h) is entitled to give evidence and to secure the 
attendance and examination of witnesses (including the 
ability to confront his or her accusers) and to present 
evidence in a manner prescribed by law;17
(i) cannot be compelled to incriminate himself or
law;13
13 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Singer [1975] 
I.R. 408 at 414 per 0' Dalaigh C .J.; The State (Healy) v. Donoghue
[1976] I.R. 325 at 335-336 per Gannon J. ; Eccles v. Ireland 
[1985] I.R. 545 at 549 per Finlay C.J.; The People (Director of 
Public Prosecutions) v. McGinley (1989) 3 Frewen 251 at 252 per 
Hederman J . ; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. W.M.
[1995] 1 I.R. 226 at 230-232 per Carney J. discussing the general 
constitutional requirement that justice should be administered 
in public.
14 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Messitt [1972] 
I.R. 204 at 211-212 per Kenny J.; Lawlor v. Hogan [1993] I.L.R.M. 
60 6 at 610 per Murphy J..
15 Ireland: In Re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217 at 262-264 per
O'Dalaigh C.J.; The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at 
335 per Gannon J.; O'Callaghan v. District Judge Clifford [1993] 
3 I.R. 603 at 612 per Denham J..
16 Ireland: The State (Buchan) v. Coyne (1936) 70 I.L.T.R.
185 at 186 per O'Sullivan P..
17 Ireland: In Re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217 at 262-264 per
O'Dalaigh C.J.; The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at 
33 5 per Gannon J.; White v. Ireland [1995] 2 I.R. 268 at 276 per 
Kinlen J..
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(j) is subject to basic or fundamental fair procedures 
during arrest, detention, charging, trial, appeal and 
sentence;19
(k) is allowed to appeal against conviction or 
sentence,-20 and,
(1) cannot be tried for a second time for the same 
offence following upon a conviction or acquittal.21
The thirteenth right is probably the most important. 
An accused must be legally represented and, if necessary, 
be assisted in securing such representation.22 The 
remaining 12 rights encapsulated within the concept of 
"due course of law" might effectively and manifestly be
herself;18
18 Ireland: Travers v . Ryan [1985] I.L.R.M. 343 at 347 per 
Finlay P. holding that any statement made by a child to the 
police must be voluntary; Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 I.R. 593 at 
606 per Costello J.; Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v. 
P .T . [1999] 3 I.R. 254 at 270 per McGuinness J.. United States:
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 471-472 per Warren
C. J. .
19 Ireland: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Shaw [1982] I.R. 1 at 61 per Griffin J.; The People (Director of 
Public Prosecutions) v. Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73 at 83 per Griffin 
J. requiring basic or fundamental fairness of procedures.
20 Ireland: The People (Attorney General) v. Conmey [1975] 
I.R. 341 at 354-356 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 363-365 per Walsh 
J. .
21 Ireland: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Ouilligan (No.2) [1989] I.R. 45 at 57 per Henchy J.; McCarthy v. 
Garda Commissioner [1993] 1 I.R. 489 at 498 per Flood J..
22 Ireland: The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at 
350 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 359 per Griffin J. ; Byrne v . 
McDonnell [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 543 at 554 per Keane J.; McSorley v. 
Governor of Mountiov Prison [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 331 at 338 per Barr 
J .; Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v. P.T. [1999] 3 
I.R. 2 54 at 2 70 per McGuinness J..
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denied to an accused person if the accused does not have 
a lawyer.23
This right can be invoked during interrogation24 and 
trial.25 This right of access to a solicitor during a 
police interview is directed towards ensuring that the 
interviewee is aware of his or her rights. The 
interviewee must have access to independent advice so 
that he or she can reach a truly free decision as to his 
or her attitude to interview or the making of any 
statement, be in exculpatory or inculpatory.26 The 
availability of advice from a lawyer is seen as a 
contribution, at least, towards some measure of equality 
between the accused and the police.27 The absence of a
23 Ireland: The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at
350 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 359 per Griffin J.
24 Ireland: In Re Article 2 6 and The Emergency Powers Bill
1976 [1977] I.R. 159 at 173 per O'Higgins C.J.; The People
(Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Madden [1977] I.R. 336 at 
355-356 per O'Higgins C.J.; The People (Director of Public
Prosecutions) v. Farrell [1978] I.R. 13 at 20 per 0' Higgins C.J. ; 
The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Shaw [1982] I.R. 
1 at 3 5 per Walsh J.; The People (Director of Public
Prosecutions) v. Conroy [1986] I.R. 460 at 478-479 per Walsh J. 
and at 489 per Henchy J. ; The People (Director of Public
Prosecutions) v. Pringle (1981) 2 Frewen 57 at 96 per O'Higgins 
C.J.; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Healy
[1990] 2 I.R. 73 at 78 and 81 per Finlay C.J., at 83-84 per
Griffin J., and at 87 per McCarthy J..
25 Ireland: The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at
350 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 359 per Griffin J..
26 Ireland: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73 at 78 and 81 per Finlay C.J., at 83 per
Griffin J. and at 8 7 per McCarthy J..
27 Ireland: The People (The Director of Public Prosecutions) 
v. Connell [1995] 1 I.R. 244 at 251-252 per Egan J. approving of 
The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Healy [1990] 2 
I.R. 73 at 78 and 81 per Finlay C.J..
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lawyer in court may deprive the accused of the 
constitutional rights to understand the charges and court 
procedures, to test the evidence and to speak on his or 
her own behalf.28 The paternalistic attitude of the 
welfare model may allow the court to take it upon itself 
to act as adviser to the accused child. The rights model 
requires the accused child to be afforded the opportunity 
of accepting or, if competent, rejecting the assistance 
of a lawyer.
In the United States, an accused must be informed of 
his or her right to remain silent and his or her right to 
a lawyer during interrogation prior to the commencement 
of any questioning. An interrogation must cease if the 
accused indicates in any manner that he or she wishes to 
remain silent or to consult an attorney. A statement 
obtained in breach of these rights is inadmissible in any 
subsequent criminal trial.29 In Fare v. Michael C.30 the 
United States Supreme Court held that a probation officer 
was not in a position to offer the legal assistance that 
a lawyer can offer in order to protect the child's Fifth 
Amendment rights. The duty of the probation officer is 
not to represent the child. The probation officer's duty 
is to report and advise the child to co-operate with the
28 Ireland: The State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 at 
350 per O'Higgins C.J. and at 359 per Griffin J..
29 United States: Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 
471-472 per Warren C.J..
30 United States: 442 U.S. 707 (1979) at 719-723 per
Blackmun J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court.
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police.
The constitutional rights afforded to the accused 
during the criminal process are supplemented by the 
common law.
In England, the Judges' Rules were developed by the 
common law to prevent police officers from abusing their 
interview powers.31 These rules are not rules of law but 
rules of practice drawn up for the guidance of police 
officers to encourage the observance of fair procedures 
when taking of statements. The failure to observe the 
Judges' Rules may mean that an accused's statement or 
admission is inadmissible during the criminal trial. The 
Judges' Rules are recognised in Ireland.32 In Ireland, 
there are nine Judges' Rules
(a) when a police officer is investigating a crime, there 
is no objection to his putting questions to persons from 
whom he thinks useful information may be obtained;
(b) when a police officer has made up his mind to charge 
someone with a crime, that person should be cautioned 
before further questioning. The usual form of the caution 
is: "You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish
to do so but anything you do say will be taken down in
31 England: R. v. Voisin [1918] 1 K.B. 531 at 539-546 per 
Lawrence J..
32 Ireland: McCarrick v. Leavy [1964] I.R. 225 at 235-236 
per Walsh J.; The People (Attorney General) v. Cummins [1972] 
I.R. 312 at 323 per Walsh J. ; The People (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v. Farrell [1978] I.R. 13 at 18 and 21 per 
O'Higgins C.J.; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Darcy, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 July, 1997 at 21- 
24 per Keane J..
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writing and may be given in evidence";
(c) persons in custody should not be questioned without 
the usual caution being administered;
(d) if a person wishes to volunteer a statement, the 
usual caution should be administered ending with the 
words "be given in evidence";
(e) the caution administered to a person who has been 
formally charged with an offence should be: "Do you wish 
to say anything in answer to the charge? You are not 
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but 
whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be 
given in evidence". Care should be taken to avoid the 
suggestion that his answers can only be used in evidence 
against him as this may prevent an innocent person making 
an exculpatory statement;
(f) the absence of a caution before a statement does not 
automatically exclude that statement, but a caution 
should be given as soon as possible;
(g) if a voluntary statement has been made, further 
questioning should only be as to the details of the 
statement in order to clarify and remove any ambiguity;
(h) when two or more persons are charged with the same 
offence and their statements are taken separately, the 
police should not read these statements to the other 
persons charged, but each of such persons should be given 
by the police a copy of such statements and nothing 
should be said or done by the police to invite a reply.
If the person charged desires to make a statement in
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reply, the usual caution should be administered; and,
(i) any statement made in accordance with the rules, 
should whenever possible be recorded in writing and 
signed by the person making it after it has been read 
over to him and he has been invited to make any 
correction he may wish.
A statement in breach of the Judges' Rules does not 
automatically render it inadmissible. However, it is a 
mandatory requirement that any statement or admission 
made in custody is voluntary.33 A statement is not 
voluntary where it was obtained either by a threat or
inducement held out by a person in authority34 . 35 A
statement is not voluntary where oppressive questioning 
occurs. This is questioning which by its nature, duration 
or other attendant circumstances (including the factor of 
custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or
fears or so affects the mind of the subject that his free
will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he would have 
stayed silent.36
33 Ireland: Attorney General v. McCabe [1927] I.R. 129 at 
134 per Kennedy C.J.; McCarrick v. Leavy [1964] I.R. 225 at 236 
and 238 per Walsh J.; The People (Attorney General) v. Cummins 
[1972] I.R. 312 at 323 per Walsh J..
34 England: In R. v. McLintock [1962] Crim. L.R. 549 at 550,
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that a head mistress of a
school was a person in authority of a student.
35 England: Ibrahim v. R. [1914] A.C. 599 at 609 per Lord 
Sumner.
36 England: R. v. Priestly (1967) 51 Cr. App. Rep. 1 at 1 
per Sachs J.; R. v. Prager [1972] 1 W.L.R. 260 at 266 per Edmund 
Davies L.J.; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Breathnach (1981) 2 Frewen 43 at 53-54 per Finlay P.; The People 
(Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Pringle (1981) 2 Frewen 5 7
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The rights model requires that the Judges' Rules and 
the voluntary confession requirement may have to be 
altered to accommodate the greater vulnerability of 
children to succumb to stress that an adult can endure. A 
police interview may be an intimidating and stressful 
experience for an adult. It is more so for a child. A 
child may be overwhelmed by a police interview. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that greatest care 
must be taken to assure that a child's admission was 
voluntary and that it was not the product of ignorance of 
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.37 
Confessions of children have been rendered inadmissible 
where the children were interviewed in the absence of a 
lawyer for protracted periods during the night.38
The rights model requires the presence of the 
child's parent, guardian, person in loco parentis or 
responsible adult during an interview. The absence of 
such a person should render the child's statement or 
admission inadmissible.39 However, the court retains a
at 80-81 per O'Higgins C.J..
37 United States: In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at 44-55 per 
Fortas J. .
38 United States: Halev v. Ohio 332 U.S. 596 (1948) at 599- 
601 per Douglas J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court; 
Gallegos v. Colorado 370 U.S. 49 (1962) at 50-55 per Douglas J. 
speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court.
39 Ireland: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Patterson (1979) 113 I.L.T.R. 6 at 8 per Finlay P.; The People
(Director of Public Prosecutions) v. W.F. (1979) 114 I.L.T.R. 110 
at 112 per Finlay P.; Travers v. Ryan [1985] I.L.R.M. 343 at 347 
per Finlay P.; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Darcy, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 July, 1997 at 25-
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discretion to admit such a statement. The rights model 
allows a competent child to object to the presence of his 
or her parent or guardian, in which case a respecting of 
that objection and a failure to obtain the presence of 
the parent or guardian might be well justified.40
The Judges' Rules have been supplemented by the 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of 
Persons in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations)
Regulations 1987. These regulations accord to a large 
extent with the rights model. The regulations make 
provision for the involvement of parents or guardians 
where a detained person is under the age of 17. The Garda
member in charge of the station must as soon as
practicable inform a parent or guardian of the fact that 
the child is custody, the nature of the offence for which 
the child was arrested, and of the child's entitlement to 
consult a solicitor.41 The member must request the parent 
or guardian to attend at the station without delay.42 The 
member in charge may be unable to communicate with a
parent or guardian. The member in charge must inform the
child of this fact and of the child's entitlement to have 
notification of his being in custody in station sent to
2 6 per Keane J..
40 Ireland: Travers v. Ryan [1985] I.L.R.M. 343 at 347 per 
Finlay P ..
41 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984, s. 5(2) (b) .
42 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r.
9(1) (a) .
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another person named by the child.43
The member in charge must inform a person under 17 
without delay that he or she is entitled to consult a 
solicitor.44 The member must cause the solicitor to be 
notified accordingly as soon as practicable. The child 
may nominate a solicitor. The member in charge is under a 
duty to notify the nominated solicitor accordingly as 
soon as practicable. The child can nominate another 
solicitor where the first solicitor is unavailable.45 
This also applies where the nomination is made by a 
child's parent or guardian.46
An arrested person under the age of 17 cannot in 
general be questioned in relation to an offence or asked 
to make a written statement unless a parent or guardian 
is present. The member in charge can permit a person 
under 17 to be interviewed in the absence of a parent or 
guardian in certain circumstances.47 A member in charge 
may authorise the exclusion of a parent or guardian from 
an interview in three circumstances.
43 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r.
9(1) (b) .
44 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984, s. 5(2) (a) .
45 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r.
9(2) (a) .
46 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r.
9(2) (b) .
47 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r.
13(1) .
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First, the parent or guardian is the victim of the 
offence being investigated.
Second, the parent or guardian has been arrested in 
respect of the offence being investigated.
Third, the member in charge has reasonable grounds 
for suspecting the parent or guardian of complicity in 
the offence, for believing that the parent or guardian 
would, if present during the questioning be likely to 
obstruct the course of justice, or while so present his 
conduct had been such as to amount to an obstruction of 
the course of justice.48
Where the interview is to take place in the absence 
of a parent or guardian, the member in charge must 
arrange for the presence during the questioning of the 
other parent or another guardian. The other parent or 
guardian may be unavailable or inappropriate. In these 
circumstances, the member in charge may allow the 
presence of an appropriate adult relative or other 
responsible adult.49 A parent, guardian, adult relative 
or other adult may request the attendance of a solicitor 
on the child's behalf. Following such a request, a 
reasonable time must elapse before the child is asked to
48 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r. 
13(1) .
49 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r. 
13 (2) .
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make a written statement.50
A failure on the part of any member of the Garda 
Siochana to observe any provision of the regulations 
shall not of itself affect the lawfulness of the custody 
of the detained person or render inadmissible any 
statement made by a detained person.51
5.5. Conflicting rights of child
A conflict may arise between the welfare and civil 
rights of the accused child. The rights model requires 
the conflict to be resolved by according supremacy to the 
civil rights of the accused child. The rights model 
precludes a judge acting paternalistic by performing an 
inquiry to determine what is in the child's best 
interests.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v.
P . T .52 a 15 year old youth who was in the care of a 
health board, was charged with an offence. The District 
Court conducted an inquiry into the child's fitness to 
plead. The same District Court found that the health 
board's assessment and care plan for the child was 
seriously deficient. The District Court judge ordered a 
secure residential assessment and care programme for the
50 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons 
in Custody in Garda Siochana Stations) Regulations 1987, r. 
13 (3) .
51 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1984, s. 7(3); Director of 
Public Prosecutions v. Spratt [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 117 at 122 per 
O'Hanlon J. ; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Connell [1995] 1 I.R. 244 at 252 per Egan J..
52 Ireland: [1999] 3 I.R. 254.
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child. The health board challenged the District Court's 
ability to make such orders during a criminal 
prosecution.
In the High Court, McGuinness J. held that the 
District Court must accord paramountcy to the welfare of 
the child and vindicate the constitutional rights of the 
child when matters concerning the custody, guardianship 
of, or upbringing of the child are being considered.53
McGuinness J. questioned whether the welfare rights 
established in G. v. An Bord Uchtala54 could be asserted 
so as to negative or interfere with the civil rights of 
the accused.55 McGuinness J. held that the District Court 
has a general duty to consider and promote the welfare of 
a child who appears before it on a criminal charge. The 
duty will be most urgent and relevant when the court is 
pronouncing sentence if the accused child pleads guilty 
or is found guilty of the charges laid against him. 
However, this duty must be balanced and harmonised if 
possible with the civil rights designed to protect the 
accused.56
McGuinness J. held that an accused's right to a 
trial in due course of law entails the presumption of 
innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the
53 Ireland: ibid. at 2 67 per McGuinness J. .
54 Ireland: [1980] I.R. 32 at 55-56 per O'Higgins C.J..
55 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions (Murphy) v. P.T. 
[1999] 3 I.R. 254 at 267-268 per McGuinness J..
56 Ireland: ibid. at 269-270 per McGuinness J..
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right to an expeditious trial and the right to legal 
aid.57 McGuinness J. held that a court performing a well 
intentioned inquiry to the general welfare of the child 
accused of a crime may ignore or unjustly postpone the 
civil rights of an accused child. It may mean that 
evidence inadmissible at a criminal trial is admitted 
during the inquiry. The law does not allow a court to 
remand an accused adult in custody for a long period of 
time in order to perform a full inquiry into the 
accused's pattern of life and future prospects when 
determining whether the adult is fit to plead. McGuinness 
J. held that the constitutional duty to promote the 
welfare of the child did not permit a procedure that 
would be constitutionally impermissible in the case of an 
adult.58
McGuinness J. held that the civil rights of an 
accused were superior to the child's welfare rights. 
McGuinness J. held that the distinction between criminal 
and child care proceedings must be maintained.59
However, Smyth J. took a different approach in 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Stratford) v. O'Neill.60 
The Constitution of Ireland expressly allows courts of 
summary jurisdiction to try minor offences.61 A person
57 Ireland: ibid. at 270 per McGuinness J..
58 Ireland: ibid. at 270-271.
59 Ireland: ibid. at 271 per McGuinness J..
60 Ireland: [1998] 2 I.R. 383.
61 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38.2.
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cannot be tried for a non-minor offence without a jury, 
unless the person's consent is obtained.62 The Criminal 
Justice Act 1951 allowed an accused over 18 to waive this 
right.63 The Summary Jurisdiction Over Children (Ireland) 
Act 1884 allowed an accused aged between 12 and 16 years 
to waive his or her right to trial by jury. However, the 
District Court could consider the child's character and 
antecedents.64 In Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Stratford) v. O'Neill65 the accused claimed that the 
District Court's ability to consider a juvenile's 
antecedents constituted invidious discrimination as the 
District Court could not consider an adult's character. 
The accused argued that such an inquiry might result in 
the District Court forming prejudicial views of the 
accused.
In the High Court, Smyth J. held that the 1884 Act 
allowed the District Court to assess the young person's 
capacity to give an informed waiver. This assessment was 
a preliminary investigation, not the trial of the 
offence.66 Smyth J. held that this investigation did not 
infringe the principle of equality. The investigation 
demonstrates constitutional concern to ensure that due
62 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38.5.
63 Ireland: Criminal Justice Act 1951, s. 2(2) (a) (ii) .
64 England: Summary Jurisdiction Over Children (Ireland) Act 
1884, s. 5(1) as amended by the Children Act 1908, s. 133(6).
65 Ireland: [1998] 2 I.R. 383.
66 Ireland: ibid. at 3 86 per Smyth J. .
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regard to differences of capacity are observed.
The reference to the child's character was not to 
the moral character but the degree of maturity and 
appreciation of correctness of choosing to proceed by way 
of summary trial or trial by jury. This evidence was to 
put the District Court in the position to assess the 
quality of the consent that might be forthcoming by the 
person of tender age.67
Smyth J. held that the oath of office requires a 
judge to act "without fear or malice or ill will towards 
anyone".68 This oath will ensure that a judge approaches 
the application with an open mind, having learnt of the 
accused's legal character and antecedents. Smyth J. held 
that the District Court's consideration of the accused's 
previous criminal convictions did not affect the 
accused's right to be presumed innocent of the charge.
The court has a discretion whether to embark on this 
enquiry. If the court does not think it is expedient to 
do so, then there is no necessity to embark on this 
enquiry. If the court thinks that it is expedient to do 
so, ultimately the accused is the one who decides as to 
whether the course to be adopted is one of summary trial 
or trial by jury.69 Smyth J. held that the provisions of 
the 1884 Act did not infringe the constitutional rights
67 Ireland: ibid. at 3 87 per Smyth J. .
68 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 34.5.1.
69 Ireland: Director of Public Prosecutions (Stratford) v. 
O'Neill [1998] 2 I.R. 383 at 387 per Smyth J..
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of the accused. The approach adopted by McGuinness J. 
accords with the rights model whilst that of Smyth J. 
does not.
The United States Supreme Court has also considered 
the relationship between parens patriae and an accused 
child's civil rights. This arose from concern at the 
juvenile court process. These courts were created 
following State legislators' concern at children being 
tried for criminal offences in the same way as adults. 
Children were subject to adult procedures and penalties. 
Children could be given long prison sentences mixing with 
hardened adult criminals. The response was the 
establishment of the juvenile court in many States.70 The 
aim of the court was to supervise, enlighten and cure, 
not to punish. The juvenile court was to be more like a 
clinic.71 The court should be staffed by experts who 
would assist the court in its curative role.72 The court 
was to stand in the shoes of the parent and guardian to 
the child. The State is parens patriae rather than 
prosecuting attorney and judge. The proceedings were not 
adversarial but inquisitorial. The court was to inquire 
into what is best for the child and attempt to stop the
70 United States: In In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at 14-19 
per Fortas J. stated that the first juvenile court was 
established in Illinois in 1899 and that 40 other States had gone 
on to establish such courts.
71 United States: In In Re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at 15-16 
per Fortas J..
72 United States: DeBacker v. Brainard 396 U.S. 28 (1969) at 
35-37 per Douglas J..
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child entering a downward spiral of crime. However, there 
was a devastating report on the juvenile court system in 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice Task Force Report: Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime 7-9 (1967). This revealed the 
depth of disappointment in what the juvenile court had 
accomplished. Too often juvenile judges fell short of 
that stalwart, protective and communicating figure the 
system envisaged. In addition, the juvenile court system 
was underfunded.
The United States Supreme Court considered the 
compatibility of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court with the fundamental rights afforded to an 
accused during the criminal process. In Kent v. United 
States73 the Supreme Court considered the power of the 
juvenile to relinquish jurisdiction in respect of a child 
and allowing the child to be tried in an ordinary 
criminal court. In this case, the juvenile court 
relinquished jurisdiction. However there had been no 
consultation with the child's parents or counsel and they 
had not been given access to the court file. The State 
argued that the denial of these rights which were 
available to adults was explained by the State's parens 
patriae prerogative.
The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court's 
objective was laudable. The juvenile court's proceedings 
were interpreted as civil in nature and not criminal.
73 United States: 383 U.S. 541 (1966) .
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However, the Supreme Court held that the "parental" 
relationship between the court and the child is not an 
invitation to procedural arbitrariness. In addition, it 
was recognised that there were a lack of facilities and 
staff to fulfil the parens patriae function. Children 
were receiving the worst of both worlds. Children did not 
receive the benefit of care nor the protection of the 
rights of adults in the criminal process.74
The Supreme Court was not willing to go so far as to 
require that a child in juvenile court should obtain the 
full benefit of the rights of adults in the criminal 
process. The Supreme Court held that a juvenile court 
should have considerable latitude within which to 
determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a 
child or waive jurisdiction. However, such latitude must 
comply with basic requirements of due process and 
fairness. The Supreme Court held that a child cannot be 
deprived of benefits without participation, 
representation, a hearing and a statement of reasons.
The Supreme Court held that a child should be given 
a statement of reasons motivating the juvenile court's 
waiver of jurisdiction. The child had a right to 
representation by counsel and access to reports. The 
court found that the child was not afforded due process 
rights in this case.75
The United States Supreme Court took a similar
74 United States: ibid. at 554-556 per Fortas J..
75 United States: ibid. at 557-563 per Fortas J..
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approach in In Re Gault.76 In this case, a juvenile court 
determined that a child was a delinquent and was sent to 
an industrial school until the child's majority. The 
juvenile claimed that he had been denied due process 
rights. It was averred that the child was not given 
notice of the charges against him, the right to counsel, 
the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, nor 
of the rights prohibiting self-incrimination during these 
proceedings. The United State Supreme Court examined the 
origins of the parens patriae jurisdiction.77 The right 
of the State as parens patriae permitted the denial of 
the same rights to children as are allowed to adults, as 
unlike an adult, a child does not have the same right to 
liberty as an adult. For example, a child could be 
compelled to attend school.78 The Supreme Court examined 
the consequences of being adjudged a delinquent. The 
Supreme Court found that nearly the same social stigma 
applies to being labelled delinquent as it does to the 
label of criminal.79 The court could also order that a 
delinquent should be locked up in an institution and 
thereby deprived of rights. The Supreme Court decided 
that the delinquency proceedings were unconstitutional as 
they violated the due process clause of the United States
76 United States: 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
77 United States: ibid. at 14-17 per Fortas J..
78 United States: ibid. at 17 per Fortas J. ; Schall v.
Martin 467 U.S. 253 (1984) at 264-281 per Rehnquist J..
79 United States: ibid. at 23 per Fortas J..
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Constitution.80 The Supreme Court held that these laws 
were such as could lead to wrong finding of facts and 
also to the imposition of regimes of punishment or 
correction which might be inappropriate or unwarranted. 
The Supreme Court held that truth would be more likely to 
emerge from adversarial conflict than from an inquiry.81
The Supreme Court held that the child must be 
provided with adequate notice of charges so that the 
child knows the case to be met.82 The child has a right 
to counsel as the judge cannot represent the child. The 
child will be provided with counsel, where the child 
cannot afford counsel.83 The court held that the child 
was entitled to the right to confront his or her 
accusers, the privilege against self incrimination and 
the right to cross-examination.84 The court held that the 
focus is on the deprivation of liberty. It does not 
depend on whether the deprivation is termed civil or 
criminal. The court held that there may have to be 
modifications of these rights in relation to any waiver 
and the presence of parents85.86
80 United States: ibid. at 31 per Fortas J..
81 United States: ibid. at 19-21 per Fortas J..
82 United States: ibid. at 31-34 per Fortas J. .
83 United States: ibid. at 34-42 per Fortas J..
84 United States: ibid. at 42-57 per Fortas J..
85 United States: The Supreme Court's approach in In Re
Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) has been followed in: In Re Whittington 
391 U.S. 341 (1968) at 344-345 per White J.; In Re Winship 397
U.S. 358 (1970) at 365-368 per Brennan J. speaking for a majority 
of the Supreme Court.
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In In Re Winship87 the United States Supreme Court 
held the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable 
doubt in juvenile court proceedings. Such a standard of 
proof would not risk destroying the beneficial aspects of 
the juvenile process. There would be an opportunity 
during post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a 
wide-ranging view of the child's social history and for 
this individualised treatment to remain unimpaired. The 
Supreme Court also applies the principle of double 
jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings.88 However, the 
Supreme Court has held that juvenile delinquency 
proceedings do not require a jury trial89 and pre-trial 
detention is permissible.90
The United States Supreme Court's approach to the 
juvenile courts is closer to the rights model than the 
welfare model. The disappointing aspect to the court's 
approach was the motivating factor: the lack of resources 
whereby children got the worst of both worlds. The
86 United States: In Bland v. U.S. 412 U.S. 909 (1973) at
910, the Supreme Court followed the approach taken in Kent and 
In Re Gault. The Supreme Court held that due process requires the 
juvenile court to have a hearing before waiving its jurisdiction 
and allowing a child to be tried in a criminal court.
87 United States: 397 U.S. 358 (1970) at 361-368 per Brennan
J. .
88 United States: Breed v. Jones 421 U.S. 519 (1975) at 528- 
533 per Burger C.J..
89 United States: McKiever v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528 
(1971) at 545-547 per Blackmun J. speaking for a majority of the 
Supreme Court.
90 United States: Schall v. Martin 467 U.S. 253 (1984) at
2 64-2 81 per Rehnquist J..
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motivating factor should have been to accord children 
civil rights in the criminal process because it was the 
right thing to do.
A court must determine the sanction on conviction. 
The most draconian sanction is the loss of liberty. The 
Irish Constitution requires that only minor offences may 
be tried summarily. The most important element in 
determining whether an offence is minor or not is the 
length of detention. The Children Act 1908 allowed for 
the detention of children for a number of years in 
different types of institutions: industrial school, 
reformatory school and borstal. The imposition of a long 
period of detention may breach the constitutional right 
of a jury trial for non-minor offences. The Irish courts 
have focused on the purpose of the institution rather 
than the period of detention when determining whether the 
right to a jury trial has been infringed. This approach 
accords with the welfare model. However, the rights model 
is indifferent to the purpose of the institution and is 
more concerned with the deprivation of liberty and 
curtailment of other rights.
In The State (Sherrin) v. Kennedy91 the Irish 
Supreme Court considered the power of the State to detain 
a child for three years in St. Patrick's Institution, a 
borstal institution.92 In the Supreme Court, Walsh J. 
found that St. Patrick's Institution is primarily a place
91 Ireland: [1966] I.R. 379.
92 England: Prevention of Crime Act 1908, s. 2.
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of detention.93 Inmates do receive useful instruction and 
are subject to discipline that may assist in the 
formation of good character and self-discipline.94 Walsh 
J. held that the most important factor in determining 
whether or not an offence should be regarded as minor is 
the length and form of punishment it attracts.95 A period 
of detention in St. Patrick's Institution must be 
regarded as a form of punishment, even though the 
punishment may produce more beneficial results by way of 
reform or rehabilitation in the offender that would be an 
equal period as an adult. The deprivation of liberty is 
the real punishment.96 An offence was not minor where it 
carried with it the possibility of a maximum three year 
sentence. Therefore, the provision was 
unconstitutional.97
Industrial and reformatory schools provide 
industrial training for children or youthful offenders 
who are lodged, clothed, and fed, as well as taught at 
these schools.98
93 Ireland: ibid. at 3 92 per Walsh J. .
94 Ireland: ibid. at 393 per Walsh J. .
95 Ireland: Mel liner v. 0' Mathghamhna [1962] I.R. 1 at 14 per 
Lavery J.; Conroy v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 411 at 436 per 
Walsh J. ; In Re Haughev [1971] I.R. 217 at 247 per O'Dalaigh 
C. J. .
96 Ireland: ibid. at 394 per Walsh J. .
97 Ireland: [1964] I.R. 73.
98 England: Children Act 1908, s. 44(1) .
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In J. v. Delap99 the court focused on the nature of 
the institution when determining whether a period of 
detention of three years on summary conviction deprived 
an accused child of his right to a trial by jury.100
In the High Court, Barr J. found that a reformatory 
school is under the aegis of, and managed by, the 
Department of Education. It is staffed by teachers, 
social workers and those in allied disciplines. The 
school has no connection whatever with the prison service 
or the Department of Justice. Its primary purpose is to 
provide long term training and educational facilities to 
assist young offenders in making a new start in life and 
to acquire a useful place in society. It is not intended 
as a place of punishment per se, far less is it geared 
for or intended to be a place of detention for short-term 
prisoners. The only characteristic which it has in common 
with a prison is that each inmate is obliged to remain in 
the custody of the school director for a specified period 
which may vary from not less than two years to not more 
than four years. Barr J. held that this factor did not 
imply that inmates are incarcerated for the period of 
their detention in a prison. An obligation to remain at a 
place for the education and training of young offenders 
did not convert a school into a penal institution 
analogous to a prison nor ought the period of education 
and training which a young offender spends there be
99 Ireland: [1989] I.R. 167.
100 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 38.5.
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regarded as a period of imprisonment in the penal sense 
of the term. Barr J. held that detention in a reformatory 
school does contain an element of punishment. However, 
its primary purpose is educational and, most importantly, 
the period of detention is in the main related to the 
function of the school as a place of instruction and 
correction. The duration of a prison sentence on the 
other hand is primarily related to the gravity of the 
offence which gave rise to it and the character of the 
accused. Barr J. dismissed the application.101
The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment on a 
young person is seen as a measure of last resort. It is 
an admission that the young person is beyond the help 
found in an industrial or reformatory school. The 
Children Act 1908 provides that a young person shall not 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an offence unless the 
court certifies that the young person is either unruly or 
depraved.102 A consideration of either unruliness or 
depravity will involve an inquiry. The rights model views 
such considerations as requiring an adversarial hearing 
where the child is afforded the civil rights of an
101 Ireland: ibid. at 169-170 per Barr J. . In McM. v . Manager 
of Trinity House [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 546 at 553 per Laffoy J. 
holding that the purpose of both industrial and reformatory 
schools is educational. Laffoy J. recognised that a detainee in 
a reformatory school is likely to be held in the company of older 
and more delinquent detainees than those found in an industrial 
school and is likely to be held under a stricter and more 
confined regimes. Laffoy J. was of the view that in essence 
detention in a reformatory school is similar to detention in an 
industrial school.
102 England: Children Act 1908, s. 102(3) .
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accused. In The State (Donohue) v. District Justice 
Kennedy103 in the High Court, Finlay P. held that the 
decision to certify a young offender as of unruly 
character is of the same status as any other decision in 
criminal adversarial proceedings. Therefore, the decision 
can only be reached by a court upon sworn evidence 
properly admissible before it.104 The accused must have 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses deposing to 
the facts concerned.105
The Children Act 1908 provided that no child or 
young person could be sentenced to death. The court could 
order that the child or young person should be detained 
during Her Majesty's pleasure.106 In The State (O.) v.
O' Brien107 a majority of the Irish Supreme Court held 
that the selection of punishment and the determination of 
the length of a sentence were integral parts of the 
administration of justice in criminal trials. These 
powers could not be exercised by a member of the 
executive.108 The effect of this decision was to allow 
the court to order detention for an indeterminate period 
which during its currency may be remitted by the
103 Ireland: [1979] I.L.R.M. 109.
104 Ireland: ibid. at 112 per Finlay P. .
105 Ireland: Greene v. Governor of Mount joy [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 
16 at 23 per Hamilton C.J..
106 Ireland: Children Act 1908, s. 103.
107 Ireland: [1973] I.R. 50.
108 Ireland: ibid. at 61 per O'Dalaigh C.J. and at 70-72 per 
Walsh J..
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President of Ireland.109 The child's detention during the 
pleasure of the court and can be reviewed by the court at 
any time. This interpretation is consonant with the 
original spirit of the statutory provision which was one 
enacted in ease of young persons and juveniles. The court 
is entitled to retain seisin of the case, review and 
supervise matter or impose a determinate sentence. A 
review allows a court to decide whether the time had come 
when the particular child might be properly released and 
discharged from the place of detention in which he was 
being confined.110 The nature of the court's power 
accords with the welfare model. However, it is a 
fundamental feature of a criminal sanction that it has a 
determinate length. The rights model requires that a 
court should determine a maximum period for which a child 
could be detained.
The United States Constitution permits the use of 
the death penalty, provided that there are individualised 
consideration of mitigating circumstances.111 A child's 
minority must be taken into account as a mitigating
109 Ireland: Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art. 13.6.
110 Ireland: The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. 
Sacco and Whelan, unreported, High Court, 23 March, 1998 at 2-3 
per 0'Donovan J .; The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) 
v. Whelan, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, ex-tempore, 13 
July, 1998 at 2 per 0'Flaherty J..
111 United States: Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586 (1978) at 
604-605 per Burger C.J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme 
Court.
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factor.112
In Thompson v. Oklahoma113 the defendant was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death when the 
defendant was 15 years old. The child claimed that this 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment violating the 
Eighth Amendment.
In the Supreme Court, Stevens J. held that a child 
who commits a crime is less culpable than an adult who 
commits a similar crime. A child or teenager has less 
inexperience, education and intelligence. A child or 
teenager is less able to evaluate the consequences of his 
or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much 
more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure 
than is an adult. A child or teenager has a capacity for 
growth. Society has fiduciary obligations to its 
children. The court held that the retributive purpose 
underlying the death penalty is simply inapplicable to 
the execution of a 15 year old offender. The court held 
that the execution of a person for an offence committed 
when the child was 15 constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.114 However, this does not apply to a child 
aged 16 or over.115
112 United States: Eddings v. Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104 (1982) 
at 112-117 per Powell J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme 
Court.
113 United States: 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
114 United States: ibid. at 823-831.
115 United States: Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
at 370-383 per Scalia J. speaking for a majority of the Supreme 
Court.
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5.6 Developing competence of child
The welfare model and rights model both provide that 
parents or the State decide on the exercise of the 
child's rights where the child is incompetent to make 
decisions for himself or herself. However, a child is a 
person with developing physical and intellectual 
capacities. The rights model provides that the parent or 
State's ability to exercise a particular right of a child 
is lost where a child is competent to make the decision 
for himself or herself.116 Therefore, a child who has the 
competence can decide on the exercise of his or her civil 
rights in the criminal process.117 In Fare v. Michael 
C .118 the United States Supreme Court held that when 
considering whether a child had waived his rights to 
silence and to consult a lawyer it is necessary to 
consider the child's age, experience, education, 
background and intelligence, capacity to understand the 
warnings given him, the nature of his rights and the 
consequences of waiving those rights.
116 England: Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority [1986] A.C. 112 at 171-172 per Lord Fraser and at 186, 
18 8-189 per Lord Scarman.
117 It is suggested that a child's competence to exercise his 
or her rights in the criminal process will be assessed in the 
same manner when assessing a child's competence to consent to or 
refuse medical intervention.
118 United States: 442 U.S. 707 (1979) at 725-725 per
Blackmun J ..
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.0. Conclusions
The most significant difference, it is submitted, 
between the welfare model and rights model relates to the 
role of paternalism. The welfare model allows paternalism 
to go unchecked. The rights model attempts to control 
paternalism.
The thesis commenced with a distinction between the 
parens patriae jurisdiction and paternalism. In each 
successive chapter, it became evident that the 
contemporary literature, the legislators and the courts 
are torn between the rival claims of child autonomy on 
the one hand and the assimilation of the child into 
social constructs such as the State, the family based on 
marriage, or more recently, the parent with custody on 
the other.
The main finding of this thesis is that the parens 
patriae jurisdiction has altered its form and has 
acquired a contemporary significance and urgency of its 
own in child law matters. The refinement of this 
jurisdiction, and its efficiency and effectiveness is 
tied in with an attempt to remove paternalism from the 
operation of the jurisdiction, giving a greater voice to 
the child's own autonomy.
The second conclusion is that the law has invented a 
panoply of regulation, very little of which is based on
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significant empirical research on how adults and children 
actually behave. The researcher submits that the future 
direction of his research must lie in an attempt to 
rectify the dearth of empirical research into how parents 
and children actually behave within the legal matrix. It 
is significant that there is very little research into 
paediatric pharmacology, and only recently has the a 
priori assumption been shaken that dosage given to adults 
must be divided by two or more for children. Likewise, 
there is a great necessity for systematic, controlled, 
randomised double-blind research into the effects on 
children of the model so that it may be reconsidered and 
reformed for the new millennium.
6.1. Recommendations
The following recommendations should eliminate 
paternalism from the parens patriae prerogative and 
transform the model into the hypothesis.
6.1.0. Legal representation
Children must be guaranteed a right to separate 
legal representation in proceedings involving their 
rights.1 The thesis demonstrates that judges view
1 A child does not have an automatic right to separate legal 
representation in proceedings concerned with that child's welfare 
and rights. In M.F. v. Superintendent, Ballymun Garda Station, 
John Rvnne and Eastern Health Board (Notice Parties) [1991] 1
I.R. 189 at 200 per O'Flaherty J. holding that proceedings 
concerned with the care and custody of children and the 
protection of their rights are in a special and, possibly, unique 
category. The proceedings are special because they concern 
children and are possibly unique in that the fundamental rights 
of persons are in issue in litigation in which they are not 
represented. Child Care Act 1991, s. 25(1) accords a court 
conducting care proceedings with a discretion to join the child 
who is the subject of the proceedings as a party. S. 25(2)
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themselves as both protectors of the child's rights, 
decision makers, and child advocates. The judicial 
function is undermined by attempts to undertake such a 
variety of roles.
The academic literature advocates according children 
separate legal representation. Kleinfeld (1970a) believes 
that the failure to accord representation does not mean 
that rights are not vindicated but that rights are not, 
in fact, recognised. Panneton (1977) and Duncan (1987) 
argue that children's interests remain unprotected 
essentially because they lack impartial representation.
6.1.1. Duties and rights of parents
The legal relationship between the parents and the 
child must be reformulated in order to accord supremacy 
to the duties of parents. The rights of parents must 
expressly be categorized as ancillary to their duties to 
protect and vindicate the child's best interests.
6.1.2. Failure to act in child's best interests 
The model permits State intervention with the
decisions of parents where there are compelling reasons. 
The thesis argues that there is sufficient evidence to 
allow for State intervention where parents fail to act in 
the child's best interests.
6.1.3. Restricting exercise of rights
The law intervenes where an individual exercises his
provides that the court may appoint a solicitor to represent the 
child who has been joined as a party or accorded such other 
rights of a party as the court may specify. The court may direct 
the solicitor as to the performance of his or her duties.
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or her rights in a manner that breaches the rights of 
another. The hypothesis requires that the courts should 
adopt the same criterion when considering the conflicts 
between the claims of child and parent.
6.1.4. Reducing subjectivity of best interests
Both the welfare model and rights model provide that 
parents and the courts must act in the child's best 
interests when vindicating the child's rights. The best 
interests standard offers little guidance to parents and 
judges. Their decisions will reflect personal or, 
societal values and mores. Steps must be taken to ensure 
the objectivisation of the best interests criterion where 
this is possible. This is to minimize damage to the child 
in what parents and judges acting quasi-parentally, 
honestly but mistakenly assert are for the child's 
benefit, when in truth they are more concerned with the 
other issues such as the viability of the family as a 
whole.
6.1.5. Duty of the State to provide for the child
The State has obligations to provide for the child, 
particularly in the fields of education and health care. 
There has been a failure by the State to fulfil these 
obligations. The State must provide the necessary 
resources so that every child is given the opportunity to 
achieve his or her potential.
6.1.6. Evolving nature of welfare rights
The concept of the content of right is usually 
considered to be immutable. However, this does not apply
222
to the welfare rights of a child. Our understanding of 
children and child development is growing. The nature of 
the welfare rights evolve as our understanding of 
children and child development grows. Therefore, the 
State must take cognisance of this greater understanding 
when affording welfare rights to children.
6.1.7. Procedural rights of child
Children should be entitled to the same procedural 
rights as that afforded to adults, when there is 
interference with the child's welfare and/or civil 
rights.
6.1.8. Balancing child's welfare and civil rights
The thesis has demonstrated that judicial 
paternalism has resulted in undue weight being attached 
to the welfare rights of the child where there is a 
conflict between the child's welfare and civil rights. 
There is a need to accord greater weight to the child's 
civil rights, particularly for competent children.
6.1.9. Safeguards where interference with civil rights 
The hypothesis accepts that there will be
circumstances in which the appropriate balance requires 
that the child's welfare rights be placed above the 
child's civil rights. However, the law should ensure that 
there should be the least possible interference with 
these civil rights. The courts should monitor this 
interference on a periodic basis, where the interference 
is continuous.
6.1.10. Child's right to equality
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There are three facets to the child's right to 
equality.
First, children are entitled to the same civil 
rights as adults. There is no justification for denying 
children the same civil rights as adults.
Second, every child is entitled to certain welfare 
rights. However, the nature of the resources vindicating 
a child's welfare rights depend on that child's 
particular needs.
Third, children and adolescents are not a homogenous 
group. There are sufficient differences between children 
and adolescents to warrant different treatment. However, 
the welfare model treats children and adolescents in the 
same way. Empirical research is needed to explain the 
differences between children and adolescents, and to 
indicate their significance.
6.1.11. Competence of children
There is a need for more rigorous empirical research 
about whether children have the competence to take 
decisions affecting their welfare, and about the range of 
decisions which children can take at certain ages or 
developmental stages. This research will form the basis 
for a statutory scheme. The effect of this will be to 
develop the law beyond the assessment of a case-by-case 
analysis, laden with the inherent prejudices of the 
decision maker.
6.1.12. Civil rights not dependent on competence
Certain civil rights offer protection against State
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interference, such as the right not to be deprived of 
liberty. The benefit of these rights is not dependent on 
the competence of the rights holder. These rights have 
been formulated from the perspective of adults. There is 
a need to reformulate these rights in order to ensure the 
protection and vindication of the rights of children.
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